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This study examines the experience of Palestinian and Israeli youth involved in a 
coexistence organization Kids4Peace Jerusalem. This qualitative research investigates the 
questions: 1) What is the interaction between collective identity and experience in K4P? 
2) In what ways do young people benefit or fail to benefit from Kids4Peace? 3) How do
the larger power structures and power asymmetries impact youth perceptions of their 
experience in Kids4Peace? 
The research explores the way in which collective identities of participants of 
Kids4Peace interact with individuals’ experiences to produce group-specific results in 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Researcher’s Statement of Interest 
Two primary principles guiding this study are honesty and authenticity -- to the 
researcher (myself), to the research subjects, and to the context in which the research arose.  With 
these principles in mind, I present my own background and interest as a researcher and individual 
to enhance an understanding of the motivations and mindset behind the research.  None among us 
perceive the world without bias.  Each is susceptible to the lenses through which they experience 
the world, shaped by individualized experience and collective socialization.  Most of us arrive at 
the scene with preconceived notions and ideas about what is true and what is right.  My journey 
to this research began with an exploration and questioning of the narratives passed down to me 
and of the preconceived notions contained within my own moral code.  
My Jewish American roots are particularly important in the context in which I collected 
my research – in Palestine/Israel.  In this land, I hold a privilege much like that which I hold in 
my own country -- with my white skin and upper middle-class upbringing.  In the state of Israel, 
however, this privilege is explicitly named and presented at every turn.  It is not hidden 
in official code, but rather embraced in the public discourse of much of mainstream Jewish Israeli 
society. 
In order to maintain transparency and integrity, it is pertinent to explain my own 
positionality and relevant pieces of identity.  As a researcher in this field, I cannot ignore the 
position I hold, and the way in which that may impact my experience and findings.  I am a white 
Jewish-American woman raised in a majority white, Anglo-Saxon Chicago suburb.  Although I 
long ago traded a sense of religiosity for one of spirituality and cultural Judaism, I hold these 
roots and this Jewish identity much deeper than I once realized.  
I was raised in a Reform Jewish synagogue - a place I believed to incubate humanitarian 
values and compassion for those suffering around in the world.  I lived by these values to the best 
of my ability and felt a sense of belonging to a community so strongly tied to ideals of universal 
love and compassion.  My Sunday school teachers inculcated their students with a profound 
reverence for the land of Israel.  We studied Israeli geography and culture.  We danced to Israeli 
music and fried falafel.  As we grew older, we gradually learned more about the politics of 
Israel/Palestine and about the conflict.  
I vividly recollect the first time I learned about the conflict and the existence of the 
Palestinians.  Our teachers taught us that there was another group of people living in what we 
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called Israel and that a “religious war” waged between the two populations.  With this 
information, I felt confused and disturbed.  I intuitively felt that a major part of the story was 
omitted.  I asked myself, how could two peoples fight violently over something deemed so holy? 
What was the true nature of the conflict?  How could two groups of people live side-by-side 
divided by a barrier?  And most importantly, who is in the right?  These were questions that 
plagued my conscience for years to come. 
These questions led me to study Arabic, Islam, and the Middle East at the University of 
Madison-Wisconsin.  I believed these academic pursuits would fill in the gaps missing in my 
education about Israel/Palestine and provide me with a different perspective on the conflict and 
Middle Eastern politics.  I dedicated much of my undergraduate experience to the exploration of 
this conflict and to understanding the experience of Palestinians.  I spent a semester at American 
University studying Peace and Conflict Resolution, through which I also spent three weeks in the 
Balkans studying post-conflict reconciliation first-hand.  This led me to dream of doing similar 
work with Palestinians and Israelis. 
As I gained a deeper knowledge about the conflict – the relevant structural and 
international factors at play -- and immersed myself in an activist community committed to 
supporting Palestinian rights, I became increasingly weary of some of the methods of modern-day 
peacebuilding.  I heard criticisms of coexistence organizations that support the occupation and do 
not address structural change.  Although I was still attracted to the idea of coexistence and 
dialogue, I wondered how the work could be done in a deeply transformative way.  In 2017, I 
took a leap of faith and made the decision to take an internship at Kids4Peace.  I hoped to learn 
first-hand how an organization like this works, and after years of study, to finally witness the 
reality on the ground.  More importantly, I set out to discover how youth-centered coexistence 
work impacts the youth involved. 
Although I began collecting the data I used in my research as an evaluation of the 
aforementioned impact of the program, I quickly discovered something much more interesting.  
The meaning that youth make of their experiences in this organization, how the unique intersections 
of personal identity and group affiliation interact with these experiences and contribute to this 
meaning-making process had a profound effect on me.  The power dynamics created by an 
asymmetrical conflict show up in the youth’s experiences.  It became evident that impact is non-
linear, and that the youth and this organization exist as an interaction – affecting one another in a 
reciprocal relationship.   
My research is centered around Kids4Peace Jerusalem, a youth-centered peacebuilding 
organization based in Jerusalem.  Kids4Peace primarily integrates Jewish, Muslim, and Christian 
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Jerusalemite youth and their families in a self-proclaimed pro-peace community that promotes 
harmony and coexistence.  In this city, holy to the world’s three major monotheistic religions, 
Jewish Israelis live alongside Christian and Muslim Palestinians, largely segregated between what 
is now known as West and East Jerusalem.  The background of this conflict is briefly be 
discussed in sections 1.7, and the ways in which Jerusalem’s segregation continues to impact 
youth and their communities will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter II, section 2.7. 
 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
 
The conflict in Israel/Palestine has been referred to by many, as an intractable 
ethnonational conflict like those in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka.  Academics in the field of 
Social Psychology, Nadim Rouhana and Daniel Bar-Tal define intractable conflict as a conflict 
characterized by existential totality, meaning its reach spans more broadly to cultural, political, 
and social life on the ground (1998).  This type of conflict concerns existential and basic needs 
such as recognition and security, both of which are critical for the survival and existence of the 
ethnonational groups in question.  At its core, intractable conflict is protracted, central, violent, 
and involves a wide perception of irreconcilability among local and international actors (Rouhana 
& Bar-Tal, 1998).1  
In prolonged ethnic conflict, there is often competition between whose memory will be 
preserved and accepted locally and internationally.  Rivalling national narratives compete for the 
hearts and minds of the region’s youth.  The version of history students receive in their most 
formative years significantly influences the future of a conflict.  Therefore, the education system 
is an important agent of national memory through which narratives are kept alive, altered, or 
erased.  
The beliefs and attitudes of the youth formed through their formal and informal education 
may determine whether the conflict remains intractable or whether it is transformed as the next 
generations take control of the national political agenda.  The formative years of youth are a 
critical time in which socialization may either deeply embed values of social justice and equality 
or reinforce stories of trauma and separation through tribalism.  For this reason, the intervention 
of integrated youth-centered peace programs may be instrumental in transforming the 
consciousness of youth in this conflict toward a social justice-oriented future.  However, it is 
 
1 It is notable to mention that the situation in Israel/Palestine is not universally understood to be simply an 
intractable, ethnonational conflict in the classic sense.  Defining the struggle in this region is contentious 
and will be discussed again in Chapter IV. 
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necessary to take a deep and critical look into these programs to understand their impact, 
minimize potential harm, and more intentionally design future programming. 
Kids4Peace is a nonpartisan, nonsectarian non-profit organization that facilitates contact 
and dialogue between the Israeli and Palestinian youth and their families. The mission states a 
commitment to rejecting violence in all its forms, to challenging an unjust and unsustainable 
status quo, and to working together for long-term solutions.  This study on Kids4Peace was 
originally designed to examine the effectiveness of the programs on multiple dimensions.  I 
aspired to enrich the Kids4Peace evaluation process with in-depth interviews with the YAP 
(Youth in Action Program) participants.  After moving through each phase of the program, I 
understood the wisdom of these young people to be invaluable to the organization. 
The entry and exit surveys designed for an annual report to USAID (the primary funder 
of the organization) ask questions such as, “what is the relationship between participation in the 
Kids4Peace programming and tolerance for ‘the other’ for Palestinian and Israeli youth?”  
Although these questions provide quantifiable data with which the organization can justify its 
funding in a neutral inoffensive manner, I felt that there were other critical ways to understand the 
net impact of this program.  I looked at the sources of criticism of coexistence program such as 
Kids4Peace.  Although each program is unique, major complaints relate to either the unjustifiable 
re-traumatization of participants or point to the fact that the organizations are set up not to change 
the systems in place, but to maintain the political and social status quo.  This paper will discuss 
the latter criticism in Chapter V.  
While listening to the stories and responses of the young people involved in Kids4Peace, 
I noticed a variety of perspectives on the purpose and goals of the organization, what it means to 
be in Kids4Peace, and even on the definition of peace itself.  I dug deeper into the evaluation 
interviews to explore issues surrounding identity, power, and privilege and the ways in which 
these elements do and do not impact the experience in Kids4Peace.  This exploration led me to 
the research questions proposed in the following section. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
I accepted the internship position at Kids4Peace with an open mind, attempting to leave 
my preconceived notions about peace work at the door.  However, throughout my time there, I 
continued to wonder about the way in which this work affects the psyches of the individuals in 
unanticipated ways.  The factor I found most pertinent was the role of the collective identities of 
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the individuals – their group belonging and the relative copower and resources that comes with it 
– in shaping the experiences gained within the organization. 
My observations of the Kids4Peace program and my role as Evaluation and Monitoring 
intern led to me to the following questions: 1) What is the interaction between collective identity 
and experience in K4P?  2) In what ways do young people benefit or fail to benefit from 
Kids4Peace?  3) How do the larger power structures and power asymmetries impact youth 
perceptions of their experience in Kids4Peace?   
The study explores the way in which collective identities of participants of Kids4Peace 
interact with individuals’ experiences to produce group-specific results.  These results vary in 
terms of goals, ways of processing identity, and output from dialogue.  The findings of this study 
also explore a difference in perceptions of the conflict, power, and the meaning of peace.  
Through the lens of this dynamic, I examine youth perspectives on the meaning of their identities 
and responses to opposition around participation in the organization, in the context of the 
Kids4Peace experience.  
 
1.4 Historical Background and Context of the Study 
 
The highly contentious piece of land claimed by both Palestinians and Israelis represents 
existential stakes for the fate of these two peoples.  The issue tears at the very core of the 
identities of both populations involved while simultaneously shaping the content and nature of 
these identities.  
 
A Brief History of War, Conflict, and Occupation 
 
The conflict between Israeli Jews and Palestinians emerged with the appearance of 
Zionism, a Jewish nationalist movement to establish a Jewish state.  This movement motivated an 
influx of Jewish immigration to Palestine and a clash between indigenous Palestinians and the 
new immigrants.  Although Jewish immigrants, many of whom had fled persecution in 
neighboring states and in Europe, desired the land of Palestine as the new Jewish state, Arabs 
living in the land of Palestine aimed for the creation of a Palestinian state.2  The two peoples, via 
 
2 Some Jews already lived in the land of Palestine prior to immigration.  These Jews were Arab, just like 
the Christians and Muslims living on the land.  They shared many cultural customs local to the area, unlike 
new immigrants from Europe. 
6 
these nationalist movements, vied for self-actualization and a nation of their own on the 
historically and religiously significant land (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). 
Muslims, Christians, and Jews all lived under Ottoman rule from 1516 to 1918 in the 
region that came to be called Palestine and later-on, Israel and Palestine.  Under Ottoman rule, 
Jews and Christians were treated as second-class citizens and were discriminated against with 
special regulations.  However, the conditions for Jews in Palestine improved in the 1840s and 
1850s, and persecuted Jews from Europe began immigrating to the land in increasingly large 
numbers.  With the rise of nationalist sentiments throughout Europe and the Middle East, both the 
Palestinians and Jews began vying for their own nation state on the land.  The movements that 
carried these aims were Zionism and Arab nationalism.  Both movements had humble religious 
and cultural beginnings but grew into political movements in the nineteenth century (Bickerton & 
Klausner, 2002). 
The British government, hoping to build Jewish support for British ends in the Middle 
East in exchange for their protection, issued the Balfour Declaration in 1917.  This declaration 
promised the land of Palestine to the Jewish people for a state of their own.  However, from 1915 
to 1916, the British high commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon corresponded with Sherif 
Hussein of Mecca, one of the region’s most powerful Arab leaders.  The two leaders discussed 
British support for an independent Arab Caliphate under Hussein that would include the land of 
Palestine.  At the same time, the British held secret meetings with their allied European powers.  
These meetings led to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which divided the Levant and Iraq region 
between British and French control (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002).  Ultimately, the Balfour 
Declaration was the only agreement that became actualized. 
The British Mandate of Palestine lasted between 1920 and 1948.  During this time, 
British on the ground maintained tight control over the local people.  Intergroup fighting between 
Jews and Arabs increased, and the British began limiting immigration to Palestine.  Jews and 
Arabs formed militias as a form of resistance against British rule (Bickerton & Klauser, 2002).  
In 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted to partition Palestine into two 
states: an Arab state (Palestine) and a Jewish state (Israel).  This plan proposed a shared and 
autonomous Jerusalem under international supervision.  The Zionists accepted this plan, but Arab 
leaders from neighboring countries rejected it as unsatisfactory.  In place of accepting the 
partition plan, Israelis and Palestinian and Arab forces fought the 1948 war over the land 
(Bickerton & Klausner, 2002).  
The 1948 war led to the creation of an independent Jewish state.  This war is referred to 
as the War of Independence by Jewish Israelis and as al-Nakba (“the catastrophe”) by the 
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Palestinians, for whom this war represented displacement and devastating loss of livelihood, 
home, cohesion, and identity.  This event caused the creation of over 700,000 Palestinian refugees 
(Bickerton & Klausner, 2002).  As of January 2017, there were 5,340,443 Palestinian refugees 
registered through UNRWA, with the projected number of total refugees nearing seven million.3  
Through the 1948 war, the land under dispute was divided between Israeli and Jordanian rule.  
Israel gained one third of the land and the West Bank and Jerusalem came under Jordanian 
control.  Meanwhile, the Gaza Strip fell under Egyptian control (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002). 
In 1967, Israel went to war with its Arab neighboring states: Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and 
Palestinian guerrilla groups.  Israel won the war and took control over East Jerusalem (including 
the highly coveted Old City), the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights4.  Thus began 
Israel’s military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, which led to the creation and expansion 
of Jewish settlements in these territories in the years to follow (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002).5   
In November of 1967, The United Nations Security Council put forth Resolution 242 to 
broker a peace deal between the Israelis and Palestinians.  This resolution advocated for mutual 
recognition, withdrawal of Israeli troops from Palestinian territories, and a “just” settlement to the 
refugee problem (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002).  This document, however, exhibited ambiguous 
language that left room for problematic interpretation.  Land in the West Bank continued to be 
confiscated for settlements and the vicious cycles of violence between the two people continued 
(Baxter, 2018, Jan. 30). 
Attempts at peace talks proliferated in the 1970’s and 80’s with no sustainable success.  
However, September of 1978 brought the monumental Camp David Peace accords, signed by 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israel’s Prime Minister Menachim Begin and mediated by 
United States President Jimmy Carter.  The Camp David negotiations normalized relations 
between Israel and Egypt and led to a few major decisions over how to allocate and govern 
Palestinian and Israeli land.  “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East,” the first agreement 
made at Camp David, delineated provisions that set the foundation for all proceeding peace talks.  
 
3 About one-third of these registered refugees live in refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza 
Strip, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem (UNRWA, 2017).   
 
4 As a result of this war, Egypt took over the Sinai Peninsula.  The Sinai remains part of Egypt today.  
 
5 The expansion of illegal settlements is one of the largest issues in Israeli-Palestinian conflict politics to 
date.  These expanding settlements continue to push Palestinians out of their land and exacerbate key areas 
of tension (i.e. the Hebron Hills) where Palestinian villages and Israeli settlements clash up against one 
another.  These expanding settlements also create “facts on the ground,” which will make a Palestinian 
independent state with all of the land outside of the Green Line increasingly unlikely.  Settlements are a 
“final status issue” in the peace negotiations between the two peoples.  
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The signers agreed to future negotiations between Jordan, Egypt, Israel, and “representatives of 
the Palestinian people” to resolve the issue of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Through these 
provisions, the decision was made to set up a self-governing Arab authority to take the place of 
Israeli military forces for five years while negotiations on “final status of the West Bank and 
Gaza” ensued.  The second accord, “A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between 
Egypt and Israel,” approved an Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai over a three-year period and a 
return of the land to Egypt.  The agreement granted Israeli ships free passage through the Suez 
Canal (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002).6 
The first Intifada (‘shaking off’) in 1987 was an extended uprising against the Israeli 
occupation that lasted until 1993.  There was a major increase in both Palestinian and settler 
violence during this time and a rise in militant Islamic groups such as Hamas.  The Israeli 
authorities responded with more suppression of the Palestinian people, heightening observation 
and restrictions on their freedoms with road blocks, check points, arrests, random tear gassing, 
and other extreme methods.  The second Intifada in 2000 involved more violent tactics than the 
first, leading to more violence and suppression (Baxter, 2018, Jan.30). 
  Finally, in the 1990’s Oslo Accords, Yassar Arafat and Yizhak Rabin agree to mutual 
recognition and come to the table for bilateral negotiations with Palestinians representing 
themselves for the first time.  Again, the documents produced failed expectations and left key 
final issues to be discussed (Baxter, 2018, Jan. 30).  Ongoing periods of attempted peace talks and 
cycles of violence proceeded the first attempts at negotiations.  Today, the history of this conflict 
profoundly shapes life in Israel-Palestine, and Jerusalem in particular.  The conflict can be seen in 
the landscape of this contested city, in the culture of both Israelis and Palestinians, and in the 
politics and social structures of the nation. 
 
Jerusalem 
 
The contestation over Jerusalem and its holy sites is one of the most volatile hot spots of 
the conflict.  Both Israelis and Palestinians claim the city as their capital, and it is home to some 
of the most sacred sites of each of the three major monotheistic religions: Islam, Christianity, and 
Judaism.  The history of this city and of this conflict forms a hotbed of tension and mistrust 
between the Israeli and Palestinian populations. 
 
6 Issues of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights were set aside during these negotiations.  
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Jerusalem has passed through the hands of numerous rulers over the centuries.7  In its 
most recent history, the city was ruled by the Ottoman Empire between 1516 and 1917, before the 
British Mandate took over the city post-World War II.  The War of 1948, which created the state 
of Israeli, then divided the city between Jordanian rule over East Jerusalem and Israeli control of 
West Jerusalem (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002).  During the 1967 War between Israel and 
surrounding Arab nations, East Jerusalem -- primarily populated by Palestinians -- came under 
Israeli occupation and has remained so ever since (Albin, 1997). 
The most major recent conflict over Jerusalem’s holy sites involves the Muslim al-Aqsa 
mosque compound (also known as Haram-as-Sherif, “the Noble Sanctuary”), which is said to be 
built over a Jewish holy site, the Temple Mount.  Haram as-Sherif, located in Jerusalem’s Old 
City, is home to both the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque.  The Dome of the Rock is a 
Muslim shrine, built over a stone sacred to both Muslims and Jews.  Muslims know this stone as 
the site where Prophet Mohammed rose to heaven on a winged horse during what is known as the 
“Miraculous Night Journey.”  For Jews, this stone is believed to be the place where God created 
Adam from dust and where Abraham prepared to sacrifice his son Isaac (Hammer, 2011).8  
Conflict surrounds excavation done underneath these holy sites and speculation around 
found artifacts.  Arguably more controversial is the question of who should serve as the authority 
of the Temple Mount (Hammer, 2011).9  This struggle over ownership of and authority over the 
Temple Mount reflects larger issues over which people should have Jerusalem as their capital and 
more generally, which collective identity group has a more legitimate right to the land.  Issues 
over the Temple Mount are so heated that a September 2000 visit by Ariel Sharon (an Israeli 
politician who served as Prime Minister from 2001 to 2006), during which he made a speech 
stating that Israel would never give up Temple Mount, instigated the second intifada uprising.  
 
7 Jerusalem’s Temple Mount served as a “territorial prize” for centuries.  This compound of sacred sites 
passed through the hands of an extensive line of peoples, including the Jebusites, Israelites, Babylonians, 
Greeks, Persians, Romans, Byzantines, early Muslims, Crusaders, Mamluks, Ottomans, and the British 
(Hammer, 2011). 
 
8 Important to Jewish tradition, this is also where the First Temple was built by King Solomon circa 1000 
B.C. and then torn down by the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar 400 years later, when he sent the Jews 
into exile.  King Herod was said to have built a Second Temple with the labor of the Jews who returned 
from banishment.  These two temples are central and sacred to Jewish mythology.  The Western Wall, the 
holiest Jewish site in Jerusalem, is a remnant of this Second Temple (Hammer, 2011). 
 
9 The Waqf, the Islamic council that has authority over the compound, excavated an emergency exit to the 
tunnels underneath the compound (originally known as Solomon’s Stables, but later converted into al-
Marwani Mosque).  However, Israeli authorities accused the Waqf of overstepping their permission to 
build an exit by bulldozing an extensive amount of land to build a large entranceway.  They were 
concerned that Jewish artifacts were destroyed in the dig (Hammer, 2011). 
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This uprising, mentioned in the previous section, involved a period of intensified violence 
between Israelis and Palestinians (Bickerton & Klaus, 2002).10  Violent conflict continues to 
occur around the Temple Mount.  
Conflict in the Palestinian neighborhood in East Jerusalem, Issawiya, has been a recent 
source of increased antagonism between Israeli and Palestinian communities in Jerusalem 
Beginning in June of 2019, Palestinians living in Issawiya experience excessive police brutality 
and daily raids by Israeli soldiers (Deprez, 2019).  Police have used physical force against 
students who they claim hurled rocks at them.  Some, like the principal of Issawiya’s junior high, 
assert that some of these accusations against students are false and that evidence has been planted 
on Palestinian youth in the neighborhood (Rasgon, 2020).  Clashes continue regularly, each side 
accusing the other of instigation.  
International involvement in Jerusalem’s politics is yet another source of controversy.  
Although in 1980, Israel’s parliament, the Knesset claimed a reunited Jerusalem as its capital.  Up 
until December 2017, the United States and the rest of the international community had not 
recognized this to be so.  All embassies have remained in Tel Aviv until this point, maintaining 
their position that it is Israeli’s capital city.  On December 6, 2017, President Donald Trump 
made a statement officially recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.  To signal this position, the 
American embassy was relocated from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem on May 14, 2018, thus exacerbating 
tensions between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem.  
 
1.5 Kids4Peace Jerusalem 
 
Kids4Peace was founded in the summer of 2002 by a band of Jerusalemite parents 
representing the three major faiths of Jerusalem – Jewish, Christian, and Muslim – who 
envisioned a better future for their children. The parents hoped for a different reality for these 
youth than the one they experienced after the breakdown of belief in the Oslo Accords and 
subsequent violence.  The program officially came to life when an interfaith group of Jerusalem 
youth (the children of these pro-peace parents) traveled to Houston, Texas for a two-week 
summer camp (Our Story, n.d.).11 
 
10 The Second Intifada, also known as the al-Aqsa Intifada, was a Palestinian uprising against Israeli 
occupation that lasted from September 2000 to 2005.  This was a period of intensified violence between 
Israelis and Palestinians that followed the failure of the 2000 Camp David Accords to reach an acceptable 
and lasting agreement between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators (Bickerton & Klaus, 2002).  
 
11 This endeavor was financially supported by a group of Episcopalians from the United States (Our Story, 
n.d.). 
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From 2005 to 2008, Kids4Peace existed as a community which gathered only for short 
summer camps, in which youth were able to learn about one another in a safe, respectful space.  
They shared their religious practices and beliefs and dialogued about similarities and differences 
between them.  The youth were supplied a fun environment aimed at releasing the stressors of the 
outside world and allowing the youth to connect as youth – playing sports, swimming in the lake, 
creating art, and hiking in nature (Our Story, n.d.).  
What started as twelve original families coalescing annually, grew into a program 
reaching nearly seventy youth each year by 2007.  This group of dedicated families opened an 
office in Jerusalem with the support of the U.S. Consulate General.  This office allowed the 
organization to grow into a larger year-round program.  This program operated on the six-year 
model, supporting year-round dialogue, leadership training, community outreach, and activism.  
Currently in 2019, Kids4Peace involves over 350 youth, 150 parents, and a network of over 2,000 
alumni of the program (Our Story, n.d.). 
Kids4Peace programs in Jerusalem allow participants to progress through stages from a 
basic curriculum that provides a space for kids from all sides of the conflict to get to know each 
other to an action-based curriculum in which the older youth create projects together and 
advocate for change in Jerusalem.  Each level of the program holds twelve meetings per year and 
peace camps over the summer, designed and facilitated by Kids4Peace to simulate an egalitarian 
and secure environment to the best of the ability of their directors and staff. This program acts to 
minimize the moderating factors that trigger intolerance. Although these factors will still exist 
after the participants return home, the hope is that the contact among youth in this environment 
will open the doors for a lasting tolerance and ultimately social and political change. 
Youth participants enter the Pathways to Peace program in sixth and seventh grade.  This 
stage of the program aims to promote friendships and allow participants to get to know about one 
another’s religion and culture.  In eighth grade, the youth discuss issues of identity and expand 
their knowledge of conflicts around the world.12  In high school, youth join the Youth in Action 
Program (YAP).  In YAP, participants begin to engage in political discussions and dialogue about 
 
12 Salomon and Kupermintz found that discussing the issues of a distant conflict can influence participants' 
perspectives on the conflict within their own lives.  These scholars mention a program in which Israeli-
Jewish students studied the Northern Ireland conflict without discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
After the program, students were asked to write an essay explaining the conflict from both the Jewish and 
Palestinian point of view. Jewish participants of the program were able to write well-balanced essays from 
the Palestinian perspective, whereas nonparticipants were barely able to write anything at all. They were 
unable to view the conflict from the Palestinian side. This research shows that discussing a remote conflict 
rather than the one in the participants' lives may actually be a more effective means of harmonizing 
narratives (Bernstein & Yusuf, 2015). 
12 
the conflict, focusing on social and political issues in Jerusalem.  This program is divided into 
tracks such as tour guiding, Model UN (United Nations), social media, and advocacy.  In this 
final action-oriented phase, the youth continue to cultivate their public speaking skills and co-
create projects whose goals is to influence their environment.  
Kids4Peace Jerusalem holds seminars and trips abroad for Israeli and Palestinian youth 
participants.  As an intern of Kids4Peace in 2017, I attended and supervised a seminar held in 
Jaffa with YAP participants.  During this seminar, students learned about the history of Jaffa, 
engaged in political and identity-based discussions and activities, and sat in dialogue with one 
another.  Kids4Peace Jerusalem often sends students abroad on speaking tours, to camps, or to 
special international programs.  For instance, in 2018, a delegation of high school students from 
the K4P attended a two week-long trip to Northern Ireland to study the conflict there.  In addition 
to youth programs, Kids4Peace Jerusalem hosts a parents’ program in order to provide them a 
safe space to discuss the program, the community, and how best to support their kids through the 
Kids4peace experience. The organization additionally hosts larger interfaith community events. 
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Definitions: Identity and Relevant Theory 
 
The concept of identity, although elusively complex, is evermore salient and critical in a 
context such as the one studied in this paper -  in an ethnic intergroup conflict in which two 
groups of people fight for legitimization and recognition of their group’s identity and for the right 
to their group’s own distinct nation based on that identity (Khalidi, 1997; Hammack, 2011). This 
section will define and delineate the difference between individual identity and collective 
identity, as well as explain the social-psychology theories that attempt to explain intergroup 
conflict and provide a basis for people-to-people conflict intervention.  
 
Individual Identity 
 
According to Philip Hammack,13 “identity is a process rather than a product of human 
development” (2011) and is defined as an ideology that becomes known through an individual’s 
engagement with one or more discourses, made manifest in a personal narrative constructed and 
reconstructed across the individual’s life course.  This narrative is written in and through the 
individual’s social interactions and social practice (Hammack, 2011).  In this way, individual 
identity is perpetually intertwined with social identity and in turn, with collective identity as is 
defined in the following section.   
 
Collective Identity  
 
Collective identity refers to an individual’s sense of belonging to a group, solidarity with this 
group, ability to differentiate from other groups, and a worldview informed by the history, values, 
and norms of the group.  The collective identity of an individual fulfills basic psychological 
needs, such as belongingness, solidarity, meaning, and self-esteem (Aboud-Halabi & Shamai, 
 
13 I borrow definitions and models from Phillip Hammack, scholar in the field of social psychology, due to 
his extensive and relevant research in the field of dialogue-based peace education programs.  Hammack 
both worked for and researched youth-centered coexistence organizations Hands of Peace and Seeds of 
Peace.  His research relies on ethnographic and narrative methods with a longitudinal study design 
(Hammack, 2018).  Hammack’s insights, methods and coined concepts, in part, inspired my own research 
on Kids4Peace. 
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2016).  Collective identity is influenced by intra-group elements, the group’s relations with 
adversary groups, and the social context in which the groups is situated (Kriesberg, 2003).  
In terms of ethnonational groups, collective identity is a fluid and complex construct that 
responds to an ever-flowing interaction with external forces (Rouhana, 1997; Trujillo, 2008).  
Rouhana’s model of collective identity describes a malleable structure constantly in flux in 
response to external stimuli.  This structure consists of psychological attachments, preferences, 
and proclivities shared among group members, as well as social and cultural values and traditions, 
historical collective experiences and national heritage, and shared political views and goals 
(Rouhana, 1997).   
Mary Trujillo points to three major forces which play upon the structure of collective 
identity among Arabs in Israel.  One of these forces is a composite of the social and political - 
forces that emerge directly from the state and its institutions.  Additionally, changes and 
evolutions within the group (i.e. families, subcultures, and influential individuals) (Hughes et al., 
2006; Jennings et al., 2009) act as external forces upon the collective identity.  Lastly, 
fluctuations and major changes in the regional and international field play a powerful role in 
shaping collective identity (Trujillo, 2008).  This means that, although grounded in the systems 
and institutions of the state, this elusive structure is perpetually evolving with the times and in 
synergy with actors within and outside of the state.  
In many collectivist cultures, it is difficult if not impossible to separate individual identity 
from its deeply rooted place in the collective.  Hammack suggests that, “There is no 
‘consciousness’ apart from social consciousness” (2011).  In Jerusalem, and Israel/Palestine at 
large, it is even more difficult to speak about individual identity separately from collective 
identity, as these concepts are deeply intertwined due to the collectivist culture and circumstances 
of intergroup ethnonational conflict.  In ethnonational conflict, collective identity is a critical part 
of individual identity due to the existential insecurity or perceptions of insecurity of the groups 
involved.  The salience of collective identity becomes heightened when the group in question is 
under a physical or existential threat.  Collective identity is a powerful tool in unifying and 
mobilizing individual members of a group.  Symbols, heroes, and myths are invoked in 
intergroup conflict to evoke a strong sense of belonging and struggle for the group’s goals 
(Rouhana, 1997). 
The collective aspect of identity is particularly salient in collectivist cultures, societies in 
which the lives, motivations, and identities of individuals are strongly interconnected with the 
community in which they exist.  Families and communities are tight-knit and heavily 
incorporated into the individual’s goals and decisions.  Palestinian society, along with other Arab 
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cultures, are known to rank extremely high in collectivism (Hostede, 1991).  Israeli society ranks 
lower in this dimension (it falls nearly in the middle of the scale between individualism and 
collectivism).  However, Israeli society certainly holds more collectivist values and customs than 
mainstream society in the United States and Western European nations (Hofstede, 1991).   
Palestinian society reflects a collectivist worldview – a “we-identity” rather than an 
individualistic personal identity (Augsburger, 1992).  Palestinians value strong family 
connections and an interconnected society over individual goals (Zaharna, Hammad, & Masri, 
2009).  This is reflected not only in the way Palestinians deal with conflict, but in the way in 
which Israelis approach conflict with Palestinians.  Collective punishment, for example, is a 
strategy most effective in collectivist cultures.  In a collectivist culture, fear of an assault on one’s 
family and community is in theory more of a deterrent than fear of individual punishment. 
 
Social Identity Theory 
 
In understanding collective identity, it is helpful to understand social identity theory 
(SIT), developed by Henri Tajfel, which been instrumental in shaping theory of group processes 
and intergroup relations since its emergence in the 1970s.  This in turn has influenced the way in 
which those in the field of conflict transformation have designed intergroup contact interventions 
(Hornsey, 2008).  
The term “social identity” refers to the identification, definitions, and evaluations of a 
person in terms of the characteristics attributed to the groups to which that person affiliates.  SIT 
describes how an individual’s self-concept is deeply associated with group membership and 
related to group and intergroup behavior (Hornsey, 2008). The processes surrounding social 
identities are at the core of understanding intractable ethnic conflict like that in Israel-Palestine, 
and Social Identity Theory is particularly relevant in examining why the source of control over 
group narratives is so contentious and impactful. 
SIT asserts that social identities are tied to the functional explanation that all human 
beings hold a basic underlying need to maintain a positive self-worth or self-concept. Social 
identity processes are motivated by an attempt to fulfill this need with group membership (which 
involves meeting other basic human needs such as belonging, recognition, and security). 
Additionally, uncertainty reduction theory provides that humans desire a reduction of uncertainty 
about their social world, status, and expectations for behavior. Social identity reduces this 
uncertainty with the security of affiliation and through the development of prescriptive and 
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descriptive prototypes that define appropriate behavior for group members (Hogg & Abrams, 
1988). 
The process of making “us” and “them” distinctions salient drives people to enhance 
perceptions of similarities among members of their in-group and amplify perceived differences 
between themselves and the out-group.  These distinctions lead to intergroup biases in behaviors, 
attributions, stereotypes, and memories that are part of a perpetual process that aims to achieve, 
maintain, and protect a positive self-concept.  The self-concept is made of a person’s social 
categories and the emotional and evaluative consequences of group membership.  Therefore, SIT 
explains the intergroup competition via narrative described below as it relates to securing a 
positive and secure self-concept (Hornsey, 2008). 
SIT says that individuals define their selves through their relationships to and interactions 
with others as well as their social groups (Hornsey, 2008).  The theory provides insights into the 
relationship between group identity and the self with explanation for why group identity is 
psychologically necessary to the wellbeing of the individual (Rouhana, 2011).   
The tribal behaviors that arise from “us” and “them” (in-group and out-group) 
distinctions calls for a process which would allow members of a group to deconstruct biased 
beliefs about members of the out-group.  For this reason, SIT has led to the development of 
Contact Theory, mentioned in section 2.6.   
2.2 Identity and Citizenship in Jerusalem 
Palestinian Citizens of Israel 
The Palestinian Israeli collective identity group includes all Palestinians living inside 
what is known as the Green Line, the armistice line drawn between Israel and Jordan after the 
1948 war.  This group consists of Muslims, Christians (Armenian and Arab), Bedouins, and 
Druze (Berger, 2019).  Although diverse in experience, the collective identity of these 
Palestinians in Israel is colored by their unique position as Israeli citizens embedded, in some 
ways to varying degrees, in Israeli society.  This citizenship shapes, in part, attitudes in education, 
society, politics, and institutions (Berger, 2019).  
As mention in Chapter I, the terminology used to describe this identity group is under 
negotiation between the state institutions, mainstream Israeli society, and Palestinian citizens of 
Israel who aim to take back the strength of their Palestinian identity.  The choice of which label to 
use can be problematic.  It is contested both within and outside of the group’s membership.  Some 
Arab citizens of Israel refer to themselves as Israeli.  Some refer to themselves as Palestinian.  
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Some offer different labels depending on their audience.  Other terms used include Palestinians 
inside Israel, ’48 Arabs, Palestinian Arabs, Palestinian Israelis, Arab-Israelis, and Israeli-Arabs 
(Berger, 2019).  This is the struggle – to become active in the collective Palestinian struggle for 
self-determination on one end of the spectrum or to optimize their opportunities in the Israeli state 
by playing the “good Arab” on the other.  
In theory, this group is to have the same rights as Jewish Israelis, but in practice, they 
have long faced institutional and social discrimination.  Approximately half of the population 
lives below the poverty line, making them the group with the highest rate of poverty in Israel 
(Berger, 2019).14  This inequality is discussed further in the one of the following sections entitled 
“Inequality and Segregation.”  
This collective identity is full of complexities, contradictions, and negotiations.  Many 
Israeli Arab youth find themselves having to navigate two worlds – that of their Palestinian 
community and that of an Israeli society that includes a Jewish, Western hegemonic narrative and 
way of life.  This often leaves them in a state of paralysis – unsure of how to represent their 
community while also taking what opportunities may be available to them via Israeli society.  
The difficulties Palestinian Israelis face are represented in Hammack’s depiction of a 
scene from the Seeds of Peace camp in which participants were told to sing their national anthem.  
The Israeli anthem on the one hand, excludes the identities of the non-Jewish Palestinians 
(Hammack, 2011, pg. 85).  On the other hand, many Palestinian Israelis, or Israeli Arabs did not 
know the Palestinian national anthem, having been fractured from the Palestinian territories living 
in Israeli, where outward expressions of Palestinian identity are anywhere from strongly 
encouraged to violently suppressed. 
The dilemma experienced by many in this group involves a negotiation between the 
Palestinian national and cultural identity and a desire or need to be involved in the society in 
which they live – Israeli society.  An inner struggle arises when some Palestinians feel as if their 
involvement in Israeli society may undermine their alliance to the Palestinian community and its 
struggle for recognition and statehood.  There is a physical fragmentation of Palestinian society 
created by modern borders and security.  This creates a rift between Palestinians living in the 
West Bank, Gaza, and those living in Israeli territory.  Palestinians living in Jerusalem have a 
unique experience living in a city split into two segregated parts: East (Palestinian) and West 
(Jewish Israeli).   
 
14 Even the Druze, who have been historically more integrated into Israeli society than other Arab Israeli 
groups, are targeted by the new nation-state law described in the section below, Living in Inequality and 
Segregation (Berger, 2019). 
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Jerusalem has been the focus of much of the conflict, and the weight of the conflict is 
easily felt while moving about the city and from one side to the other.  Divisions run deep in a 
city of many cultures.  Despite segregation, many Palestinians living in Jerusalem must cross 
from East to West for work, shopping, and entertainment.  This illustrates the contradiction of 
living in Israel and participating in Israeli society, but not quite belonging.  Experiencing racism 
and discriminations, while watching their Palestinian brothers and sister experience violent 
aggression and restriction of basic human rights in Gaza and parts of the West Bank.  
Jerusalem Residents with a Blue ID 
Not all Palestinians living in Jerusalem are Israeli citizens.  Some live in the city with no 
citizenship, but rather hold a residency status represented by a blue identification card unlike the 
green ID held by Israeli citizens.  These residents may vote in municipality elections but are not 
granted the right to vote in national elections.  
Living as a resident in Jerusalem not only robs the individual of opportunities and equal 
rights, but this existence is precarious in many ways.  Residency status can be revoked if a 
Jerusalem resident leaves the city and country for an extended period of time.  The length of this 
period is not officially defined, so Israeli officials are essentially able to revoke this status at will 
(Shaham, 2018).  Having this precarious status as a resident rather than the security of citizenship 
to a nation, exacerbates a sense of insecurity and uncertainty for members of this group. 
Jewish Israelis 
Despite often being grouped together as one “side” when it comes to the conflict, Israeli 
Jews (or Jewish Israelis) are heterogenous in ethnicity, opinions, and religiosity.15  To understand 
the position of Jewish Israeli youth in Kids4Peace, it is necessary to avoid viewing Israeli Jewish 
culture as monolithic, without giving weight to the diversity of subcultures which color the 
nation’s sociopolitical character.16  
15 The terms Israeli Jews and Jewish Israelis are used interchangeably in Israeli culture, and I will use them 
as such. 
16 This argument recommends an examination of the individual, group, and institutional interests that play a 
role in Israeli negotiating culture in addition to national interests (Wittes, 2005).  This heterogeneity is seen 
most starkly in the dichotomy between the diplomatic subculture and the security subculture of Israeli 
negotiating.  Although the security-centered mentality has dominated throughout Israeli history, there a 
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Aside from the issue of the occupation and the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, 
there are deep internal divisions between Israeli Jews themselves.  Israelis Jews are deeply 
divided between left wing and the right wing, with some Israeli Jews falling in the middle.  
Among Jewish Israeli youth between the ages of 18-24, 69.9 percent identify as right-wing.  53.8 
percent of young Israelis voted for right-wing parties.  29.6 percent of young Jewish Israelis 
support a peace deal based on a two-state solution.  40.2 percent of young Jewish Israelis support 
the annexation of all of the West Bank (Maltz, 2020). 
One of the divisions creating upheaval in the social and political realms is the struggle 
between Jewish Orthodoxy and Secularism.  Although there exist strong Leftist currents in Israeli 
society, particularly in its early days, the Orthodox establishment has gained control over Israeli 
politics in recent years.  Young, secular, leftist Jews in Israel struggle against the state’s ultra-
Orthodox establishment and its power over the trajectory of the country.   
Another source of division among Jewish Israeli is ethnic.17  The Jewish population is 
composed of Mizrahi Jews – Arab Jews who have local ancestry or have immigrated from other 
places in the Middle East and North Africa, Ashkenazi Jews – those who immigrated from 
Central and Eastern Europe, Sephardic Jews – with ancestry from Spain and Portugal, and 
African Jewish immigrants – many arriving from North and East African (i.e. Ethiopia, Sudan, 
Morocco, etc.).  
Despite the aforementioned political divisions, nationalism remains a strong undercurrent 
in today’s Israeli culture.  Daily life involves nation-driven activities and security-inspired 
activities.  The manifestation of a security culture (further described in 2.3) is a defense 
establishment that calls for mandatory military service for Jews (Wittes, 2005).  Military service 
is a central aspect of Israeli life.  All Israeli Jews at the age of eighteen are required to serve in the 
military, although national service is also an option (Levush, 2019).18 
As discussed in the findings section (Chapter IV), the relationship between “Jewishness” 
and “Israeliness” is a complicated one and one without a consensus among Israeli Jews 
 
diplomatic counter-discourse emerged in Israeli negotiations during the 1990s (Wittes, 2005).  Ultimately, 
the security-focused rhetoric won out in more recent times in response to an escalation in violence between 
the Israelis and Palestinians in the last couple decades (Wittes, 2005). 
 
17 Marginalized populations of African refugees face segregation and racism in Israel, similar to racism 
faced by refugees and immigrants in the United States and Western Europe.  In 2018, Israel made moves to 
deport asylum seeking Jews from Eritrea and Sudan.  
 
18 Ultra-Orthodox Jews (Haredi) and Israeli Arabs are exempted from the draft.  
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themselves (Auron, 2012).  Although nationalist politics attempt to blur the lines between the 
Israeli identity and Jewish identity, many Israeli Jews develop their own process around 
discovering their beliefs about identity and coming to terms with their position on the land and in 
the conflict.   
Inequality and Segregation 
This section provides both an overview of inequalities between Israeli Jews and Muslim 
and Christian Palestinians – as well as the Druze minority – in Israel and a snapshot of 
inequalities and segregation specifically in Jerusalem.  
Israel is considered an ethnic democracy, which structurally privileges those who practice 
Judaism or are of Jewish descent.  Of this privileged class, Ashkenazi Jews from European 
countries are among those most privileged and powerful in Israeli society, relative to Mizrahi or 
Jews of African descent.  Israel’s controversial new Basic Law on Israel as the Nation-State of 
the Jewish People, dubbed more simply the “Nation-State Law”, passed on July 19, 2019, 
symbolizes the institutionalization of this inequality and racism.  The Nation-State Law serves to 
remind all who question the Zionist roots of the country that “the Land of Israel is the nation state 
of the Jewish People” and only the Jewish people.  The law reinforces the Jewish nature of all 
national symbols and proclaims Hebrew to be the one and only national language, downgrading 
Arabic to a lower “special status” (Lis, 2019).19  Although this was already common practice, this 
move harms efforts to boost the status of Arabic in Israel and to equalize opportunities for 
Palestinians by bringing it into the greater social and political sphere. 
The content and meaning behind this Nation-State law are nothing new to Israeli society.  
Living a Jewish life in Israeli is supported and subsidized by the government.  Non-Israeli Jews 
are included in this elite class and hold special privileges in Israel.  Jews from around the world 
(particularly from the United States and Europe) can become Israeli citizens by making ‘Aliyah’, 
which means “ascent”.  This is a fairly easy process, and the Israeli government actively recruits 
Jewish internationals to become citizens through programs such as Birthright, which provides 
free trips to Israel for Jews around the world.  The combination of these institutional elements 
leads to systemic racism and discrimination, which oppresses non-Jewish Arabs in Israeli society. 
19 The law also requires judges to regard the “Israel’s Jewish character”, not only individual rights and 
freedoms, in their decision-making process (Sommer, 2018).   
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Today the city of Jerusalem is largely divided into two physical land segments - the 
Israeli side (West Jerusalem) and the Palestinian side (East Jerusalem).  From 1948 to 1967, East 
Jerusalem was controlled by Jordan in conjunction with the territory now known as the West 
Bank.  The 1967 War led to Jerusalem falling under Israeli rule.  The gradual encroachment of 
illegal Israeli settlements onto Palestinian territory assigned under the Armistice Agreement has 
led to an increasingly narrow physical connection between East Jerusalem and the West Bank.  
The loss of this connecting strand of the land has become an urgent issue for Palestinians who 
hope for a unified Palestinian state with a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem.20  This loss of 
connection further fractures the Palestinian community, leaving Jerusalemite Palestinians more 
culturally isolated from Palestinians in the West Bank.  Additionally, Jewish settlements in East 
Jerusalem,21 the demolition of businesses and homes, and surveillance of Palestinians in East 
Jerusalemvictimize Jerusalemite Palestinians and reinforce the narrative of struggle against the 
occupation (Handel, 2011). 
Israelis and Palestinians share the collective experience of existential insecurity but 
occupy distinct roles in the conflict.  Jewish Israelis represent the occupying society of 
Palestinians in the occupied territories and the majority relative to the Palestinian minority living 
in Israel.  Palestinian participants in this study (including both Palestinian citizens of Israel and 
residents of Jerusalem without Israeli citizenship) will be derived entirely from the latter group 
living in Israeli territory in Jerusalem.  These Palestinians face discrimination and subordination 
within an ethnically and religiously defined Jewish state (Hammack, 2008).  
Palestinians in the occupied territories have remain stateless inhabitants of territory subject to 
military occupation for over forty-five years.  According to Giacaman, the social and 
psychological development of this group is characterized by collective frustration, humiliation 
and loss (Giacaman, et al., 2007).  Although Jerusalemite Palestinians do not face some of the 
same challenges of their collective group members in the West Bank and Gaza, this struggle is 
contained in the content of the larger Palestinian collective identity through its master narrative 
and collectivist cultural values.  Additionally, Jerusalemite Arabs face discrimination and 
socioeconomic disparities.  As of January of 2020, Palestinians living in East Jerusalem made up 
thirty-eight percent of over 900,000 residents living in the city.  Despite this statistic, the 
Jerusalem Municipality only invests ten to twelve percent of its budget into Palestinian 
neighborhoods (Rasgon, 2020).   
 
20 This is one of the final status issues in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.  
 
21 As of 2019, there are thirteen settlements inhabited by about 215,000 settlers in East Jerusalem (Israel 
and the Palestinians…”, 2019). 
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About 300,000 Jerusalemite Palestinians live as residents of Jerusalem with unequal status 
and citizenship to neither Israel nor the Palestinian Territories.  Resident status can be revoked by 
Israeli officials for various reasons, and they must go through extra processes to gain travel 
documents to leave the country (Shaham, 2018).  
Disparities manifest in one of the most important sectors of society – the education 
system.  Jewish schools in Israel are provided state-funded extracurriculars, but Arab schools 
historically have not been provided the same programs (Rouhana, 1997) .22  Because military 
service is integral to Israeli society, Palestinian Israelis lose access to the resources, opportunity, 
and mainstream participation which the military provides.  Albeit, many Palestinian Israelis 
would not wish to join the military out of principle, this aspect of society deepens economic and 
sociopolitical disparities.  For instance, many jobs have historically been closed off to Palestinian 
or Arab Israelis due to this fragmentation from mainstream Israeli society through lack of military 
service (Rouhana, 1997). 
 
2.3 The Issue of Narrative in Conflict 
 
Founded and solidified largely through the experience of conflict, the Palestinian and 
Israeli collective identities have been shaped dramatically by the way in which each has 
experienced and dealt with the struggle between the two peoples.  The adoption cultural values 
and a collective belief system, along with the creation of narratives that uphold these values and 
belief systems, allows individuals to adapt to their larger environment (Ting-Toomey and Chung, 
2011).  These belief systems lead groups to create static images of ‘the other,’ keeping people 
separate from one another and living in fear of ‘the other.’  In this way, these belief systems 
exacerbate the conflict and continue to block people on the ground from working together to 
influence the larger political structures.  
 
Narrative and Collective Memory 
 
Narrative refers to the historical and cultural stories widely accepted and shared by members 
of a collective group identity.  Individuals also craft personal narratives of identity that create 
meaning from everyday experiences.  This meaning-making process involves interpreting raw 
 
22 I discovered evidence for this phenomenon in interviews with both Jewish Israeli and Palestinian 
students.  Two Jewish students in particular reported that they dropped out of the program due to the 
copious amounts of other activities available to them.  These students also cited that Palestinian students on 
the other hand, do not have the same access to after-school activities. 
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experiences of emotion such as fear, anger, and frustration (Hammack, 2011).  Collective 
identities in conflict adhere to these social constructs through which a coherent, interrelated 
sequence of historical and current events is built.  These are “accounts of a community’s 
collective experiences, embodied in its belief system, that represent the collective’s symbolically 
constructed shared identity” (Biton & Salomon, 2006). 
Narratives become the stories we tell ourselves as societies and individuals.  Individuals 
within a group develop social identity through a process of integrating individual experiences 
with the stories of the experiences of the collective, a phenomena Philip Hammack describes as 
the ‘master narratives of identity.’  Hammack argues that it is the coalescence of the personal 
narrative with the master narrative that contributes to the cycle of conflict in Israel/Palestine 
(2011).  Although there are evidently numerous other factors that contribute to this vicious cycle, 
it is this point that brings many to coexistence work in this region.   
Collective memories, or the social representation of past events related to conflict and 
persecution, are building blocks within larger collective narratives (Nicholson, 2017).  As an 
extension of this discussion, it is meaningful to examine how Palestinian and Israeli collective 
memory of the conflict and its pinnacle moments work together with cognitive coping 
mechanisms (which will be discussed in the following section) to produce powerful historical 
narratives.  Cathy Nicholson’s ethnographic research on Israeli and Palestinian collective memory 
finds that interpretations of experienced historical events through a collect lens become 
incorporated into the groups’ collective memories and are used to justify and legitimize the 
groups’ actions and positions (2017).   
The shaping and use of collective memory illustrate how conflict with ‘the other’ shapes 
the culture of each people in an interactional way.  Stories of victimhood and legitimization of 
one’s group over the other becomes defining content of each collective identity.  In this way, the 
collective identities of the groups in conflict are inherently interconnected.  Each group – and the 
land itself -- is now intertwined with the other group’s collective history and evolution as a 
people, as each narrative is built on the negation of the other’s (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998).  The 
perception of the irreconcilability of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has very much to do with the 
narratives central to the collective identities of these peoples.   
Ethos of Conflict 
Intractable conflict generates a physically and psychologically unsafe environment for 
those most impacted by the conflict.  Conditions associated with this type of conflict include 
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stress, anxiety, and physical and existential threat (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998).  Groups in conflict 
must develop coping mechanisms to deal with the steep psychological price of conflict.  The 
adoption of cultural values and a collective belief system allows people to adapt to their larger 
environment (Ting-Toomey and Chung, 2011).  Daniel Bar-Tal coined the term ‘ethos of 
conflict’ to describe the specific coping mechanism developed in this case.  In conjunction with 
the larger cultural, social, and historical background, these coping mechanisms build the lens 
through which each of these groups perceive and respond to conflict. 
‘Ethos of conflict’ is a “configuration of central, shared societal beliefs that provide a 
particular dominant orientation to a society and give meaning to societal life under conditions of 
intractable conflict” (Bar-Tal, 2000).  It refers to a biased, selective, distorted, and simplistic 
narratives that develop from the societal beliefs and mindsets adopted under protracted conflict.  
Although Israelis and Palestinians experience this ethos in divergent ways based on their position 
of power within the conflict, they share this phenomenon (Shaked, 2016).  A study on this ethos 
in Palestinians and Israelis shows that those who adhere more strongly to this ideology suffer less 
from psychological distress than those who were less committed to the ideology (Lavi et al., 
2014).  This finding suggests a functional quality to these belief systems despite their containing 
bias and sometimes distorted views.   
 For Palestinians and Israelis, the ‘ethos of conflict’ includes eight common elements: an 
unshakeable belief in the justness of the group’s goals, delegitimizing beliefs about the other’s 
humanity and morality, victimization beliefs, patriotism, a positive collective self-image, beliefs 
that involve self-justification and self-glorification, security beliefs, unity beliefs, and peace 
beliefs.  Beliefs, ideologies, and assumptions about “the other” are engrained in the cultural 
consciousness as a mechanism for coping with protracted conflict.  These elements have become 
an integral part of their cultural worldview, which in turn informs the way both Palestinians and 
Israelis deal with conflict in the present.  In this way, conflict and culture unfold through a 
reciprocal process.  Because they are directly related to each peoples’ identity and historical 
memory of the conflict, they are essential to understanding how they will interact with conflict in 
the future (Shaked, 2016). 
Due to the ‘ethos of conflict’ and the battle for identity recognition, collective memory 
serves an incredibly important role in Israeli and Palestinian societies.  It is critical to examine 
how Palestinian collective memory of the conflict and its pinnacle moments works together with 
an ‘ethos of conflict’ effect to produce powerful historical narratives.  The term narrative in this 
case refers to “the social constructions that coherently interrelate a sequence of historical and 
current events; they are accounts of a community’s collective experiences, embodied in its belief 
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system, and represent the collective’s symbolically constructed shared identity” (Biton & 
Salomon, 2006). 
 
Palestinian Master Narrative 
 
The shared Palestinian narrative involves a sense of loss, dispossession, displacement, 
and an existential insecurity initiated by the establishment of the state of Israel and persisting 
today through additional loss of land, lives, rights, and freedoms under occupation.  The 
Palestinian collective memory holds the image of Palestinians forced out of their homes in masses 
during the 1948 war (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002).  It contains records of land lost through the 
building of an apartheid-like separation barrier, of endlessly expanding settlements, and of the 
humiliation of check points and the permit regime.  Through a stark evolution tied to conflict and 
life under occupation, the Palestinian identity is colored with pain, struggle, and sacrifice 
(Hammack, 2011).  In the overarching Palestinian narrative, there is no moral legitimacy to the 
existence of the Israeli state (Rounhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). 
The Palestinian shared narrative involves a sense of loss, dispossession, displacement, 
and an existential insecurity initiated by the establishment of the state of Israel (known to 
Palestinians al-Nakba) and continuing through with the war of 1967, as well as loss and restricted 
freedoms occurring to this day.  Living under occupation during the interim period after the Oslo 
Accords reinforced a sense of insecurity and helplessness, as Israel controlled most aspects of 
Palestinian life.  Any kind of autonomy regarding their own political rights, status, or movement 
had been ripped away and held at arms-length indefinitely.  They had no freedom to move 
between the divorced territories without permits issued by the Israelis.  Palestinian access to 
resources such as water, electricity, and electromagnetic frequencies was almost completely 
under Israeli control (Wittes, 2005).  Their identity was challenged and crystalized at every 
checkpoint and barrier, where a Palestinian identity was synonymous with restricted movement.  
These experiences add strength to the longing for Palestinian self-governance, autonomy, and 
national symbols representing only the Palestinian identity such as stamps, national armed forces, 
and a Palestinian presidency (Wittes, 2005).  The desire for these symbols represents the deep 
intrinsic need for recognition and legitimization of the Palestinian people, which underlies the 
Palestinian approach to peace talks.   
            The experience during the interim period after the first Oslo Accords had a dramatic effect 
in shaping Palestinian negotiators from that point on.  Although there was a lot of optimism and 
faith in the PA immediately after the agreement, the leadership lost the confidence of the 
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Palestinian people over time and the distance between the leaders of the PA and local leaders 
widened.  This increased tension and divisions among the Palestinians.  The elite leaders who 
returned from the negotiations attempted to monopolize power and silence opposing factions 
through authoritarian-like practices such as torture, detainment, and censorship.  This undermined 
any sense of legitimacy the PA once had, creating distrust in the Palestinian Democratic system 
as a whole (Wittes, 2005).  Inevitably, this affected the sense of trust in the negotiation process 
and in turn, the confidence of the negotiators at Camp David in 2000.  As Hanan Ashrawi 
articulated, “The gods descend from Olympus, and suddenly we realize they’re frail” (Wittes, 
2005).  Once the elite leadership understood their need for a constituency that found them 
legitimate, they attempted to overcompensate by making bold promises they lacked the capability 
to keep, further delegitimizing them in a vicious cycle (Wittes, 2005). 
This argument demonstrates how Palestinian collective memory of the conflict and its 
pinnacle moments works together with the previously described “ethos of conflict” effect to 
produce a powerful historical narrative.  This master narrative plays a critical role in active and 
passive Palestinian modes of resistance.23  This narrative has also acted as a political piece in 
negotiations.  The Palestinian collective memory of being severed from their land, displaced, 
fragmented, and ultimately made to be second class citizens, supports the view that the 
Palestinian people had already made their historic compromise (Wittes, 2005).  Given the 
political and material power disparity between the two peoples, conceptualizing the negotiations 
(Oslo Accords and subsequent negotiations mentioned in Chapter I) in this way felt crucial for the 
Palestinians. 
Israeli Master Narrative 
The dominant Israeli narrative emphasizes the Jewish experience in Europe, one that 
involves alienation, marginalization, persecution, and ultimately genocide.  The Jewish people 
felt that the world had turned their back on them during the Holocaust.  They particularly 
distrusted their Arab neighbors who demanded that the British block Jewish immigrants escaping 
from Europe during WWII (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002).   
For these Jews, Israel symbolizes a place where the Jewish people finally have a home 
for themselves, a place to remain safe from antisemitism.  The establishment of a Jewish state 
was seen through this lens as the liberation and empowerment of the Jewish people.  The psyche 
23 See discussion on the social power of narrative in Chapter V. 
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that developed from circumstances of persecution and continued tensions with Israel’s 
neighboring countries in the Middle East leads Israeli Jews to see themselves as the underdog in 
the region.  They continue to feel victimized and in need of security (Bickerton & Klausner, 
2002).   
The Israeli collective memory maintains that the Arabs abandoned their homes in 1948 
during the war, planning never to return.  Allowing those people to return would cause a major 
security risk that Israel could not afford in a region surrounded by those who wish to delegitimize 
and disband their statehood (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002).  Israeli citizens continue to see 
themselves in a state of insecurity and danger due to suicide bombings during the second intifada 
and bombs sent from Gaza.  Those with this mindset maintain that the only way to keep Israeli 
Jews safe is to maintain the status quo and continue with extreme border security, a permit 
regime, and collective punishment for the families of suicide bombers.  
The concept of security, or lack thereof, is a consistent trope in the Israeli master 
narrative.  The idea of security represents the overarching trope that unites these experiential 
themes in the master narrative of Jewish Israeli identity (Hammack, 2008; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 
1998).  When it comes to the conflict, one of the central, and arguably the most important, 
interests of the Israeli people is security.  This need can only be fully understood through the long 
historical memory of persecution among the Jewish people, most significantly including the 
recent atrocity of the Holocaust.  Present-day Israeli soldiers and citizens continue fear knife 
attacks, car-rammings, or other acts of violence (Eglash, Booth, & Cameron, 2015; Holmes, 
2019; Lieber, 2020).24  The sense of vulnerability is three-fold among the Israeli Jews, shaped by 
the historical experience of the Jewish people, of the Zionist enterprise, and the existential 
insecurity of the Israeli state since its birth.  The Israeli people have felt under attack and without 
protection throughout each of these experiences (Wittes, 2005). 
 
Coexistence Narratives 
 
In order to achieve a sustainable peace, many peace workers and social psychologists 
believe that society must go through a deep cognitive transformation, shedding their conflict-
dependent societal beliefs for ones that support the development of harmonious relationships with 
 
24 These attacks exist in a cycle of violence between Israeli and Palestinian people (including Israeli-Arabs 
and Palestinian residents of Jerusalem) in which Israeli soldiers victimize and oppress Palestinian civilians, 
and in turn, a few Palestinians a year attack Israeli soldiers and sometimes civilians. 
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the ‘other side’ (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998).  This would involve a process of changing negative 
beliefs about the other into ones that would promote harmonious interaction between the two 
peoples.  
2.4 Education and the Socialization of Youth in Conflict 
The Israeli education system is largely segregated by Israeli Jews and Arab Palestinian 
citizens and residents (Bieling, 2016).25  The education system in Israel segregates students based 
on religious and ethnic divides.  It is split into four tracks: state-secular (Mamlachti), state-
religious (Mamlachti dati), independent religious (Haredi or Ḥinuch Atzmai), and Arab schools 
(Types of Schools in Israel, 2014).  There are also private schools for specific sectors of Israeli 
society.  Oftentimes private schools are set up for children of foreign nationals (i.e. the American 
International School in Israel).   
In intractable conflict, education is often used as a means of social control rather than a 
tool for empowerment and social mobility.  Nationalist politicians may curate textbooks and 
curriculum to reinforce conflict-supporting narratives.  In addition to these narratives, school 
activities, field trips, and symbols instill nationalist sentiments in students (al-Haj, 2003).  These 
narratives are intended to block understanding of the ‘other side’ of the conflict and motivate 
militaristic tendencies.  Youth on both sides of conflict are indoctrinated with belief systems that 
may enhance their psychological resilience under the intractable conflict, but breed intolerance 
towards ‘the other’, building stronger group identity salience. This is where the strategy of 
intergroup peace programs enters the picture. Aimed at breaking down problematic national 
narratives and increasing tolerance and trust between young people, these programs hope to 
create a generation of peacebuilders and change-makers.  
25 “The system in its current form was established in 1953 with the State Education Law which provides the 
legal framework for the establishment of two sectors: a Jewish secular and a Jewish religious one. While 
the Palestinian minority is not mentioned in this law, the establishment of an Arab school sector that is 
separate from the two Jewish ones followed rather inevitably from it.  The Israeli education system can be 
seen as a political tool used by the government to advance its goals of furthering the Jewish character of the 
state rather than to provide the best possible education for all citizens.  Despite an amendment of the law in 
2000, the Arab sector has no official legal standing, but exists alongside the two ‘official and recognized’ 
Jewish sectors as an ‘unofficial but recognized’ one. Thus, from the inception of the state school system in 
1953, Arab Palestinians and Jewish Israelis were generally prevented from attending school together.  
Recent efforts of singling out the Arab Christian population in Israel regarding conscription and education 
suggest that the education system in its current form is more than just a provider of knowledge for the 
citizens of the state. The Ministry of Education has complete control over the school curricula of all types 
of schools – Jewish, Druze and Arab public and private, from kindergarten to high school” (Bieling, 2016) 
  
 
 
 
29 
Although most Jerusalemite youth in Kids4Peace have not been exposed to the same kind 
of physical violence and trauma of those in the Gaza and the West Bank or of their parents’ and 
grandparents’ generations, these youth have indirectly absorbed auditory and visual 
representations of this violence through the media, through stories of family and community 
members, through the education system, and in everyday images and symbols to which children 
are exposed.  Children in conflict engage in informal and formal practices related to the conflict 
on a regular basis.  These practices, which encourage children to form concepts, categories, 
impressions, understandings, and preferences, may include security drills in schools, bomb drills 
when a bag is left on or near a train, praising war heroes, and supporting nationalist symbols and 
memorials.  Children in conflict environments learn the categorization of their in-group and the 
rival out-group.  These categories gain salience through the everlasting bombardment of symbols 
and messages related to conflict.  They gain conflict and war-related vocabulary in addition to 
their meaning and implications.  They acquire an emotional repertoire of fear, insecurity, threat, 
and hatred related to the conflict (Nasie, 2016).  In short, the three main agents of socialization 
for youth are family, media, and education. 
Assuming a melioristic view of humanity, it might be natural to look to the youth as 
beacons of hope for a better more peaceful future amidst the darkness of conflict.  One would 
hope that schools could provide a safe space for these youth to gain the tools and understanding it 
would require to come together to build a brighter, more peaceful future.  Unfortunately, this is 
often not the case.  In fact, the education system most often works to further socialize child and 
young people in a way that reinforces ethos of conflict, which exacerbates conflict.  
In prolonged ethnic conflict, much of the underlying tension surrounds the competition 
between whose memory will be preserved as the national narrative. The role of these narratives in 
the realm of education is crucial to examine, as the way students are taught history in their most 
formative years significantly influences the future of a conflict. The school system is an important 
agent of national memory through which narratives are kept alive or transformed. Therefore, the 
beliefs and attitudes of the youth formed through their education will determine whether the 
conflict will remain intractable or whether it will be transformed as the next generations take 
control of the national political agenda.  From a young age, in Israeli and Palestinian schools 
learn drastically different narratives regarding history and national identity.  The education 
system is under the control of nationalist governments in the cases of both Israeli curriculums and 
the curriculums designed by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.  Jerusalem.  
Textbooks in state sponsored schools contain the master narratives of the collective group 
identity, conveying the values and messages that will uphold that group’s worldview and beliefs.  
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These curriculums ignore information that may provide alternative perspectives on the conflict 
and may lead to greater understanding of the ‘other side’ (Gur-Ziv & Mazali, 2001; Nasie, 2016). 
The Israeli curriculum brushes over or completely erases accounts of forced Palestinian 
displacement during and after the 1948 war.  This curriculum claims that the Palestinians left 
their homes voluntarily.  On the other side, the Palestinian curriculums often leave out any 
mention of the Holocaust or Jewish persecution in Europe, thereby leaving out a large part of 
Jewish history that led many to immigrate to Palestine.  These narratives leave out pieces of both 
stories that would allow for a greater understanding of one another.  The teaching of these 
different narratives coupled with the segregation of children from these two groups and prevalent 
feelings of insecurity among all leads to the dehumanization of “the other” (Lavi et al., 2014).   
In addition to textbooks, modes of instruction, classroom discussions, nationalistic 
ceremonies, field trips, symbols in schools and classrooms, and other types of informal education 
work to reinforce the national narrative (Nasie, 2016).   
Motivated reasoning describes the tendency of individuals to confirm their assessments 
of information to some goal or end irrelevant to accuracy. This ideologically motivated cognition 
has been described by studies as an adaptation rather than deficiency, in that it aims to promote 
the interests individuals have in signaling group membership and group loyalty as a means of 
achieving wellbeing (Kahan, 2013). This explains why the promotion of and widespread adoption 
of strong narratives in ethnic conflict is so prevalent and how, once entrenched at a young age, 
these narratives could be difficult to break.  This is particularly salient for Israeli Jewish youth 
entering the Israeli Defense Forces, as group loyalty in military service is even more dramatically 
tied to an individual’s identity, goals, and tasks. 
Naive realism is the idea that individuals assume themselves to be objective perceivers of 
reality and that others, if rational and given access to the same information, should share the same 
judgements and reactions to the same stimuli, issues, and events. If others with the same 
information do not share these opinions, those demonstrating naive realism will overestimate the 
bias of the other group or individuals in comparison to their own presumed objectivity. 
Furthermore, individuals experiencing naive realism may attribute the failure of others to 
perceive reality the way they do to a fundamental flaw in character, intelligence, or an 
intrinsically warped perception. They may consider the other lazy, irrational, or strongly biased 
by ideology or self-interest (Pronin et al., 2002). The content of the narratives taught in textbooks 
is a powerful tool, as the children taught in these schools grow into adults who assume that all 
others perceive this same reality. In prolonged violent conflict, these assumptions and judgments 
have the potential to create immense harm. 
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It is out of the scope of this paper to provide a more in-depth look at these cognitive biases.  
However, it is important to note that these mechanisms are at play and extremely successful in 
building a society intended to function within and perpetuate a state of war.  In order to interrupt 
potentially harmful socialization, contact intervention is crucial in the region’s population of 
youth. 
Palestinian and Israeli Jewish youth in Jerusalem have historically learned from separate 
curriculums, except for a short time period when the Israeli administration controlled all school 
curriculums.  In recent years, the Israeli government, under Education Minister Naftali Bennett 
and Jerusalem Affairs and Heritage Minister Zeev Elkin, approved a plan take back control over 
curriculum in East Jerusalem.  The plan coerced Arab East Jerusalem schools to adopt the Israeli 
curriculum over the Palestinian one (Skop, Hasson, & Rinat, 2017; Kashti & Hasson, 2016).26  
Given that the premise of Kids4Peace draws in a specifically peace-driven crowd, many 
of the youth who come to the program have already received a coexistence narrative from their 
parents or bi-national schools.  A large portion of the students in Kids4Peace come from a mixed 
Palestinian-Israeli school called Hand-in-Hand.  Students coming from the mixed school are 
familiar with their group’s master narratives from interacting with their community outside of the 
school and taking in the country’s cultures, but they also have access to a coexistence narrative 
shared with organizations such as Kids4Peace.  Many of these youths have incorporated this 
narrative into their own worldview.27 
 
2.5 Contact Theory 
 
As calls for peacebuilding organizations such as Kids4Peace and Seeds of Peace arose in 
response to frustration and declining belief in political leaders to solve the nations’ crisis.  
Allport’s Intergroup Contact Theory provided a basis for designing new grassroots people-to-
people methods of peacebuilding.  Contact theory, derived from social identity theory, outlines 
the necessary prerequisites for intergroup contact to lead to lasting attitudinal transformation 
(Pettigrew, 1998).   
 
26 Palestinian or Arab schools default to the Tawjihi curriculum, which preserves the national a cultural 
identity of Palestinians living in Jerusalem (Hijazi, 2015). 
 
27 During the study, youths from Hand-in-Hand School demonstrate higher levels of optimism for the future 
of the two peoples.  Understandable, youth from this school find coexistence on a larger scale easier to 
imagine than those educated in segregated schools.  
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Allport claims that for contact to lead to true transformation, four conditions must be met.  
These conditions are that (1) intergroup contact be held in an environment that upholds equal 
group status for both parties, (2) there are shared goals among all group members, (3) intergroup 
cooperation is aimed towards achieving aforementioned goals, and (4) the contact be supported 
by authorities (Pettigrew, 1998).  Allport’s theory proceeds to outline four processes of change 
through which attitudinal change happens.  In the first stage, the ingroup members learn about the 
outgroup.  This learning process aims to debunk harmful beliefs about the outgroup, thereby 
reducing levels of prejudice (Pettigrew, 1998).28 
The next stage of the theoretical process of transformation involves “changing behavior”.  
Intergroup contact ideally involves behavior modification as the precursor to attitudinal change.  
In this case, the behavioral change refers to acceptance of outgroup members and the integration 
and collaboration of members of the groups in conflict.  In order to reconcile the dissonance of 
old attitudes and new present realities, contact theory presumes that humans will revise attitudes 
(Pettigrew, 1998). 
The third process is that through which group members “generate affective ties”.  
Positive emotions, particularly empathy, evoked by this ideal form of intergroup contact can 
influence and heighten positive intergroup contact effects.  Forming meaningful friendships and 
sympathies between members from the different groups is critical for this stage (Pettigrew, 1998).  
The final stage in this transformation of prejudiced attitudes is a process of “ingroup 
reappraisal,” which involves redefining the ingroup to include members of what was formerly 
perceived as the outgroup (also known as deprovincialization) (Pettigrew, 1998).  This idea of 
ingroup reappraisal is seen in coexistence organizations that form a new community.  Kids4Peace 
does this by building a pro-peace community that harbor values of harmony and coexistence.  The 
program of Seeds of Peace asks participants to strip themselves of their group identity for a new 
identity as a “seed of peace” (Hammack, 2011).  This final stage is at the heart of the coexistence 
wing of the pro-peace movement.  
Some research has disproven the effectiveness of some aspects of intergroup contact 
interventions.  For instance, academics have come to acknowledge that this equal status is most 
often unachievable in these scenarios due to a larger sociopolitical power asymmetry outside of 
the contact intervention (Rouhana, 2004; Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2008).  For this reason, more 
current critical approaches attempt to explicitly challenge the power asymmetries that exacerbate 
 
28 This first stage reflects the Pathways to Peace program for Kids4Peace sixth graders described in section 
1.5. 
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the conflict, particularly when the powerful party does not explicitly recognize the asymmetry 
(Hammack, Pilecki, & Merrilees, 2013).   
Despite Pettigrew’s doubts about the validity and universality of contact theory, 
organizations such as Kids4Peace, Seeds of Peace,29 and others like it continue to design 
programs based around these ideas.  The aforementioned criticisms of the theory relate to some of 
the criticisms and problem areas of these organizations. Therefore, further research done on the 
impact of these specific organizations is critical to understand where the benefits and 
shortcomings lie.   
 
2.6 Power Asymmetry in Conflict: A Structuralist Perspective  
 
It is crucial to acknowledge that although the psychological mechanisms described in the 
previous section contribute to the perpetuation of the conflict, primarily by maintaining the power 
of narratives and their limitations on a full understanding of the conflict, this conflict is not purely 
psychological or cultural conflict by nature.  This is a conflict over tangible resources such as 
land, water, and power.  Basic human needs such as identity and security are central to this 
conflict and its resolution, as are critical structural changes that protect the basic human rights and 
freedoms of all peoples involved.  It is important to address these oppressive structures that 
enforce social, political, and economic inequality (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998)  
As a peace activist and past intern of a coexistence organization, I believe in the power of 
the people to transform their nations with grassroots organization.  However, I also believe in the 
importance of examining the exploitative power structures that limit this work.  I entered the 
work with a critical eye for deeper underlying dynamics influenced by larger power structures.  
Through my time as both an intern for Kids4Peace and a researcher, I maintained a structuralist 
 
29 The organization Seeds of Peace is used occasionally as a reference point for Kids4Peace.  Although 
Kids4Peace Jerusalem has not been extensively researched by academics, social psychologist and scholar 
Philip Hammack presents in-depth research on another youth-centered coexistence organization called 
Seeds of Peace.  Hammack’s research of Seeds of Peace in his book Narrative of Politics has inspired the 
beginnings of my own research on Kids4Peace (2011).  The two organizations differ drastically in method 
and structure, but Hammack’s model for studying the impact of Seeds of Peace proves useful in exploring 
the impact of this type of peacebuilding model organization on a participant’s interpretation of their own 
identity and adherence to a belief system (2011). Seeds of Peace was founded based on contact theory 
mentioned above.  The premise of the organization recognizes that war and conflict are conceived through 
and manipulated by governments and wealthy, powerful interest groups, not the people on the ground.  The 
worldview supported by the organization assumes that most people can coexist in peace if they could 
transcend their identification with master narratives of their collective identity groups.  Instead they would 
humanize and identify with ‘the other’ in order to build a new coexistence narrative in which the two 
peoples are positively interconnected (Hammack, 2011). 
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perspective while examining the program and its impact, even while staying present and open-
minded during the experience.  Scholars in relevant fields (of conflict resolution, social 
psychology, etc.) have come to recognize the importance in addressing these social structures 
when studying contact intervention as a mode of conflict transformation.  Phillip Hammack 
admits that at the end of his time involved with grassroots people-to-people conflict interventions, 
critiques of the work arose within him.  He stresses that these interventions often do not consider 
“in a truly meaningful way” the structural violence that frames the experiences of Israeli and 
Palestinian youth and thus influences their realities and personal narratives (Hammack, 2011). 
In conflict intervention framed around contact, power asymmetries often mean that the 
groups involved have different motivations, goals, and preferences in content based on their 
advantage or disadvantage in the larger sociopolitical context.  In studies done in randomized 
groups and on Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews in Israeli, members of the less powerful group 
indicated a greater desire to discuss power during the interaction that the group in power.  
Members of the advantaged group, on the other hand, demonstrated more of a desire to discuss 
commonalities between the two groups rather than discuss group-based power (Saguy, Dovidio & 
Pratto, 2008).  This evidence has significant implications when deciding who designs the content 
of the intergroup interaction.  The same study also found that members of the more politically 
powerful group who perceived the group’s advantage as illegitimate were more likely to want to 
confront the issue of power (Saguy, Dovidio & Pratto, 2008).  This finding is reflected in my own 
research when speaking with young Left-wing Israeli Jews.  
The reason for these differing motivations and preferences is that disparities in economic 
security, political power, and opportunities for social advancement within a society create 
completely different social realities for the advantaged and disadvantaged groups in conflict.  
These different realities shape the motivations group members have towards maintaining versus 
challenging the status quo.  Members of the advantaged groups are more inclined to hope for the 
stability of a system which privileges them, rather than members of the disadvantaged group who 
are more likely to work toward systematic and social change (Saguy, Dovidio & Pratto, 2008). 
Members of the advantaged group may uphold ideas that legitimize and naturalize the 
existing social hierarchy rather than mobilize for social change (Saguy, Dovidio & Pratto, 2008).  
One way to legitimize and maintain the status quo considered in the study done by Saguy, 
Dovidio & Pratto, is to emphasize the shared aspects of the groups in conflict.  This focus on 
points of common ground may be useful in promoting a positive shared identity and positive 
relations between the groups (Dovidio, Gaertner, Niemann, & Snider, 2001).  However, it may 
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also further embed problematic status relations by covering the reality of the privileges and 
powers held by one group over the other.  
Although research shows that the less powerful group will likely uphold goals of deep 
social change and political transformation, this gets more complicated when we discuss the 
delicate system of opportunities that exist for Palestinian citizens of Israel living in Jerusalem.  
Given their different experience, this group may have different goals than those living as 
Palestinian residents of Jerusalem or those in the West Bank and Gaza.  Could these opportunities 
change the group’s goals for contact?   
The insights brought forth by the research mentioned in this section is incredibly 
important to contextualize coexistence work, and the work of Kids4Peace in particular, within a 
greater system that promotes structural inequalities.  That being said, I aim to avoid the over-
simplification and generalization of the individuals within these groups.  With the academic 
research outlined in this section as a reference point, I dig further into the motivations, goals, and 
preferred outcomes of the participants of Kids4Peace. 
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research Principles 
1. Do No Harm
In considering taking a role in the field of conflict transformation, it is necessary to live 
by a motto borrowed from the medical profession directing practitioners to “do no harm.”  One 
can only be aware of an intervention’s possible impact by deeply understanding the cultural 
context and political and sociocultural dynamics in which the intervention will be positioned.  
This paper aims to lay the foundation for an elicitive process, as described by John Paul 
Lederach, by gaining some of the explicit and contextual conflict knowledge necessary to 
understand how conflict arises in this particular society, how it operates, and how to best address 
it (1995).  This is the discovery phase of the elicitive approach (Lederach, 1995).  Normally for 
the participants of the intervention, the purpose of this phase is to lay the foundation from which 
one can knowledgeably explore the field before drafting a process through which the conflict may 
be transformed in a meaningful way.   
Participation in an organization such as Kids4Peace can be a sensitive issue in certain 
sectors of these communities.  Oftentimes the larger community, in addition to friends and 
family, do not agree with the work of organizations such as Kids4Peace. To protect the wellbeing 
of the youth subjects and to prevent any undue harm, I keep their identities anonymous by using 
pseudonyms and attaching only vague descriptions.  I refrain from using identifiable information 
such as exact ages, neighborhoods, and anything else that could lead to the identification of 
specific individuals participating in the study.  This precaution should shield these youth from 
identification by those within or outside of the organization. 
2. Authenticity and Transparency
This paper aims to represent the youth participants of the study and myself as researcher 
with the greatest amount of authenticity.  By acknowledging my own biases (via my worldview, 
identity, and background), I hope to establish a trust with the research subjects and the reader.  
During the research process I established open communication with research participants – telling 
them about my own background and reasons for involvement.   
It is important to present the voices of the individual research subjects in the purest way 
possible.  Although I clear up some of the language in the quotations spoken by the subjects, I 
minimize this editing in an attempt to maintain the truest nature of the youth’s speech.  At times 
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the youth subjects respond with broken speech patterns or break off mid-sentence.  This may 
reflect the difficult and complicated nature of the subject matter.  I aim to include these 
contextual clues to emotion and inner struggle in the data. 
3. Empowerment and Agency of Subjects
Part of my intention in approaching this research was to give the youth who go through 
Kids4Peace the opportunity to tell the story of Kids4Peace through their unique lenses and to 
have an impact on the future of the organization.  Throughout the interview process, I had a few 
of the participants acknowledge the therapeutic effect that the interview had.  The interview 
process had a similar effect on me as I listened to the stories, insights, and struggles these youth 
presented with vulnerability. 
4. Self-Awareness
I aim to acknowledge my own biases and shortcomings in the research and how my own 
position of privilege as a Jewish American woman impacts my experience in the field.  I 
acknowledge that my positionality and lack of language skills may have constrained the fluidity 
of the research in some ways.  Additionally, my own biases and the lens through which I perceive 
the conflict influences my interpretation of the data.  
3.2 Research Paradigm 
I used ethnographic methods with an idiographic approach to this research.  This 
approach focuses on the individual and emphasizes the unique personal experience over setting 
generalizations.  The idiographic approach often defers to case studies, unstructured interviews, 
and thematic analysis in order to an in-depth insight into individual behavior (Conner, et al., 
2009).  A deep understanding of the human experience can be discovered through the 
examination of the individual experience. 
I model my research paradigm off the ethnographic and narrative-based research methods 
used by Philip Hammack in his approach to the study of classic social psychological intervention 
in the conflict in Israel/Palestine.  Phillip Hammack is an American social psychologist and a 
leader in the narrative psychology movement.  His model of identity presented in this article 
integrates cognitive, social, and cultural levels of analysis while focusing on content, structure, 
and process.  Hammack argues for a narrative approach to the study of identity and culture in 
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order to combat the mainstream cultural psychology paradigm which focuses on the general over 
the unique (Hammack, 2008).  
3.3 Research Process 
Field Site 
The field work for this study took place at Kids4Peace Jerusalem.  A majority of the 
original interviews for Kids4Peace took place in the Kids4Peace office in East Jerusalem. 
Interviews took place in a private room away from other staff members to maintain privacy for 
the interview.  Exceptions were made for interviewees who are unable to make it to the office, in 
which case I met these participants in a location more convenient for them (i.e. a coffee shop, 
cafe, etc.). To assure privacy during these interviews, I conscientiously chose secluded seating 
where the interview would not be overheard. For those who have moved from Jerusalem or will 
be out of town during the time of the interviews, I offer the opportunity to participate through a 
Skype or phone interview. I have conducted these remote interviews from a private location and 
instructed the interviewees to do the same.  
Research Participants, Recruitment, and Sampling 
For this study, I recruited a sample of 19 participants from Kids4Peace to interview for 
my research.  I accessed the names of possible interviewees through staff members of the 
organization.  The original population of interviewees includes two groups: high school students 
in the Youth Action Program (YAP), the ninth-grade program and recent alumni of Kids4Peace. 
The former group involves female and male youth between the ages of 14 and 18.  The ages of 
alumni range from 19 to 22.  
The first group of high school participants were selected by the director of the organization 
and the program coordinators.  Additionally, I made an announcement asking for volunteers at the 
YAP town hall event.  I also asked youth to spread the information about the study to their friends 
in Kids4Peace. 
I was given a list of recent alumni by the director of the organization and by the Ninth Grade 
Program Coordinator. I sent the recommended participants messages through WhatsApp that 
briefly introduced them to the research and asked for their participation in the evaluation and in 
my own research.  
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The fact that staff pointed me towards participants who were most active and stayed involved 
in the organization created a selection bias.  However, I believe by acknowledging this bias, I am 
able to look at the specific demographic of participants in a more direct light.  These are generally 
the students who were most committed to the program and therefore most likely had deep 
processes around what this participation meant to them.  
Certain groups overrepresented in my interview sample may also be overrepresented in 
the Kids4Peace programs.  Specifically, a majority of my subjects are Palestinian citizens of 
Israel due to the disproportionately large number of members of this identity group who 
participate in the programs.  Participants from this group also proved to be more responsive and 
available for interviews.  Table 3.1 provides a demographic summary of the interview data.  
The sample of Jewish Israelis participants in my study consist of both religious and 
secular Jewish youth but excludes ultra-Orthodox Jewish youth.  My sample holds both right-
wing and left-wing Jewish youth, although not in equal numbers.  From my sample, left-wing 
Israelis appear more likely to sign up for Kids4Peace program. 
The Tables below provide a brief demographic overview of the research subjects. 
TABLE 3.1: Nationality/Identity Group 
Female Male Total 
Israeli-Arab 5 6 11 
Palestinian residents of 
Jerusalem 
0 1 1 
Jewish Israelis 5 2 7 
TABLE 3.2: Current Participants/Alumni 
IL ILA PA Total 
Current 
Participants 
2 5 1 8 
Alumni 5 6 0 11 
(IL – Israeli Jew, ILA- Israeli-Arab, PA- Palestinian Resident of Jerusalem) 
TABLE 3.3: Religion 
Muslim Christian Jewish Total 
Current Participants 5 1 2 8 
Alumni 4 2 5 11 
Total 9 3 7 19 
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Original Role of Researcher as Intern for Kids4Peace 
 
In my role as Monitoring and Evaluation intern, I was tasked with data collection in 
various forms for the 2017-2018 USAID report. This included both the collection, input, and 
analysis of data from entry and exit surveys for the year.  The evaluation also included 
conducting interviews with some of the youth participants and alumni. The interviews for the 
evaluation, covered the indicators measured by entry and exit surveys in addition to background 
questions and some questions of my own interest. The interviews asked for youth comments and 
critiques of the organization’s programs (See Appendix for the list of interview questions).   
 
Interview Process 
 
The initial interview process began on November 22, 2018. I conducted twelve initial 
interviews for the organization.  I received WhatsApp contact information for potential research 
subjects and requested participation through WhatsApp message.  For my research, I used these 
initial interviews that I conducted on behalf of Kids4Peace.  After the research was approved, I 
solicited formal assent/consent from the interviewees to use the data for my research purposes.  I 
ensured that all participants and parents of underage participants could understand the instructions 
and consent forms given. After the initial interviews and approval of this research, I continued 
conducting interviews and follow-up interviews remotely via skype using the initial interview 
questions.  
A majority of the original interviews for Kids4Peace took place in the Kids4Peace office 
in East Jerusalem. Interviews took place in a private room away from other staff members to 
maintain privacy for the interview. Exceptions were made for interviewees who are unable to 
make it to the office, in which case I met these participants in a location more convenient for 
them (i.e. a coffee shop, cafe, etc.). To assure privacy during these interviews, I chose secluded 
seating where the interview would not be overheard.  For those who have moved from Jerusalem 
or will be out of town during the time of the interviews, I offer the opportunity to participate 
through a Skype or phone interview.  I have conducted these remote interviews from a private 
location and instructed the interviewees to do the same.  I recorded the interviews with the 
permission of the participants and transcribed the interviews from the recordings.   
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First-Hand Experience and Observation as Additional Data 
The data used in this research includes the insights that have been brought forth by 
friends, colleagues, and acquaintances I have met throughout my research and experience in the 
Middle East.  I include my experience as an intern at Kids4Peace, as I observed programming 
first-hand and served as an additional supervisor for the 2018 local summer camp at Camp 
Ketura.  I attended a YAP seminar in Jaffa, as well as a workshops and events throughout the 
year.  In addition to the time spent with Kids4Peace, my time in Jerusalem provided me with a 
wealth of perspectives from those I befriended and those with whom I interacted.  I absorbed 
information by witnessing interactions between Palestinians and Israelis and within these 
collective identity groups. 
Data Analysis – Narrative and Coding Themes 
 
I used content from the interviews as well as possible follow-up Skype interviews to 
analyze youth responses. I coded the interviews, finding common themes, and examined those 
themes against the backdrop of the organization and the conflict.  I will look for differences and 
similarities between responses with a focus on differences between demographics (i.e. nationality, 
gender, age group, current participants versus alumni, etc.).  I examined the stories of the youth to 
identify meaningful insights into the impacts of the Kids4Peace program and how the program 
interacts with collective identities of the youth in the organization.  I also highlighted codes 
(motifs, reoccurring important topics and terms). 
The analysis of this date extracts themes and motifs within the themes (also known as 
codes) to provide an impressionistic picture of the experiences of the youth in Kids4Peace.  I use 
one to four quotations from the interviews to illustrate each motif within a theme.  If the theme 
has no motif, I provide three to seven quotations to illustrate the theme.  Not all subjects are 
represented under all themes.  I chose the quotations that most strongly and intricately represents 
the core the themes and motifs.  I do attempt to representations the largest number of youths 
possible in order to present a wide variety of voices and to honor the subjects who sacrificed their 
time and energy for the study. 
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CHAPTER IV: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Themes from the Research 
 
I arrived at the topic of this study in a roundabout way.  I originally conducted the 
interviews used in this study through my role as the Monitoring and Evaluation Intern for 
Kids4Peace.  Therefore, the framework of my first batch of interviews follow the themes outlined 
by Kids4Peace staff and leadership for the purpose of writing annual reports for the 
organization’s major donor at the time USAID (United States Agency for International Aid).  The 
measurable outcomes outlined in the report left a major gap in understanding the real impact of 
the programs.  That the evaluation of the programs was based solely on a document curated for 
USAID caused me to question whether the report was aimed at finding genuine results that would 
inform important and sustainable change.  For this reason, I sought to fill in the gap in evaluative 
information with my own research.  
My interest lies not only in how this organization impacts the greater community and 
sociopolitical structures, but also in how it lends itself as a filter through which participants 
interact with their own identity.  Through a broader lens, I also aim to understand how the larger 
asymmetrical power dynamics between these identity groups manifest through the youth’s 
experiences.   
The original themes found by the organization’s leadership and measured in the program 
evaluation are as follows: Personal transformation, negative externalities, positive supports, hope 
and perceptions (of the conflict), actions, social change, and ripple effect, knowledge and 
perceptions, and agency.  I have borrowed from and adjusted some of these themes while 
analyzing the data.  The following themes and motifs30 are those which brought out the 
complexities of the interaction between collective identity and experience in Kids4Peace. 
 
4.2 The Salience of Collective Identity and Assignment of Meaning 
 
This section discusses collective identity and the complications of group belonging in 
Jerusalem.  This issue is particularly complicated for Palestinian citizens of Israel (also known as 
Arab-Israelis or Israeli-Arabs) who have dual allegiances that provide various social, political, 
and economic benefits.  Collective identity in Jerusalem, although strongly salient, is a source of 
 
30 The motifs, important concepts that reappear throughout the data, are highlighted by bold lettering 
throughout this chapter. 
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confusion and frustration for many youths, whether Palestinian citizens of Israel, Israeli Jews, or 
Palestinian residents of Jerusalem. 
As I observed the Kids4Peace programming, I sought to make sense of what I heard, saw, 
and intuited from these interactions.  The organization hosts a patchwork of cultures and sub-
cultures, languages, and layers of power and privilege.  This led me to question how the 
politicized collective identities (i.e. national, religious, and political) intersect with the experience 
of the youth participants of Kids4Peace. 
This section will preface the themes from this research with an exploration of the 
complexity of each collective identity present and their salience in Kids4Peace as well as the 
other environments the youth encounter in their daily lives.  The salience of identity refers to how 
a certain aspect of one’s identity shows up with a particular importance in a given environment.  
The youth deal with the salience of their collective identities in a variety of ways, the nature of 
which depends on the sociopolitical position of the group.   
 
“What are you?” The Dual-Identity Bind of Palestinian Citizens of Israel 
 
The dual-identity bind refers to the conundrum Palestinian citizens of Israel (also known 
as Israeli-Arabs) face when confronting the two allegiances held inherently within their identity.  
These individuals belong simultaneously to the Israeli collect through their citizenship, but often 
more strongly to the Palestinian collective through their social, cultural, and political affinities.  
This is especially true for Palestinian citizens of Israel (Israeli-Arabs) living in Jerusalem.  For 
some like Malik and Chris, this struggle moves from the external to the internal.  These 
individuals present the problem of identity as an issue arising from assumptions and projections 
of others, not their own relationship with their identities.  Both of these youths have a background 
in the Hand and Hand school in Jerusalem, a mixed school for Israeli Jews and Muslim and 
Christian Palestinians citizens of Israel. 
Chris, a self-identified Christian Arab and citizen of both Israel and the United States, 
explains the paradox that arises in his answer to “What is your nationality and how do you 
identify yourself?”  Chris responds:   
Now, I think that's one of the most difficult questions ever in this issue.  And that's one of 
the things I still struggle with until now.  And I see other Arabs struggling with [it], 
especially when it comes to defining ourselves within this country.  My nationality is 
technically Israeli -- also, American.  I have an American passport and an Israeli 
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passport.  But I'm neither of those things, to be honest.  I'm not Israeli, but I'm technically 
Israeli.  But I'm not an American.  I've never lived in America.  
Although Chris’s situation is somewhat unique given his American passport, his example 
highlights the common position in which Palestinian citizens of Israel find themselves.  It is often 
difficult for individuals from this group to know which piece of their identity to highlight.  The 
setting of Jerusalem and the Hebrew University makes this challenge evermore present.  As 
mentioned in Chapter II, Jerusalem is segregated between East and West, Palestinian and Jewish 
respectively.  Simultaneously, there is interaction and interdependence between Israeli Jews and 
Palestinians living in Jerusalem.31  Chris continues:  
I'm technically, between me and myself, I'm a Palestinian -- you know? – it’s who I am.  I 
was born from this region.  My grandfather would've defined himself as a Palestinian -- 
and his father before that.  But when it comes to introducing myself, it's very difficult.  
Especially as a Christian more maybe than as a Jew or a Muslim, because a Muslim can 
say "I'm an Arab," and everyone understands that.  And a Jew says, "I'm Israeli," and 
everyone knows that.  But for me, if I go somewhere abroad and I talk, people are like, 
"Oh, where are you from?"  And I say, "I'm Israeli."  And then they assume that I'm a 
Jew. 
Chris’s last point in the quote above indicates that Palestinian citizens of Israel (or Israeli-
Arabs) experience a marginality through the way others view the Israeli identity.  There is an 
inherent “othering” in the remarks of those he encounters.  If an Israeli is not a Jew, the 
assumption of mainstream society is that the individual is an “other”.  Outsiders (and locals) 
make normative assumptions about who Chris is based on the society in which he lives – one that 
places Palestinians as second-tier citizens -- the miscellaneous category.  He continues: 
And if I tell them, "I'm a Palestinian," then they assume that I'm from the West Bank, 
which is also not true.  If I tell them I'm an Arab, then they assume I'm Muslim, and they 
make some assumptions that go with that which are wrong.  But they also don't apply to 
me, so I wouldn't want them to assume things that, you know, is not me… So it's very 
hard… Usually if I have to make a short introduction, I say, "I'm from Jerusalem."  And 
that's a very clever way of saying it, because then you're not saying exactly what you are.  
But if I am getting to know someone closely, then I have to tell them, “I'm a Christian, 
 
31 Many Palestinians work in West Jerusalem.  Some Palestinians are involved in the culture there by 
frequenting clubs, bars, restaurants, and other cultural events.  In this way, the line between cultures has 
begun to get blurry, but the stark reality of racism and conflict makes stating one’s identity as an Arab or 
Palestinian in Jerusalem uncomfortable at the very least. 
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who is also an Arab, who is also living in Israel and Jerusalem.  But yeah, I'm of original 
Palestinian origin,” you know.  So it's not fun to say all that. 
The assumptions others have based on which identity Chris presents reveal the double 
bind of being a Palestinian citizen of Israel.  I interpret his response to suggest discomfort, 
frustration, and potentially fear around the way in which these collective identities tell a story that 
is not his own.  He offers a strategy for escaping this question – saying that he is from Jerusalem 
– but does not seem to find a comfortable solution to this predicament through his time in 
Kids4Peace or otherwise.  Chris plays verbal gymnastics to answer the question in the most 
comfortable way possible. 
As an individual, Malik appears to be relatively at peace with his two seemingly 
contradicting identities -- Israeli and Palestinian -- compared to some of the other Palestinian 
Israeli subjects of the study.  He asserts that these identities could coincide harmoniously, if only 
both communities would accept that reality.  Malik does not see his Israeli and Palestinian 
identities as mutually exclusive, but as two parts of his whole.  He does not express feelings of 
confusion or shame, but rather identifies the conflict as the culprit of his fractured identity.  Malik 
represents those who do not see Israeli and Palestinian identities as separate.  He appears strong 
in his convictions and seems to know himself better through his time in Kids4Peace and other 
coexistence organizations.  Malik says: 
So I guess there’s kind of a contradiction with how I identify myself.  And how I identify 
myself, many would see as a contradiction - the idea of being both, identifying both as a 
Palestinian and as a citizen of Israel.  But I don’t think both of those things are mutually 
exclusive, and I think many people would identify similar to me.  And I think that’s a 
contradiction that was created by a political climate that shames and shuns people for 
identifying as Palestinians.  I think it’s also just that the war and conflict prevent people 
from identifying as part of both.  I want to strive for equal rights in Israel among all 
citizens, but at the same time, I feel that’s part and parcel of my Palestinian identity.  I 
think that’s something that can’t be taken away from that. 
Here Malik references the importance of the struggle for equal rights to his collective 
identity as a Palestinian.  The concept of resistance and the struggle for justice are key concepts in 
the Palestinian master narrative and intrinsic to the Palestinian identity.  To value resistance and 
struggle for equal rights in one’s heart while simultaneously working to live harmoniously with 
those who represent an oppressive class may seem counterintuitive.   
As mentioned above, Malik believes that stripped of the political implications, these 
identities could coincide without contradiction.  At the same time, it appears unimaginable at this 
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stage to remove these political implications. An interesting contradiction arises from this 
assessment of the source of double bind of identity for Palestinian citizens of Israel.  Although 
Malik asserts that Israeli and Palestinian identities could coincide harmoniously without the 
existence of the conflict, these identities are simultaneously shaped and reinforced by conflict.32  
The female students whom I interviewed holding both Palestinian and Israeli collective 
identities represented the complications associated with their identities in a simpler, reflective 
manner.  These young women are explicit that although they hold Israeli passports, they do not 
identify with the Israeli collective identity.  When asked to define her nationality and explain how 
she represents herself, Mariam laughs at the absurdity of the predicament in which she is placed.  
She answers: 
Nationality… that is a tricky question.  My -- uhh I don’t know.  Palestinian, I 
guess.  Well the thing is the Palestinians – well, because I live here - live in 
Jerusalem - that’s like Israel.  The Palestinians, they don’t really say you’re 
Palestinian.  “Okay, you’re Arab.  And maybe you originally were Palestinian, 
but now you live there so...”  And you have the Israeli passport, so they don’t 
really accept you there.  And here you’re Arab and you’re not Israeli, but you’re 
not Palestinian.  So it’s a whole thing.  And then your passport says “Jordanian,” 
so you’re just confused.  
This interrupted speech pattern in Mariam’s response exposes confusion and 
contradictions associated with the topic of her identity.  She searches for a way to 
articulate her struggle and express the position of her identity.  A broken speech pattern 
occurred frequently among subjects speaking of identity and other sensitive topics.   
Mariam laughs again and admits, “So… I guess I say just I’m Arab.”  The 
frustration and confusion is evident in Mariam’s speech and in the tone in which she 
laughs at the absurdity of her predicament.  When asked how she represents herself, 
Mariam responds simply, “I’m Christian.”  She then expands on whether Kids4Peace 
strengthened or weakened her sense of collective identity: 
Kids4Peace helped me ground my -- shape who I am as person how I see myself 
-- how I see others.  But as a nationality, it really -- maybe it made me avoid 
calling myself a certain thing like Israeli or Palestinian, so I just go to the middle 
and just say Christian Arab.  So, I guess both. 
 
32 So much of modern Palestinian identity relates to the struggle for independence, autonomy, and equality.  
Likewise, much of the Israeli identity is shaped around an existential threat and need for security. 
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Chris articulates the complications of his own relationship with his collective identity and 
the heaviness of the question “what are you?”  In Jerusalem, answering this question involves 
considering the connotations of all possible answers.  Chris expresses the frustration at the 
psychological struggle Palestinians -- particularly those living in Jerusalem -- face when 
confronted with conversations around their identity: 
You know, you probably say, "I'm an American" or something, and that's it… I’m just 
saying most of the world has something they can say that people understand.  That, you 
know, like doesn't have a heavy heart to it.  You know, like a heavy conversation that has 
to follow -- just where you're from.   
Chris then reflects the issue of identity by acknowledging my position as an American 
studying identity and the complications around identity in Jerusalem.  He exposes the fact that 
this is struggle I cannot fully comprehend given the existential security of my nationality.  He 
contrasts his own experience of identity in a complex conflict environment with my experience of 
being an American.34  Although the American identity carries its baggage, it provides those who 
hold it with extensive benefits.  To Chris’s point, that I do not have to question out of necessity 
how I present my nationality is an immense privilege.  The fact that as an American, I am able to 
more easily separate my sense of self from my national collective identity is an expression of that 
privilege, as well as of a cultural upbringing that instills a sense of individualism. 
Chris speaks to the complexity of his own identity, representing the dynamic, layered 
identities that have evolved in meaning and relationships to other groups over time but have 
nonetheless remained enigmatic.  Chris illuminates the predicament of these group identities not 
fully fitting onto his own sense of self.  This phenomenon of imperfectly suited identities rings 
strong throughout many of the interviews I conducted, particularly with Palestinian/Arab-Israeli 
youth.  I found this to be a common theme among the Millennial and Gen X Jerusalemite 
Palestinians with whom I became acquainted during my fieldwork.  Chris states: 
I feel like that's a self-struggle [around identity], and has a lot of things between me... I 
define myself as a Palestinian, but I don't have a Palestinian nationality, so someone can 
tell me, "You're not a Palestinian technically."  So it's very complicated.  Like none of the 
identities that are given to me technically fit to me and it's not easy.  But I don't know if 
Kids4Peace could help with that, even though they did make an effort to stress that idea 
of identity and who we are.  But it gets harder.  
 
34 Hammack also emphasizes the contrast in psychological burden and identity salience between American 
versus Palestinian and Israeli youth (Hammack et al., 2014).   
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The theme of loss or erasure of Palestinian identity appears in my interview with Chris.  
He mentions the erasure of Palestinian culture and identity, which began and continues due to the 
conflict and the occupation35 of Palestinian people and land.  The Israeli state uses tools such as 
curriculum, manipulation of language, and state institutions to exclude Palestinian identity and 
narrative from the national character of the state and to “other” the identity of the Palestinians.  
Chris continues: 
And part of the conflict here is the fading of the Palestinian identity and culture.  Which 
in many ways caused a lot of people to forget about their national culture and stick to the 
religious culture, which started more of a religious conflict even within their community 
now.  In the past ten years, you can see that there's more tension between Christians and 
Muslims [than] maybe 50 years ago or [that] did not exist at all 50 years ago.  So now it 
exists because people lost their Palestinian identity, and now they're identifying with 
whether you're a Muslim or you're a Christian.  And that's how there's more problems 
now.  But, yeah. I don't know if Kids4Peace helped - to summarize in this aspect - but it's 
a very complicated aspect. 
Although Chris remains ambiguous as to the part of Kids4Peace in this struggle between 
maintaining and erasing Palestinian national identity.  It is relevant to note that Kids4Peace 
brands itself as an interfaith organization, focusing on the three major religions in Jerusalem – 
 
35 Malik does not explicitly mention the occupation.  However, I found through my experience in Jerusalem 
that some Palestinians, particularly citizens of Israel, are more delicate than others in using these terms in 
company of unknown political associations.  An individual using the term ‘occupation’ can hold a variety 
of implications about the individual’s political position, but this term most often indicates a left-leaning, 
pro-peace, or “pro-Palestinian” position.  Therefore, using this term as a Palestinian citizen of Israel or 
resident of Jerusalem in the company of those who oppose these views could potentially invite social or 
physical harm.  Many members of the Israeli Palestinian collective code switch (alternate between two or 
more languages or terminology in conversation) in order to avoid this harm and succeed in their 
environment.   
High-context cultures like that of Palestinians often use indirect or symbolic language in 
communication.  This style is likely shaped by both cultural communication patterns and the experience of 
living under foreign occupation and suppression of national expression (vague language becomes practical 
in a highly tense political environment).  Additionally, high-context communication is a trait Palestinians 
share with other Arab cultures, but for Palestinians high-context communication also serves as an adaptive 
mechanism through which Palestinians may express themselves while under political and social 
suppression.  High-context communication involves buried, blurred, or suggested meanings, as meaning is 
often found in the context rather than the overt content of the message.  Symbolic language often takes the 
place of the direct speech associated with low-context cultures.  Palestinians under occupation, for instance, 
used the symbol of a watermelon to represent their flag when the overt symbol of the flag itself was banned 
(Zaharna, Hammad, & Masri, 2009). 
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Islam, Judaism, and Christianity.  Although the programming does discuss the Palestinian 
collective identity, much of the program is also focused on religious identity.36 
Malik also references the erasure of Palestinian identity as a concern.  Malik points to 
terminology in the struggle between maintaining Palestinian identity and adopting Israeli culture 
for Palestinians living within the Green Line.  He emphasizes that this challenge may be 
exacerbated by the context of Jerusalem, where divides are both stark but blurred in certain 
circumstances (i.e. the workplace, entertainment centers, etc.).  Malik asserts: 
I can’t pretend that I’m Israeli or… a lot of people would use the term Arab-Israeli.  I 
don’t like that term, because I feel it strips me of the Palestinian-ness that I definitely feel 
I identify with. Especially being here in Jerusalem. Maybe it’s not always common with 
people in the north - people in Nazareth or Haifa or Acre - maybe it’s not as apparent. 
But for me, that’s something that’s a key central part of my identity. 
This theme of erasure of the Palestinian identity appears in the Palestinian experience 
in Kids4Peace, particularly because the organization focuses primarily on grouping individuals 
based on religion rather than national group.  This could be one way the organization de-
politicizes its work.   
As mentioned in Chapter II, Israel’s state-designed curriculum aims at propagating the 
Israeli master narrative and minimizing mention of a national Palestinian character.  When 
learning about history and culture in Israel, students are taught that Israel is a diverse country that 
hosts Muslims, Christians, and Druze as well as Jews, but often does not describe this group as 
Palestinians.  Palestinian national holidays and important historical events are ignored.37  
Although many Palestinians citizens of Israel attend all Arab schools that use the Tawjihi38 
curriculum, the Israeli state is currently fighting to instate its own curriculum in Arab schools.  
Chris and Malik do not credit Kids4Peace as an aid in easing the inner struggle around 
their personal relationships with collective identity.  Each describe Kids4Peace as an organization 
aimed more toward mending the conflict between peoples, but not so much the struggle within 
 
36 The focus on faith is interesting to note, because although many participants do identify as religious, 
there is a significant portion who do not.  The common denominator of all participants is a connection to a 
national identity group (either Israeli, Palestinian, or both).  It would be logical to aim for a roughly even 
division between Israeli and Palestinian-identifying participants.  The choice by early leadership of the 
organization to divide members evenly by faith (one-third Jewish, one-third Christian, one-third Muslim) 
creates a dynamic in which Jewish participants are largely outnumbered.  This begs the question, why the 
emphasis on faith over nationality?   
 
37 Presenting Palestinian culture and key historical events would negate pieces of the Israeli master 
narrative described in Chapter II.  
 
38 Tawjihi is the curriculum taught in Arab Palestinian schools. 
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oneself.  Other participants did cite Kids4Peace as an aid in solidifying their sense of selves and 
confidence in their identities.  
 
A Resident without a Country: Jerusalem Residents with the Blue ID 
 
As mentioned in Chapter II, many Jerusalemite Palestinians do not hold Israeli or 
Palestinian citizenship.  Rather, these Palestinians hold a blue ID which grants them Jerusalem 
residency.  Without prior knowledge, I was unable to decipher which Palestinian youths in the 
Kids4Peace program were Israeli citizens and which were residents holding a Blue ID.  After I 
collected my data, I discovered that only one of my subjects holds a Blue ID.  The remaining 
participants are Palestinians in Israel or Israeli Arab or Israeli Jews.   
It seems meaningful that out of all the students who were recommended for an interview, 
only one is a Jerusalem resident. This could be explained both by social inequalities and cultural 
necessity.  From my experience in Jerusalem and the expertise of my advisor, I gather that 
Jerusalemite residents in many ways tend to be more linked to Palestinian society outside of the 
Israeli state.  Palestinian Jerusalemite residents with the blue ID travel more easily between the 
West Bank and Jerusalem.  Many have family members living on the other side of the separation 
barrier in the West Bank and travel frequently to spend time with them.  In this way, these 
residents with the Blue ID may experience certain sociocultural obligations to the Palestinian 
community in a way that is unique from Palestinian citizens of Israel, who are inherently 
embedded in Israeli society by the nature of their citizenship.  
Palestinian citizens of Israel (or Israeli-Arabs) have already submitted to some forms of 
Israeli society by default.  These individuals use Israeli services and often enjoy Israeli 
entertainment.  Most Israeli-Arabs speak Hebrew, whereas not all Palestinian residents have 
access to the Hebrew language learning.  This disparity leaves Palestinian residents with less 
economic and social opportunities than those with Israeli citizenship. 
Those Israeli-Arabs with whom I spoke seemed to hold Western, pluralistic, and liberal 
ideals in many ways.  For this reason, these youths seem to be the kind of candidates Kids4Peace 
staff would recommend for the study.  These youths also seemed to be relatively open about their 
experiences in Kids4Peace, and they freely offered criticisms of the organization as well as 
various cultural issues in Jerusalem and the West Bank. 
The sole Palestinian resident I interviewed was the one most concerned with whether his 
information would be identifiable in the publication of my research.  I asked him to explain in his 
own words what this interview meant for him in relation to his Palestinian community.  He 
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explained that he did not want his community to know about his involvement in Kids4Peace.  
From observations during my time in Jerusalem, the segment of the Palestinian population with 
the blue ID (indicating Jerusalem residency) seems to be even more deeply connected and 
socially influenced by Palestinian culture in the West Bank than those with Israeli citizenship, 
although both feel this connection to varying degrees. 
When asked, “what is your nationality and how to do you represent yourself?” Ahmed 
definitively answers, “I’m Palestinian,” with no additional comment.  His answer was so 
definitive, that as an interviewer, something stopped me from digging deeper into the issue. 
 
Occupier or Ally, Left-wing or Right-Wing? The Predicament of Israeli Jewish Identity 
 
 
Although the number of Jewish Israelis enrolled in the Kids4Peace programs is relatively 
low compared to Muslims and Christian Palestinians, this population is and has historically been 
surprisingly diverse.  Many Jewish Israeli participants do come from Left-wing backgrounds, but 
some also come from more Right-wing communities.  Jewish Israelis in the program range from 
secular to religious.39  This diversity in ideology and religiosity leads to different experiences 
even within this group.  
Yael discusses the salience of her religiosity among the other Jewish Israeli participants.  
The fact that she was one of the only religious Jews in her group led her to feel an additional layer 
of difference and the need to represent her sub-sect of the Jewish community.  Yael explains: 
So, like when we did go on Kids4peace to Camp Michael when I was twelve, the big 
issue was being Jewish and religious.  Like some of the activities we did on Saturday, I 
was like, “Oh, I actually can’t do this”.  And no one realized that, because no one realized 
that’s not something you wouldn’t be able to do on Shabbat.  Like they said, “okay, we’re 
going to do the tie-dying on Saturday.”  And I’m like, “Oh, I can’t do that.”  And they 
say, “Oh, we have pool time,” but there’s not ehovs, so I can’t take my towel.  Or like 
there’s grass outside, so I can’t like go onto the grass while I’m dripping wet, because 
that’s not allowed.  And so a lot of things that you feel like, “oh, suddenly I’m a 
representative.”  I feel like when we later joined the different delegations that we had to 
each area.  Like we had -- we went to Georgia and there were some different chapters.  
So once we were all together, there were some more religious kids and there were more 
people identifying with me.  So it stopped feeling like I had to represent and more like we 
 
39 Although I did not observe any Orthodox or Ultra-orthodox participants, one alumna cited having a 
friend from an Orthodox background.   
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were a group.  They’re not going to do anything to hurt me, because now there’s a group, 
and like, they can’t screw over an entire group. 
The process of Jewish Israelis (particularly those from Right-wing and Religious Zionist 
backgrounds) to reconcile their Zionist identity and belief systems with more liberal coexistence 
belief systems is highlighted through their participation in Kids4Peace.  To this point, Yael 
asserts: 
Like one of my friends said, the biggest problem, and the reason that there’s all this 
conflict in the Middle East is Zionism.  And I had to think back and start saying, “Wow. 
What does Zionism stand for? What are its roots? Why would that conflict with 
Palestinian Identity?  Why is this the cause of the conflict and why is this still a problem? 
And if so, how do I keep my Zionistic identity without hurting other people?” Which is a 
big issue that is hard to resolve and takes a lot of thinking.  And even today I’m not really 
one-hundred percent able to explain my beliefs without feeling like I’m hurting one side 
of my identity as someone who participated in Kids4peace and cares about Arab people 
and people who aren’t on the “winning side.”  And on the other hand, I mean, as a Jewish 
Zionist, how do I not hurt that part of my identity and don’t lie to myself about what I do 
care about? 
Yael acknowledges the way her friends perceive and have been hurt by Zionism.  As she 
grapples with what it means to be a Zionist in the context of both Israeli and Palestinian 
narratives, she asks herself some difficult questions. 
Yael appears committed to this journey of reconciling her relationship to Zionism with 
her relationship to Kids4Peace.  However, Yael’s future entails a further dive into Zionism in a 
context which likely promotes its ideology.  This both shows the importance of the seeds planted 
by Kids4Peace and the potential limitations of these seeds when competing with the powerful, 
state-sponsored tools that promote a nationalist narrative.40  Yael continues: 
So my school is very big on talking about identity and really figuring that out.  Next year, 
I hope to go into a pre-army program that one of its main focuses is Zionism and 
leadership and Zionist identity, which is something that I hope to sort of get into and 
really be able to understand.  To learn a lot more about the conflict, what it means day to 
day and a lot of its roots, which are still difficult to understand when there are conflicting 
narratives.  And every day we uncover parts of the history book that we didn’t really 
want to uncover if they are uncomfortable or conflict with what we knew until now.  I 
 
40 For Israeli Jews, these tools include pre-army programs like the one Yael describes, army enlistment, and 
other programs that promote a nationalist agenda.   
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think that’s really something that will help me... I don’t know the word in English… To 
really work on my identity and to give it a stronger face.  
Yael hopes to uncover the uncomfortable truths that contradict the Israeli – and more 
specifically Zionist – master narrative that colored her view of the land on which she lives.  It 
seems that she aims to gain a deeper understanding of her belief system by challenging it.  She 
does not shy away from ugly truths or criticism of her Zionist identity.  Instead, she grasps for 
understanding.  When asked if Kids4Peace led Yael to question her ideas around her collective 
identity, she responded: 
Not necessarily my identity but what more what I was told my identity has in it.  I was 
told, “we’re a Zionistic family.”  My mom made Aliyah and came here in her twenties.  
My dad is from a kibbutz, and my grandparents came and built a lot of the ___ aspects of 
the country… participating in that wave of Chamutzim. And I mean, I always knew that, 
but I never knew what that entailed.  Like, “Okay, I’m Zionistic.  I live in Israel.  I buy 
Israeli products.  I go to the army.  I think it’s important to serve our country.”  But on 
the other hand, I was also raised that you can’t hurt other people like for ideological 
reasons.  And so, how does that tie in?  How do I say, “I’m a Zionist,” when the meaning 
of the word took a new turn.  Like when a Palestinian friend of mine says it as if it’s the 
worst epidemic to ever arise.  How do I explain what to me being a Zionist means 
without giving up on any of the foundations I was raised on?  
Although Yael brings up this point, she also describes her community as one that 
incubates the same values of Kids4Peace:  
I mean, it’s kind of funny, because the community I’m in has a lot of people who were 
either in Kids4Peace or believe in the cause.  I mean, a really good family friend of mine 
is Omri, who was basically the face of Kids4peace for a while.  Umm… so it’s not like 
there’s this conflict between what I believe in and the people who surround me.  
Yael and Israeli Jews like her who come from a pro-peace background may have a more 
intuitive psychological integration phase of the Kids4Peace process – when youth bring the 
experiences, they have had through Kids4Peace back into their daily lives.  These participants 
may have more support from community members and family or already have access to other 
integrated spaces such as the bilingual Hand in Hand school.  
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Adina represents the right-wing minority of Kids4Peace.  Right-wing participants are 
uncommon given the culture and recruitment practices of the organization41.  Adina expresses 
some frustration with the assumptions placed on her as a right-wing Israeli Jew: 
Like me, specifically, and also my family are right-wing.  And in all of Kids4Peace, I'm the only 
right-wing here.  It's horrible.  Because also, a lot of people say, "You're right-wing.  What are 
you doing here?"  And I feel like it depends how you define Kids4Peace.  Because I define 
Kids4Peace as a place where I get-- like just because I'm right-wing, it doesn't mean I'm not going 
to talk to an Arab or be friends with an Arab.  It's just when there are certain situations, my 
politics are more to the right.  It's not like a stereotypical, "Oh, you're right.  So let's kick out all 
the Arabs” -- Not like that. 
Here Adina presents her perception of a nuanced right-wing identity and defends her 
moral position.  It is significant to note Adina’s suggestion that her own definition of Kids4Peace 
may differ from the definition others in the organization based on her group affiliation.  Her 
perception of Kids4Peace adjusts around her goals and visions as a right-wing Jewish Israeli.  
Noa offers her perspective as a secular Jew in the program who felt confused by the 
program’s religious focus: 
And the rest of it, maybe I got some-- how do you say it?  Like religious knowledge.  
Because I wasn't religious at all.  I'm not religious at all [laughter].  And Kids4Peace was 
the first time that I actually-- I mean I think that their agenda maybe-- that's how I 
remember it that their agenda is that this conflict is religious based kind of maybe. I mean 
not just but some of it… After 10 years in the program, I'm still trying to figure it out. 
Yeah. It's definitely complicated the way they present things. And I think maybe they 
believe that the peace or I don't know maybe that coexistence will come from learning 
other people's religion.  I think that might be more a part of it than the conflict itself being 
religious.  But yeah, I think they use that as a tool to help people understand each other.  
That was really weird for me because I never got to practice my own religion and now I 
have to practice some other people religion. And I had no idea. I mean they spoke about 
Judaism and they spoke about Islam and Christianity and I understood them both.  All of 
them I understood the same level, because I had no idea.  And all the information I got 
was from Kids4Peace because my family is not religious.  And my school [Hand-in-
Hand] really tries not to go into religious details because it's kind of complicated. We 
 
41 Kids4Peace recruits through community outreach and awareness.  Therefore, recruitment in the larger 
Israeli Jewish community has primarily remained within the realm of left-wing communities.  Some Jewish 
participants have at least one international parent and go to more left-leaning schools.  Some come from 
Hand-in-Hand, Jerusalem’s interfaith school. 
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learn about the basics about all religions. And then we stop in my school because which 
religion would I go to? Do I go deeper into my religion or other people religion or--?  So 
I think Kids4Peace wasn't afraid in practicing and learning about some other people-- I 
mean, about religion. So I think I got lots of information about this from Kids4Peace. 
And I think about most of the knowledge about the conflict that I have is not from 
Kids4Peace. It's from outside of Kids4Peace… I think it's not a religious conflict.  And 
they thought maybe -- not that it's a religious conflict, but that religion has a part in it. 
And I think, yeah, they use it as a tool.  But I didn't feel connected to that tool at all. So I 
felt like I don't get to speak about the things that really matter to me in this conflict, but 
I'm really interested. I'm really interested in that.  So I think it's a small thing, but it's also 
a really big thing because I felt really frustrated to go to these meetings which were 
around religion. And I don't feel connected not to my religion, not to other people 
religions. Yeah. So I think mostly this. 
Noa also expresses the difficulty she feels in remaining left-wing in Israeli society: 
I think with time and everything that's happening outside -- everything that's happening in 
Israel right now and in Jerusalem in specific -- it's really hard to remain left-wing here. 
It's really hard to believe in one of them.  I think it became harder and harder through the 
years to believe.  I have to go to my school and to go to Kids4Peace.  It became harder 
and harder.  
 
Kids4Peace as a Platform for Understanding Relationship to Collective Identity 
 
Most subjects of the study reported that their experience in Kids4Peace helped to shape, 
contest, accentuate, and/or solidify their understanding of and relationship to their collective 
identity. 
Malik utilized the Kids4Peace programs as a venue through which to process his 
relationship to the collective identities he holds – both Palestinian and Israeli – and their master 
narratives.  His coming to an even more solid understanding of this relationship and his individual 
self occurred through his experience in Kids4Peace, albeit in a round-about fashion.  It seems that 
through a dissonance between the Kids4Peace coexistence narrative, which Malik felt he was 
obligated to propagate, and his own personal and collective narratives that he seems to arrive to a 
stronger sense of self and assuredness in his convictions.   
One of Malik’s most powerful anecdotes described an interview he gave for the 
American press in which he played the role of an Arab-Israeli representative of Kids4Peace.  He 
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recalled feeling pressured to present a rose-colored, coexistence narrative.  Afterwards, he 
regretted that he did not respond with a more authentic presentation of his own truth and the truth 
of his people.  Malik recalls: 
I think that's something that definitely harms the reputation of these programs in the 
Palestinian society.  I think when we start adopting these falsities about the occupation, or 
when we start saying things more lightly, because it just sounds nicer to say them that 
way, or even because it's scary to do that.  It takes a lot of courage to say that to an 
Israeli.  I definitely understand the fear that's associated with it.  But the impact that 
you'd be having on that Israeli student if you're not actually honest with the things that 
you go through is subliminal compared to the impact that you would have if you were 
actually honest.  And yeah, I think I see that a lot in a lot of videos of Kids4Peace and 
other organizations where Palestinian students go up, and they speak about their 
experience and-- I don't know how to put this -- It's not a self-fulfilling prophecy, but it's 
like because Kids4Peace fosters that equality between students and giving both 
Palestinians and Israelis the equal -- and calling it a conflict and not an occupation.  And 
having this idea of respect, yeah, emphasizing the idea of respect so much.  Although it's 
good to have respect, but they emphasize it so much that I think it makes Palestinian 
students give the organization what they think it wants to hear rather than what they 
actually feel.  And that's something that I've definitely experienced with other students. 
… And it's something that I even fell onto in the past.  In my first few years in 
Kids4Peace, I wasn't true to myself and my political opinions.  In that 2014 Gaza thing, 
the war on Gaza, there was a lot of press coverage of the camp.  And see, I was in Seattle 
at the time, so there was a lot of press coverage of that.  And very often we'd be asked 
about what we think about the war on Gaza.  And I think one time I answered that we, as 
in a collective of Israelis, Palestinians are suffering-- I think I said something along the 
lines of, "We suffer from the rockets from Gaza like we suffer from the rockets into 
Gaza," or something like that.  And I don't think that was true.  I think, even at the time, if 
you were taking me for a one-on-one conversation and asked me, "Is this really true to 
what you think?"  I would have said no.  But in my heart, I always thought that that's the 
reaction that Kids4Peace wanted to elicit from me.  And so that's what I said.  And at the 
end, actually, I got a lot of backlash for it.  And I was a sixth-grade student.  I was like 
twelve-years-old, cut me some slack.  But even on the article that that quote was in, I 
think I got some hate in the comments from people that I didn't even know.  Yeah, I 
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didn't even know about it, actually, until I came back and my parents told me, "Well, 
look. People said this, this, this, this about you.” 
… So, yeah, I think the best and most straightforward thing is to just encourage honesty.  
I think the impact would be so much greater if people just emphasized honesty.  
Emphasize that they shouldn't go into this organization with predetermined opinions 
about what they want.  I think, also, the organization's kind of at fault for promoting that.  
Many times we've been asked by-- in certain activities, we've been asked to give a 
Palestinian narrative of a certain event, an Israeli narrative of a certain event, and then 
come together and bring a Kids4Peace narrative of a certain event.  And it's very, very, 
very corrosive to any sort of positive, meaningful discussion that we'd be having.  It's 
terrible.  To adopt a Kids4Peace narrative that's a centrist narrative just for the sake of 
being centrist, I think it's terrible.  It's really, really bad.  And I think it hurts the impact 
that it has.  I think in the minds of participants, it means that you should change your 
opinion.  You should change your opinion this much.  Or because there's a Kids4Peace 
narrative, just adopt that Kids4Peace narrative without actually considering facts and 
statistics and the stories of other participants. 
Malik admonishes the idea of propagating a centrist narrative for participants to blindly 
adopt.  He offers a powerful assessment of the authenticity of this centrist narrative.  This quote 
from his interview lays the foundation for much of the criticism of coexistence work.42  This 
quotation also provides interpretation of the participants of Kids4Peace and their authenticity; in 
this way, it presents a meta view of the other interviews in the study.  This lens led me to question 
whether this dynamic played out in my own interviews with participants.  Malik’s remarks 
brought me back to responses given by other participants.  Muna, for example, when asked if 
anything in Kids4Peace could be done better, said: 
No, I guess everything they do is quite amazing and lovely.  I love everything about it.  It 
was really really amazing and lovely.  I loved it so much.  And I really enjoyed the 
people who were with us.  The company, the advisors, everything was great and amazing.  
Many of Muna’s responses were along the same lines – optimistic, appreciative and 
complimentary of the Kids4Peace program.  Although she very possibly meant this glowing 
 
42 These insights lend themselves to some of the larger criticisms of the coexistence organizations such as 
Kids4Peace, Seeds of Peace, and Hands of Peace.  This is linked to the conversation about normalization in 
Chapter V. 
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review, I wondered why these responses aligned so perfectly with a coexistence narrative that 
supports the activities and proposed ideals of Kids4Peace.43   
In other interviews, some clues suggest that participants may potentially feel pressured to 
accept the centrist narrative outlined by Malik.  There is a possibility that, as he says, participants 
internalize expectations implicitly laid out by the organization.  Saed, for example, when asked 
what he has gained from his time in Kids4Peace, responds:   
The other side’s view – like, point of view.  What they think. That this land belongs to them. We 
think that this land belongs to us. Like so on.  We get to hear their opinion, and this can change 
our minds.  You can be against an idea, but when you hear the other side’s story.  It can change 
up your mind.  
 Then, when asked in what way it may have changed his mind, Saed admits:  
Until now, there is no major change, but I think that later -- by the years -- that it will change.  
I’m not sure if it will change or anything, but it can change other people.  
This response highlights an expectation that participants will change their beliefs about 
the conflict.  This expectation seems to be felt and articulated more so by Palestinian participants.  
Another interpretation of this response suggests that Saed originally meant that the minds of 
Jewish Israelis could be changed through contact with Palestinian participants like himself, not 
the other way around.  
 
4.3 Emotional Themes: Shame, Fear, and Alienation 
 
The emotion-based themes that emerged from the research are some of the most 
memorable and significant.  A variety of emotional themes appeared in the interviews -- both 
positive and negative -- presenting the nuanced and paradoxical nature of the experience of youth 
in Kids4Peace.  Some of these themes are: hope, disillusionment, fear, pride, shame, confusion, 
belonging, alienation, and strength.  However, to better understand the complexities of 
participation related to collective identity, this section focuses on three emotional themes: shame, 
fear, and alienation.  Shame and fear around one’s group identity and its associations appear in 
interviews with both Palestinian Israeli citizens and Jewish Israelis, as does alienation from that 
collective identity group.  Examples of these emotions arise in interviews with Malik and Chris 
on the Palestinian (Israeli-Arab) side, and with Alma and Johann on the Israeli Jewish side.  The 
 
43 Another reason for this style of response could be the timing of our interview.  The interview was held 
immediately before a Kids4Peace workshop while the other kids were socializing inside the event space.  
Muna may have been less present and rushed through answers in order to return to her friends.  
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theme of alienation from collective identity group arises as an important theme in discussing the 
place of Kids4Peace in society and how participation may impact an individual’s relationship to 
their identity group.  
The following section provides a snapshot of the complex nature of the psyche placed in 
the unique position of these youth in Jerusalem.  Although delineated by single emotional themes, 
these themes are interactional and multidimensional by nature.  These sections contain overlap as 
these emotions interact reciprocally and compound one another. 
Opposition to participation of Kids4Peace is deeply connected to collective identity 
content and loyalties.  This opposition affects participants to varying degrees depending on the 
strength and quality of their connection to the collective group and their position in the 
community.  Some participants minimalize the impact of this opposition in their interviews, 
suggesting that these attitudes do not sway them.  
Although some of these participants experience bullying, many seem to minimize its 
harm as a possible coping mechanism.  Some may also find the pay-off of Kids4Peace to be 
worth standing out in their community.  Some, like Muna, even cite the opposition they 
experience as a source of strength and motivation to continue doing the work.  They may not be 
as strongly identified with their collective group and value their own independence and individual 
identity to a greater degree.  In other cases, these youth were raised in communities that valued 
coexistence and were exposed at a young age to this peace narrative.  This peacenik subculture 
can lead to the placement of harmonious and coexistence values over group affiliation in some 
cases, even in a collectivist culture in an ethnonational conflict.  The relative privilege of the 
youth entering the program may play a role in their ability to maintain some level of detachment 
when it comes to criticism from their communities.   
In contrast to Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza or to Israeli Jews living in 
majority Jewish areas in Israel (or in settlements), living in Jerusalem puts many Israeli-Arab 
youth and adults in a position of coexistence of convenience and survival.  All the same, these 
youth report experiencing light to heavy levels of opposition from friends, family members, 
teachers, and even from complete strangers, exacerbating feelings of shame in the youth.  The 
content of this opposition often implies that participants in the organization are less legitimate 
members of their group or that they are traitors in some way.  Other teasing involves painting 
participants of Kids4Peace as idealistic and naïve.  Opposers exhibit a lack of understanding of 
the rationale for joining Kids4Peace and express disapproval of its activities.  
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Shame 
 
Shame is a painful emotion that responds to a sense of failure to attain some ideal state.  
Youth in Jerusalem feel shame in the context of their identity due to the expectations and 
meaning placed on their collective identities.  These expectations are impossible to meet for 
youth in the nexus of two competing collective identity groups (Israeli and Palestinian).  Youth 
internalize the lack of coherency between their sense of selves and the expectations and meaning 
associated with their collective identities as shame.  Malik and Chris discuss shame around the 
Palestinian piece of their Israeli-Arab identity in the context of the racism they face in their daily 
lives and in response to institutional racism that exists in the use of language and mainstream 
assumptions about what it means to be Israeli.  Malik explains how shame is intertwined with the 
contradictions within his identity: 
So I guess there’s kind of a contradiction with how I identify myself and how ...like how 
I identify myself, many would see as a contradiction - the idea of being both, identifying 
both as a Palestinian and as a citizen of Israel. But I don’t think both of those things are 
mutually exclusive, and I think many people would identify similar to me. And I think 
that’s a contradiction that was created by a political climate that shames and shuns people 
for identifying as Palestinians.  I think it’s also … I think it’s also just that the war and 
conflict that prevents people from identifying as part of both. 
For participants and alumni of the program, the data brings up themes of shame and fear 
around being an Arab in an Israeli setting.  Chris reports observing a reluctance from his fellow 
classmates to reveal their Arab identity to non-Arabs at the Hebrew University.  Although Chris 
pushes through his own discomfort, he confronts issues of collective identity-based shame 
through his Arab acquaintances.   He reports experiencing discomfort in observing this 
phenomenon:  
It's very hard for me. This is one of the biggest issues I'm seeing at the university, you 
know. I see one of my classmates who is also a Christian. He doesn't like to tell all our 
classmates that he's an Arab. I notice it. I notice that he avoids it, and I know because I 
get a weird feeling when I have to say it. But I always force myself to not feel ashamed, 
because I feel like I'm stupid if I'm ashamed of who I am. You know? But I've seen not 
only him, but a lot of people, who don't like saying they're Arabs because of the looks 
that they might get, or the fact that they might get isolated. And they end up finding very 
funny, clever ways of avoiding that question and answering [ambiguously]. And it's not 
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fun, you know? It's not fun to also feel like you should feel ashamed of who you are, you 
know? 
As Arab Palestinian citizens living in Jerusalem, Malik and Chris also report their 
experience of racism in after-school activities.  These experiences of racism may or may not have 
impacted their experience in Kids4Peace.  Each went into the program having been ostracized as 
an Arab Palestinian surrounded by Israeli Jews: 
Chris describes his experience as a child facing racism while playing tennis in his 
neighborhood: 
One of the things I remember also was I used to play tennis and -- because tennis was 
next to my house, which is just tennis center wherever -- and I was kind of facing some 
racism there by Jewish people when I was a kid.  It was not very fun at all.  I started 
feeling that there's legit racism.  I was spat at, cursed [at].  They didn't want to be my 
friends a lot of times.  It was not very fun, especially when you're like eight or nine or 
whatever.  
Malik explains his participation in extracurriculars primarily attended by Israeli Jews: 
It didn’t lead to a lot of meaningful interaction between me and the Israeli students. At 
best I would say it didn’t have much impact, at worst it was quite confrontational.  It was 
harrassing.  There were a lot of racist… when I look at it now, I can see racist things 
being said much more clearly.  I remember this a while back actually… I was surprised 
that back then I didn’t stand up for it, and the teacher didn’t stand up for it...(4:40) I was 
sitting in class.  I used to be -- believe it or not -- I used to be a very quiet kid in these 
extra curriculars.  I didn’t speak to many people.  And I would be sitting quietly and 
minding my own business.  And I think for sitting quietly, one of the Israeli students had 
said I’m a “good Arab” for doing that.  And I didn’t give it much attention back then.  In 
fact, I think I thought it was a compliment.  But now in hindsight, it’s so surprising to me 
how the teacher -- at the time the substitute teacher -- just responded to that with a smirk.  
It was even like he showed any --possibly he showed agreement, or he enabled that to 
happen. 
… But there are a lot of occurrences like that.  Unfortunately, it’s not something to ___ 
I’ve had a lot of friends in the same situation where they’re a minority in an Israeli 
educational framework.  I’ve had friends who have had their hair burned.  It’s quite tough 
to be the minority in these things.  Most definitely most definitely you can’t have a 
political discussion without people ganging up on you.  You have to learn that some 
subjects are just taboo to speak about.  
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Due to the racism Malik faced, Kids4Peace presented a new opportunity through which 
he was able to discuss politics with Israeli Jews in a safe setting.  A safe space for expression is 
particularly valuable space for students who have the desire to have these conversations, but have 
been made to feel afraid, uncomfortable, and disempowered in mixed group environments.  
Malik expresses ambivalence around the terminology of “Arab-Israeli”.  There seems 
to be a dissonance in identifying as an Israeli, but not as a Palestinian.  Replacing “Palestinian-
ness" with “Arabnes” strips the Palestinian part of his identity of its legitimacy and importance in 
the public sphere and symbolically strips the Palestinians of the right to a nation.  Malik says: 
I can’t pretend that I’m Israeli or… a lot of people would use the term Arab-Israeli.  I don’t like 
that term, because I feel it strips me of the Palestinian-ness that I definitely feel I identify with - 
especially being here in Jerusalem. Maybe it’s not always common with people in the north - 
people in Nazareth or Haifa or Acre - maybe it’s not as apparent. But for me, that’s something 
that’s a key central part of my identity. 
Noa and Johann express an active detachment from the collective Jewish Israeli identity 
due to shame catalyzed by the racist structures of the Israeli state in which they hold privilege.  
The implication is that these feelings are related to guilt they may feel in their association with an 
oppressive regime. 
A theme that arose from interviews with leftist-raised Jewish-Israeli students is 
detachment from the master Israeli narrative and collective identity.  These participants 
arrived to Kids4Peace already with a larger political and social consciousness than those who 
strictly adopt the Israeli master narrative.  At some point it appears that a few of these individuals 
chose to separate themselves from either the Israeli collective identity or Jewish identity.  This 
process of detachment seems to be associated with feelings of responsibility and guilt around 
Jewish privilege in Israel, policies of the Israeli state, and actions of the Israeli Defense Forces.  
Noa serves as an example of a young Jewish Israeli woman who attended the mixed 
school Hand-in-Hand and was raised with Left-wing, pro-peace values.  She was exposed to the 
coexistence narrative through her time at Hand in Hand, maybe even beforehand through her 
family.  Therefore, the ideals of Kids4Peace are already ingrained in part of her identity.  
However, because of her group’s position in the conflict, at some points in her journey, Noa 
seemed to struggle with feelings of shame and coming to terms with her privilege in the Jewish 
state and the associations her identity holds.  Noa recalls:  
It was [difficult].  I mean in Kids4Peace, it was really hard for me to say in Kids4Peace 
that I am Jewish Israeli.  Because it meant something for people there that it didn't mean 
for me.  And I understood that throughout the years in Kids4Peace that saying I'm Israeli 
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and I'm Jewish. Jewish Israeli is not as objective… Yeah. It's not as objective as I thought 
it was.  So there for sure, I thought about it a lot.  And I didn't feel comfortable saying 
that I'm Jewish Israeli all the time.  And I didn't use the word Jewish in lots of places.  
And it was the same like Israeli or something.  Or Hebrew-speaking or something.  I 
think I wasn't comfortable with my Jewish identity for a long time.  Around middle 
school and high school, I didn't feel comfortable with it.  Because just about how we 
spoke about the privilege we have.  And the fact that I can come here and be a citizen and 
get my citizenship.  I didn't feel comfortable about it.  I think Raufman, which was an all-
Jews program that I did, that kind of made it a little more comfortable.  A lot more 
comfortable.  Now I don't feel afraid to say that I'm Jewish, that I deserve to be here just 
like every other person.  Not instead of other people.  And I'm also really proud of the 
fact that I'm Jewish.  I think that proud, and I know it comes with lots of achrayut -- 
responsibility… Actually, I think it's Kids4peace had a really big part of [why I felt 
uncomfortable saying I’m Jewish].  I don't know why I can't-- I don't remember 
specifically that conversation that I wasn't feeling comfortable with my Jewish identity.  
But I know that the Palestinian side was really vocal and was heard a lot. Maybe more 
than the Israeli side.  And yeah, that was part of why I didn't feel so comfortable about 
my Jewish identity.  I can't remember why.  Maybe it was just me.  Maybe it was the first 
time that I heard about all those terrible, terrible things that are happening just next to me.  
And I was so in shock that I got into defense and thinking, "No, that can't be the whole 
story."  But now I know that it kind of is the whole story.  And at least that's what matters 
to me that people are unsafe here.  And feeling threatened and going through checkpoints 
everyday -- that's the main thing for me.  Maybe this time was the first time I've heard 
about those things and I said to myself, "that can't be it."  But it is.  So yeah, Kids4peace 
had a big part of it. 
Some of the Left-leaning participants simply did not feel a deep connection to their 
national citizenship for various reasons.  Johann too is a Left-leaning Jewish Israeli with a 
complex background (like many Jewish immigrants), which mixes both Middle Eastern and 
European roots.  His desire to detach from his Israeli identity seems to signal a disapproval of the 
Israeli project and governmental policy.  On the other hand, this distancing from group identity 
appears to be a privilege of a generation of youth who are coming of age in contemporary Israeli 
society.  Johann says: 
So technically I have an Israeli citizenship.  I’m Jewish.  I’m a reform Jew.  My mother is 
Yemenite.  My father is Austrian.  But if you were to ask me, I don’t necessarily define 
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myself as Israeli.  [There are] a lot of reasons why, but generally it’s that I don’t have a 
particular affinity or connection to an extent that I would actually identify with being 
Israeli.  Although I do acknowledge the fact that I was born here, I live here, I 
participated in all of the cultural societal systems that constitute being an Israeli, but I still 
would rather not identify as such.  I would say I’m from Jerusalem.  And generally 
Jewish and other stuff.  But when it comes to nationality, I wouldn’t say I’m Israeli.  If 
they would ask me, “are you Israeli” specifically, I would say yes.  But it wouldn’t be the 
first thing I would say about myself when someone would ask me, “who are you?” 
It is not only Palestinian citizens of Israel who avoid claiming Israeli as their nationality.  
However, as a Jew, Johann likely chooses Jerusalem over Israel as a descriptor for his residence 
for different reasons.  
 
Fear  
 
Fear is a common theme experienced by both Palestinian and Israeli youth in Jerusalem.  
Participants report being bullied for their participation in Kids4Peace and confronted by 
outsiders.  At times the coexistence work these youth participate in attracts confrontations that 
could potentially become dangerous to their physical and psychological well-being, emphasizing 
the real risk of this kind of peace work in a conflict environment.  In his interview, Hamza recalls 
a time in which a group of boys were confronted by a group of Jewish Israelis while on a 
seminar: 
But one time, we did [face opposition to coexistence work], as a group.  And this was at a 
seminar three or four years ago... We weren't kids anymore.  So what happened is-- we 
were Israelis and Palestinians in the same group.  And it was then like we'd finished our 
activities.  We're just in a room.  Obviously, guys and girls [separated].  So the way the 
hostel was built was in layers.  And each room had its own balcony, but you could look 
directly onto the lower floor's balcony.  And so a few of us were outside on our balcony, 
and we noticed that on the level above -- there were like two or three rooms next to each 
other.  And the guys were outside. They were drinking, smoking, listening to music, and 
hanging out.  Very different.  They were, I remember this, they were Mizrahi Jews from 
Rishpon... So a little bit of a rougher and kind of more divided background -- like lower, 
working-class sort of.  Tall, big guys… So they noticed that we were—that there were 
Arabs and Jews.  They noticed the Israelis, but also that there were non-Israelis.  So they 
had a lot of questions.  And then in the beginning, it was I think a lot of talk about like, 
  
 
 
 
65 
"Oh, what are you doing here?".  But then they noticed that there were Israelis and 
Palestinians.  And so then they didn't like it.  I remember they called to one of the Israeli 
boys, “boged” -- “traitor”.  I remember that once, someone was trying to climb onto our 
balcony.  They knocked on our door… So yeah. That’s something I remember.  Like just 
as Israelis and Palestinians being together-- like -- yeah. We met Israelis who didn't like 
that. But that was just a very-- it was something we had to deal with as a group the next 
day with our advisors, but it wasn’t like every day. 
Chris laments the fact that, although he has made good Jewish friends at Kids4Peace, he 
knows that many of them will join the army and may participate in violent or discriminatory 
treatment of his people.  Chris describes his thoughts and feelings around the issue: 
It's not easy.  It's not easy.  I mean I don't take anything personally, because I know a 
lot... they're forced to go into the army.  I know if I was in their case, I would go into the 
army.  And maybe even -- I would try to go for the best unit in the army too.  Because I'm 
just an ambitious person.  And that's what they put in front of me, that's what I'm going to 
do.  So I understand that point.  But it's not easy, because in the end of the day, the reality 
of the situation is after what I've seen in my life, I feel like in the end of the day the army 
is -- you can call it defense army -- but it's defending against someone. And that person is 
us -- Arab people.  We’re even Arab citizens, which is very unfortunate… I mean, if you 
want to say that a lot of people make the case that, “okay, Arabs from outside are coming 
in, Gaza and West Bank these outside are coming in behind.”  But even as an Arab 
citizen that technically has every right like any other citizen.  We get treated like shit by 
the army, by the police.  Things like that… So it's not easy for me, because I know that 
they go there, they go into the army, and they're probably fucking around with, messing, 
I'm sorry for using sorry for using, messing around with some Arab on the checkpoint or 
they're probably going to some Arab's house and breaking things in there.  Yeah, so it's 
not easy.  But I understand also that a lot of them don't want to be in the army.  And 
rather do their own thing for three years.  And some of them actually can't wait to go to 
the army.  I mean one time we were actually on our way to Kids4Peace, me and another 
guy who's also in Kids for Peace.  And no joke, we started talking to an American Jew, 
and he did not know the Arabs.  And I don't know how we mentioned the military, and 
just goes like this, like the whispering.  He's like, "But I wouldn't mind to join the army 
and shoot some Arabs."  Quietly like that -- whispering. 
In addition to some presence of fear and ambivalence, these anecdotes exhibit how 
through this fear and ambivalence, trust issues between Arab/Palestinian and Jewish Israeli 
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participants could continue to lay latent or even grow during participation in the Kids4Peace 
program.  
Chris does not blame the individuals, however.  He demonstrates empathy for Jewish 
Israelis and acknowledges the difficulty in reconciling the juxtaposition of the harmonious world 
of Kids4Peace with the harsh, violent reality outside in which his people face poor treatment from 
soldiers and police officers.  Chris also cites a racist incident perpetrated by an American Jewish 
male on the bus on Chris’s way to Kids4Peace.  Subtle notes of fear appear in his response to my 
question.  Kids4Peace, which attempts to reduce feelings of fear in interaction with the other, 
cannot erase the certainty of the future of some of the Jewish youths with whom he interacts.   
 
Alienation 
 
In this section, I investigate how external opposition to individuals' participation in 
Kids4Peace creates a sense of alienation from collective identity group, which in Jerusalem, 
means one’s family and community.  The alienation from one’s collective identity and 
questioning of allegiances relates to deeper issues of identity for these youth surviving in a 
conflict setting.  Presence and severity of alienation as a theme varies based on collective identity.  
Presence and severity of alienation as a theme varies based on collective identity.   
Shame is a major part of the experience of alienation.  I distinguish this motif of shame 
within the theme of alienation in that this shame is derived from a separation from the collective 
group and an isolation from the sense of belonging this group provides.  In cases of alienation, 
members of the collective group shame an individual, leading them to feel as if they do not meet 
the requirements of what it means to be an Arab or a Palestinian – a Muslim or Christian – a Jew 
or an Israeli.  Although ultimately some of this teasing may be light-hearted and does not lead to 
complete ex-communication from the group, the implications of identity-related teasing could 
potentially leave a lasting impact on the way these participants view themselves and their 
relationship to their collective identity.45 
The only Palestinian resident I interviewed exhibited the most concern over anonymity.  I 
interpreted this to mean that the closer to the Palestinian community outside of Jerusalem, the 
 
45 The potential negative impact of this teasing being exacerbated feelings of an ill-fit identity, feelings of 
isolation, and distancing from one’s community.  However, there is also potential for positive repercussions 
of these interactions.  Kids4Peace participants may push back against teasing to start a dialogue with their 
friends.  The teasing and opposition to Kids4Peace, if not extremely serious, could act as a place for 
participants to make changes in their community, as conflict can be a mechanism for the transformation of 
society.  
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more an individual may wish to hide participation.  This closeness to Palestinians outside of the 
Green Line may vary depending on family and neighborhood.  Many participants reported hiding 
their participation when visiting friends or family in the West Bank.  This youth’s concern with 
exposing his participation in Kids4Peace illustrates how strong the anticipated opposition might 
be. 
When Palestinian participants face opposition to their participation, the questioning 
strikes deeper than simple, superficial teasing.  Many in the Palestinian and international activist 
communities alike view organizations like Kids4Peace as “normalizing” the occupation 
(tatbi’a).46  Those who oppose normalization oppose this process before an end to the occupation 
and subjugation of the Palestinian people.  Chris explains: 
I guess from my close circle, I never felt that there was that strong of resistance.  But 
that’s also partly because the school I went to was a private school, so the people there 
are not as extreme.  But they were still more extreme than others, but they’re not that 
extreme that they would start fighting me because of my opinions.  But they would 
disagree with me and a lot of times maybe they’d crack a joke-- You know, I've been 
called “Jew”, a Jew in my school when we were kids.  But you know, it's not the biggest 
deal.  I think they made a song. It was a bad rhyme, but they said, "Look at Chris, he's 
like a Jewish." or something like that.  
The findings of the interviews show that youth like Chris, Malik, Noa, and others who 
attended either the mixed Israeli-Palestinian school or private schools are less likely to be in an 
environment that presents extreme opposition to this work.  Without having exact numbers, it 
appears that a large proportion of participants of Kids4Peace do come from these schools that 
harbor pluralistic ideals and coexistence values.  Additionally, the fact that the students chosen 
for my study -- some of the most active in the program – came from these schools may signal that 
youth are more motivated to continue with the program if they will not face extreme opposition or 
alienation from the outside world.  Malik says: 
The resistance is largely from my friends in Jerusalem [and] a lot of my friends in the 
West Bank and Ramallah who really look down upon these programs.  They think they’re 
normalizing programs.  They legitimize the injustices that they face as a result of the 
 
46 Normalization defined by the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel 
(PACBI) has defined normalization specifically in a Palestinian and Arab context “as the participation in 
any project, initiative or activity, in Palestine or internationally, that aims (implicitly or explicitly) to bring 
together Palestinians (and/or Arabs) and Israelis (people or institutions) without placing as its goal 
resistance to and exposure of the Israeli occupation and all forms of discrimination and oppression against 
the Palestinian people” (Ziv & Chacar, 2011). This topic is discussed in depth in Chapter V.  
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Israeli occupation.  That they normalize them in a way that they take them off the table 
and they pretend like everything is fine.  They think it’s like collaborative, and they don’t 
necessarily like that.  So yeah, I definitely received a lot of backlash from them.  I 
definitely received a lot [of backlash].  Especially from Jerusalem and Ramallah - those 
two places I’d say I received the most backlash from.  To say in Ramallah, in my friend 
groups there, to say that you are a part of such a program, it would be social suicide.  And 
people there -- the community of people there I associate with -- they don’t represent the 
majority of Palestinian society.  They’re pretty affluent people.  They’re people who have 
-- their English is excellent.  I met them through model UN conferences and stuff, so 
that’s the sort of society I’m dealing with.  They live in a bubble in Palestinian society.  I 
don’t think they’re exposed to many things outside of it.  I don’t think they have been 
exposed to those things growing up.  So to them, me being a citizen of Israel, that’s 
already a betrayal.  That’s like a question mark on top of their heads. 
Here Malik emphasizes the strain of maintaining friendships in Ramallah and Jerusalem – 
presumably his community outside of Kids4Peace – while participating in Kids4Peace.  He hides 
the Kids4Peace aspect of his life in order to retain his social position in the Palestinian 
community.  Malik’s comment additionally illustrates the delicate relationship between West 
Bank and Jerusalemite Palestinians, especially for those with Israeli citizenship.  Palestinians 
living in Jerusalem are exposed to a different set of cultural dynamics that include interacting 
with Israeli Jews and mainstream Israeli Jewish culture.  This may already be difficult for many 
in the West Bank Palestinian community to accept, given Malik’s comment about his Israeli 
citizenship being taken as a betrayal.  To elevate involvement with Israeli Jews to another next 
level through participation in Kids4Peace – to dialogue, to play, to eat and attend camp together – 
this may be cause for additional strain between these two disconnected populations.  
Mariam also cites normalization as a reason for backlash she received for her 
participation in Kids4Peace:  
The people outside tend to have a very confined opinion about these kinds of -- There’s a 
word in Arabic.  I don’t know how to translate it into English, but it basically says it’s a 
planned movement by the Israelis - like it’s a way to go more into -- to take over more. 
[Normalization (tatb’a)].  I used to get attacked for it in high school.  Like by my 
teachers.  They used to be like, “oh, you’re in Kids4peace,” like in front of the whole 
class.  I do see where they’re coming from, but at the same time I don’t think it’s the 
most negative thing.  I think it’s necessary for people to come to listen.  And to speak out 
to the other person. And Kids4peace provides that.  It provides a safe area in which both 
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sides can talk about it.  Like it’s a safe place to do that.  And I think it’s necessary to do 
that.  And as a result -- It could result in people from both sides in becoming friends and 
becoming more accepting.  That’s the positive way of seeing normalization.  It depends 
on how you perceive it. But I do see… People are filled with anger.  I do understand why 
they would be against it straight up right off the bat.  It’s not an easy process.  I 
understand people are angry.  I understand why people would be against it.  But people 
are participating in it, and it could result in many good things.  I think both sides are valid 
in my opinion.   
When asked how she felt when her teacher made this comment in class, Mariam responds:  
Yeah, I felt attacked that day.  My teacher goes through check points every day to get to 
school. And I did not argue with him, because I was like I don’t have much valid 
argument to tell him.  I could tell him I am there making friends and trying to achieve 
peace… but to him that doesn’t mean anything really… ya-anee47, it doesn’t change the 
fact that he has to go through checkpoints every morning, and that it takes him two hours 
more than if there hadn’t been checkpoints.  So there’s always -- there’s people who -- 
and I’m privileged as well.  Compared to many people who live in the West Bank who 
are very confined.  I can’t go and tell them, “oh look at me, I’m friends with -- look at my 
israeli friends -- we’re all happy together.”  And they are there they just can’t travel 
freely, they have all of these issues.  It doesn’t feel right, you know?  So I didn’t really 
respond to him or defend myself.  I kind of understand where he was coming from but at 
the same time, I did believe in what I was doing.  But I did not believe it was appropriate 
to confront him about it.  
Saed and Ismail also report that members of their collective Palestinian community 
express opposition to their participation in Kids4Peace.  Visibly upset at the memory of these 
accusations, Saed recounts: 
It’s mostly based on friends. Like friends sometimes make fun of us. Not a lot. It’s rare. 
It’s when we were younger. Like, you’re in Kids4peace, you’re against our country, like 
just saying stereotypes that are not true… things that are not true.  
Maroun also cites push-back from friends when it comes to his participation in 
Kids4Peace.  It seems that Maroun speaks hypothetically here to these acquaintances, presuming 
the type of arguments he may encounter and his projected response.  Because they are close 
friends they understand.  I expect that other friends might not like the idea.  Because I’m dealing 
 
47 “I mean” in Arabic. 
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with the ‘other side,’ how they say it.  And they’re like, “you’re betraying your country.  You’re 
working with Jews.  They stole our country” and stuff.  “Yeah, that might be true.  But still, I’m 
learning, I’m understanding, I’m doing the right thing.  Unlike you.”  So that’s my reaction to the 
reactions as well. 
Youth belonging to the Palestinian collective identity are not the only ones who face 
alienation from certain sectors of their community.  As a continuation of his story in 4.3, in which 
he recounts a confrontation with Jewish Israelis during a seminar, Hamza makes an important 
point in his description of the debrief after the encounter: 
We just discussed it kind of.  The Israelis, I kind of liked having them there because I 
remember asking like, "Why would they be against you?  You're Israeli."  But to them, it 
was like, [bad] because it's-- we're with Arabs. It doesn't really matter that we're Israeli to 
them.  If there was a scenario where a Jew was that severely opposed to us.”  Then they 
said like, "it wouldn't matter that we're Jewish. 
So kind of hearing that was a big thing for me like, “oh, wow.”  There is kind of a divide 
there.  I think Jews might feel differently about other Jews because of their political 
views.  We did have to deal with our advisors on how would we approach it next time 
and what were the mistakes, and also just acknowledging, “oh, this is something that 
happens”.  People aren't always going to like what you do. 
Hamza’s commentary highlights an important element of Israeli Jewish society – the 
heterogeneity in thought and attitudes towards conflict48.  Although many Israeli Jewish youth 
from the organization are fortunate enough not to experience complete alienation from their 
community for their participation (and oftentimes this work is even applauded within left-wing 
communities), this anecdote is a reminder of the external challenges Jews face when participating 
in Kids4Peace.  The opposition’s impact on collective Israeli identity may be even more salient if 
the Israeli Jew in question does not participate in the army, creating further distance from 
mainstream Israeli expectations.   
Although some Jewish Israelis do receive criticism when it comes to their participation in 
Kids4Peace, fewer Jewish youth reported experiencing this, and those who did, did not seem to 
 
48 Refer to Chapter II, Hamza references the divide in Jewish Israeli culture based on ethnicity (Mizrahi 
versus Ashkenazi) and socio-economic divide (he describes the group of men as “rougher” and “lower-
class.”)  As a Palestinian citizen of Israel living in the intersection of both Israeli and Palestinian cultures, 
Chris holds insight into the social dynamics of both cultures and into the way they overlap via his own 
identity group.  
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suggest that this criticism completely alienated them from the Jewish community.49  Johann and 
Noa represent the Left-wing Jewish identity that is already deeply immersed in a pro-peace 
framework.  These students attended the mixed Israeli-Palestinian Hand-in-Hand School.  When 
asked if he faced challenges to his participation from his community, Johann reports:  
So not really.  I mean the fact that I already lived in a community in high school that was 
integrated -- so that kind of was a… they didn’t really care.  So it was kind of like “woo, you’re 
doing it”.  If I did have any problems, I mean it was my family.  For example, I don’t think 
anyone had a particular problem -- not in my immediate family, but maybe with like cousins or 
stuff.  If they did have a problem, that already would have presented itself when I started going to 
the Hand in Hand School.  So it was just kind of bundled in with that.  
It seems that these students faced the initial blocks that challenge the coexistence 
ideology before entering Kids4Peace, since attending Hand-in-Hand school means that these 
students live a coexistence lifestyle every weekday of the school year.  Noa’s personal narrative 
falls under the same category.  She explains: 
Meeting once a week or once every two weeks is less extreme than going every day to a 
school which is mixed. Sometimes people were just like, "Maybe go to an all Jews 
school, and then go for Kids4Peace, and that will do." So I think that was one of the 
things. None of the people I've known I know questioned my decision to go Kids4Peace. 
[There are ideas that--?] that's the things I do to go to mixed groups, and meet Arabs, and 
speak Arabic. But, yeah, going to the school was different and I was becoming who I am 
because of what my school was difficult in this situation. I have one specific friend which 
every time I meet and every time I see, we would speak a little bit about ourselves, and 
then she always comes with those really annoying kind of questions about my school and 
my decision to go to the army and she's really-- I mean, I don't thinks she sees me as who 
I am but just sees me as who she wants me to be and what she wants to be, and I'm not. 
So, yeah, it's different but I also get lots of support. My family supports me, of course. 
And I know my grandpa is really, really proud of me in whatever I do. So I get my 
support in my-- how do they say 'not supportive'? 
 For Jewish Israeli citizens who go to Hand in Hand, it seems that the questioning of their 
participation in Kids4Peace and the Hand in Hand school do not necessarily outweigh the support 
they receive from their families and communities. Noa continues to describe the support she 
receives from her grandparents: 
 
49 However, Noa does divulge that it has become increasingly more difficult to be left-wing in Israel from 
her perspective. 
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My grandpa and grandma were really proud of the fact that I chose not to go to the army, and 
every time my school puts up something on Facebook, they immediately share it.  And I think 
that maybe-- yeah, I think the fact that I-- I mean, I could also go to this school and to Kids for 
Peace and I cannot take any-- it wasn't such a big part of me, but because it is, I know they have 
to accept it, and they became closer to the idea because of that. They also accepted it and 
themselves and [inaudible] and it changed them as well. 
This anecdote illustrates that in some ways, Noa has more of an impact on her family 
than she first realizes.  From my observations, I gather that the opposition from the Jewish 
community is less present and severe than that from the Palestinian community.  This may be due 
to the power asymmetry and the charge of normalization.  Israeli Jews may experience less risk 
when it comes to participation in coexistence organizations.  For individuals on the group, this 
kind of work may appease their consciences.  The riskiest aspect of this kind of work for Israeli 
Jews is psychological.  They may begin to question the national narrative that holds their society 
together.  More Israeli Jewish youth may start to refuse military service and oppose the 
occupation. These are the reasons for opposition within the community.  However, the Jewish 
population continues to hold power securely over the country. 
To reiterate her point, Noa mentions her work in the national service (Sherut Leumi) and 
her refusal to join the army.50  When asked if she believes her voice has an impact on those 
around her – her friends, her roommates, those she works with in the national service-- Noa 
answers: 
I wish I had more [of an impact on them].  I think that somehow my opinions and the way 
I see the world became not legit.  At least, not legit as other ways to see the world and 
other opinions.  In that, sometimes the moment I opened my mouth and start speaking to 
people about those things they shove me out.  I mean, they tell me to shut up because I'm 
kitzonit.  I'm extreme, and I'm leftwing.  And whatever I have to say it's-- it's not the 
truth.  And I think it's mostly because I'm not-- I want to translate this word in the Google 
translate -- “forceful” -- I think that people don't see my opinions as forceful.  I mean, I 
also don't see my opinions as forceful.  But it doesn't mean it's naive.  It just means it's 
peaceful.  And somehow it became less and less mikubal -- less and less accepted to 
listen to these kind of opinions.  So maybe I have some kind of-- and I know the moment 
that we start speaking about something in a deep kind of way, and start to speak in a 
 
50 Sherut Leumi is an alternative for those who do not wish to or cannot serve in the Israeli Defense Forces.  
Through this program, Israelis citizens do community volunteer work and may receive the same benefits of 
those who join the army.  Arab citizens are exempt from conscription in both the military and national 
service, but legally may participate in Sherut Leumi.  
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meaningful conversation, I know that some time people will listen.  But most of the time 
it's just really artificial and it's not deep enough to speak about those things.  I also think 
people are afraid of listening to me and hearing what I have to say because it threatens 
what their acceptable narrative is.  And people don't want to change most of the time… I 
think [the leftwing narrative is getting less and less acceptable] with time and everything 
that's happening outside -- everything that's happening in Israel right now and in 
Jerusalem in specific.  Yeah, it's really hard to remain left-wing here.  It's really hard to 
believe in one of them.  I think it became harder and harder through the years to believe.  
I have to go to my school and to go to Kids4Peace. It became harder and harder.  
It is clear through Noa’s answer that the smaller the left-wing becomes with the 
strengthening of right-wing politics and with current events that cause more division between 
Israelis and Palestinians, the more challenging she finds holding her position.  
Rather than feel discouraged by those opposing the work of Kids4Peace, Muna, a 
Christian Palestinian citizen of Israel, uses the backlash to fuel the work she does in Kids4Peace.  
She says: 
People are so convinced about the idea that Israelis are bad and they’re the enemy and 
whatever so it’s hard to be going against the flow.  [But] it gives me more power to help 
me know that I should be doing this work more and more. 
 
4.4 Self-Expression and Self-Reflection: Release, Relief, Communication, and Growth 
 
The section examines the interactional level of the Kids4Peace experience.  It describes 
and analyze experiences of youth from opposing sides of the conflict directly in dialogue.  This 
discussion identifies output of contact through for youth variant based on collective identity 
group. 
The responses to the questions above vary greatly depending on the age of the youth 
subject.  Alumni of the program report different experiences with dialogue based on the staff who 
were with Kids4Peace at the time.  Since a major overturn in Kids4Peace staff in 2017-2018, 
interviews suggested that the dialogue held during the programs failed to retain the deep, 
transformative quality of those of years past.  The difference may be due to the loss of seasoned 
facilitators, the group of youth involved, the events that occurred during the time of the program, 
and the environment in which the program took place. 
Having acknowledged these variables, it is valuable to explore what the participants took 
away from the dialogue and how they experienced the dialogue space.  Many students reported a 
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feeling of relief in being able to express themselves to ‘the other’.  I found this only in the 
Palestinian (Israeli-Arab) subjects.  Jewish Israeli students reported higher levels of frustration 
and discomfort.  Some Israeli Jews also reported personal growth and gaining perspective through 
this process.  Arab/Palestinian students claimed a new-found empathy for the experience of the 
Israeli Jews as well as increased skills in communication and listening.  
 
Relief and Release 
 
A powerful motif that emerged from the interviews with Palestinian participants is the 
transformative power of being heard.  Both Christian and Muslim Palestinians alike report a 
cathartic effect to dialogue.  Hamza, a Muslim Palestinian alumni expresses his hope that the 
‘other side’ would take his perspective into consideration, but the experience of being heard 
seemed to serve as a release and held value in itself.  Hamza says: 
Just the experience of having them hear you is a big thing.  Really, I would just hope that 
they would actually listen and take things on board.  My wish would just be that this is 
acknowledged, and kind of -- I definitely don't expect -- I can definitely kind of feel or 
understand why they might have a connection to this space as well. 
It appears that Hamza feels more open to understanding the perspective of the other when 
given the opportunity to be heard.  He expresses his wish for transforming the others in dialogue, 
but not an expectation.  
Malik’s interview that deals with his ability to release the tension he experienced from 
years of repressing racism, discrimination, and microaggressions in Kids4Peace.  After discussing 
the racism he faced in Israeli extracurriculars, Malik asserts:  
I mean [Kids4Peace] was the first time I could speak about politics or about my treatment 
as a Palestinian in Jerusalem as part of a normal you know non-offending discussion … 
it’s like an even-handed discussion where it’s like one on one or two on two. It showed 
me a side of Israeli society that I never saw before. I knew people had those discussions. I 
knew people had those political opinions. Hell, my parents had those political opinions. 
And they deal with a lot of that stuff on a daily basis. But I didn’t necessarily experience 
that… I think it was definitely a relief to be able to do something like that. I don’t think 
many people get the chance to. I also don’t think many people were put in my 
predicament before.  I think most Palestinians largely keep to themselves and oftentimes 
confrontations with Israeli security forces or police, the army and such turn violent.  So 
yeah, I think their experience would be slightly different.  But it was definitely something 
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that was constructive.  It definitely made me learn a lot. It wasn’t something that was 
easy all the time. But I definitely think it had a net positive.  It wasn’t as if something was 
revolutionized in terms of my understanding of the conflict. But it was a lot more open 
and comfortable to speak about these kinds of things. It was a safe space where I felt like 
the things that I believe in weren’t necessarily taboo.  Like there were other people who 
believed in them, and I could communicate it to the quote unquote “other side” without 
being shamed for it. 
Malik felt a relief in finding a space in which he could express his beliefs without being 
shamed or judged.  He asserts that more than knowledge about the conflict, this was a greater 
output he received from time with the organization.  It seems that Kids4Peace provided Malik a 
unique opportunity to share in a way he could not anywhere else.  
Chris explains the value he gained from sharing his voice and ideas and developing 
leadership skills through the program:   
The biggest thing I feel like Kids4Peace gave me is maybe a platform to share my ideas 
and my thoughts and bring it all out. I remember the most times that I felt like 
Kids4Peace was very beneficial and what I liked was when we went to leadership and 
we'd have actual conversations that were not even-- not really often. It's like it was legit 
conversations, which I believe are very, very important.  A lot of times with the younger 
kids, they try to hold back.  At least when I was a counselor, they were trying to hold 
back.  They weren't trying to get very deep into the conflict.  But when we were older, we 
got pretty deep.  And it was very good, and I think also for me to be able to share my 
opinions and to have an outlet or a place where I could share, a safe place.  Because it's 
not very safe to share your opinion, whoever you are.  As an Arab, I've seen that.  As an 
Arab in the Arab society, it can be sometimes problematic.  And as a Jewish if you are 
left-wing, you get called a self-hating Jew and a lot of things, so it's very hard to find a 
safe place where someone can share their opinion here without getting aggressive 
feedback.  So I feel like that's something that Kids4Peace helped me a lot with.  
It appears that the space Chris found to share his truth and discuss important issues was 
beneficial to him.  Chris expresses a need for a safe space for self-expression that was met 
through his participation in Kids4Peace.  In the Kids4Peace program he was able to avoid the 
ostracization and shaming from Arab society.  He acknowledges that this safe space could be 
beneficial for left-wing Jews who also face opposition to their liberal beliefs around the conflict.  
This response illustrates the importance of a space in which people with similar pro-peace values 
can come together and speak in a way that may be repressed outside of the program walls.  
  
 
 
 
76 
Ahmed, a Palestinian resident of Jerusalem addresses the opportunity he gains through 
Kids4Peace to share his perspective and have dreams and ideas taken seriously.  In other spaces, 
these ideas may be seen as unrealistic or idealistic.  Ahmed explains:  
If Kids for Peace-- we Kids for Peace just keep talking about what's happening but if you 
talked about the same thing that you're talking with Kids for Peace everyone will judge 
you. And he will start saying, "Oh, you can't do anything. You're not going anywhere 
with that." But at Kids for Peace if you said anything-- but sometimes it happened and 
sometimes no. Because like last year we-- do you know the cinematic? We talked to them 
about putting Arabic subtitles in their movies and they agreed with that. So they gave us a 
date. But I can't really remember that date that they are going to start putting Arabic 
subtitles. 
Although Ahmed does not have a confirmed date for the implementation of the Arabic 
subtitle project, he impresses that having his ideas heard and considered by adults was an 
empowering experience in itself.  
 
Communication 
 
Two Jewish Israeli participants expressed developing better “debate skills” through 
Kids4Peace.  Tamar emphasized this in her interview:  
My debate skills got better.  Because, I mean, I was on a debate team.  And I used to just 
write down points and then write down the people that are against me’s points and then 
use it against them.  But now I learned that debate is more about having not a discussion 
but really understanding what the other is saying and not just writing down your points 
and then using it against them.  Because sometimes you use a point against the other 
person but you don't understand it, so you just make a fool out of yourself.  You're 
contradicting yourself by saying it.  And I didn't understand what it meant until I came 
here, and I really learned it. 
A few Palestinian participants highlighted empathy, active listening, and non-violent 
communication over learning how to get their point across more powerfully.  Chris asserts:  
I [use the skills I gained from Kids4Peace] actually, more by listening and being able to 
listen to others, and how to respond. When I was in my leadership, again that's where we 
used to talk.  Part of the issues was: 1) I always wanted to talk, and I had a hard time 
listening to others, 2) I was very aggressive in the way I talk.  And I get emotional.  And 
that I think [Kids4Peace] helped.  I'm much less emotional.  I'm not as emotional or 
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easily triggered.  I have the ability to listen more and convey my message in a calmer 
way.  That's some of the things I remember really helping.  In general, it's always useful 
to have these tools where you know how to communicate with others effectively.  Which 
is what they taught us about a lot in my camp.  That it's very important to know how to 
communicate and how to say things in a way that is acceptable or right or how to say it.  
And also in general arguing, my approach to dialogue was an arguing approach where it's 
either I'm right or you're right.  And it's a whole ego thing that goes a lot of times into 
argument, where-- and that's not very ineffective.  Because a lot of times what happens is 
for example if we're arguing and somehow gets to our egos, even if you agree with me, 
you won't admit it.  And that's not effective at all.  So it's really about knowing how to 
give the person in front of you [inaudible] how to talk in a way where they can feel okay 
with agreeing with you or have-- what I remember the word, dignity to agree with you.  
Whatever, if that makes sense.  I give them the ability to agree with you, and to come and 
see your point.  The idea of kind of dialogue and argument is that the other person sees 
your point and understands you, not for you to embarrass them or to make them feel bad.  
Which is an approach that a lot of people take, and I used a little bit. I used to do it when 
I was younger, of course… of course I still do it sometimes. But taking the person part 
out is very important. I’ve seen people make things personal and it never goes in the right 
direction. 
Hamza describes his experience developing empathy for the ‘other side’:  
I can definitely kind of feel or maybe understand why they might have a connection to 
this space as well. Otherwise, it would have been like, "Oh, because they were here 2,000 
years ago, and there's a wall that they think is holy." But now, it's like I can understand. 
It's more than just that you were born here and you grew up here and so have your 
parents. To a Palestinian, it's like, "So, I can count 20 generations." But I can understand 
like, "Okay, but even you as a person, regardless of your identity, you're also from here in 
a way." So I can kind of-- so I guess it is empathy, less than maybe in a debating sense, 
but just as at an individual level. 
The small group of Israeli Jews who focused on developing debate skills juxtaposed with 
the Palestinians/Arabs who noted that their development of active listening and non-violent 
communication skills could present meaningful data, albeit loose.  This difference in response 
could be attributed to two possible factors: 1) the relative power dynamic outside of the room and 
2) a difference in cultural communication styles.  
  
 
 
 
78 
The youth I interviewed almost unilaterally agreed that through their experience with 
Kids4Peace, they underwent a process of finding their personal voices through a combination of 
solidifying the self and being given the opportunities to express this self through opinions and 
personal narrative.  The results were positive for both Israeli Jews and Muslim and Christian 
Palestinians.  
Fatima, a Muslim Palestinian citizen of Israel, is one of the participants who believes 
Kids4Peace accentuated her sense of self.  As a participant who moved on to become a Counselor 
in Training (CIT) to an advisor to the position of a director, Kids4Peace provided Fatima with 
self-confidence, leadership skills, and the opportunity to use her own voice.  Fatima asserts: 
Kids4Peace helped me know who I am more. Like highlighted who I am. [In] the way that I 
speak today and identify myself.  It helped me know my roots more and also to understand the 
others even if they hurt you in the past.  It helped me shape the way I see people in Jerusalem and 
see the occupation- conflict [with] more open eyes. 
Sarah, a Jewish Israeli, also cited finding her voice as a partial result of her experience in 
Kids4Peace: 
I have more of a voice [after Kids4peace]. I speak out more in debates. State my 
opinions… Kids4peace was one of the reasons.  
Both Jewish Israeli and Palestinian Israeli youth like Fatima and Sarah felt empowered 
with the opportunity to speak openly and freely about their opinions and feelings in dialogue.   
 
Self-Reflection and Growth 
 
Israeli Jewish emphasized different themes from their experience of dialogue in 
Kids4Peace than Palestinian citizens and residents.  Johann discusses his development of a 
political awareness through his time in Kids4Peace:  
As Jews, you don’t really hear about Palestinians’ experience here, especially in 
Jerusalem.  And for some of [the Israeli Jews] kind of -- well, their place in it kind of 
doesn’t exist.  They hear that, and they don’t particularly think about how they are a part 
of -- let’s just say the systems of occupation and oppression that [Palestinians] face. And 
I definitely think here having Palestinians who had and have preconceived notions of 
Jews and Israelis and Israeli systems and the way they experience things definitely helped 
me kind of look further into myself and ask, “what is my place in all of it?”  When they 
talk about their experiences living under occupation or having experiences that a 
Palestinian would go through during their daily lives in Jerusalem, which is something I 
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only got from school later as all of us kind of developed a political awareness.  But in 
Kids4peace it was definitely kind of having people who are politically aware – actually 
from both sides – because Jews are encouraged to have very political views from a very 
young age – but from both sides to have varying political opinions and for me to 
understand that my political opinions were kind of like, “tralala let’s all live together,” 
when I was in 6th grade, which was kind of what was expected of me.  But you know, 
[Kids4Peace] was kind of the first time and place that challenged me to think -- I went to 
a place where I saw two sides – not particularly um – I didn’t identify with any of them.  
From the Jewish side, it was that I didn’t identify with the views that they had.  And from 
the Palestinian side, it was that I didn’t identify with basic core identities that they had - 
you know, they’re Palestinians.  So definitely kind of the first place that got me to think, 
not sure if intentionally that was the - I’m sure actually that wasn’t necessarily the point, 
but that was the first place where I had to stop and think, “wow. That person is going 
through that experience. What do I have to do with that?” 
Johann expresses a similar sentiment to the one Malik presents in section 4.3, which is 
that he took on an idealistic coexistence belief system due to expectations from others.  However, 
interestingly enough, Johann found Kids4Peace to be the place that allowed him to question the 
“tralala” attitude he had about the coexistence and the conflict.  This may be due to his identity as 
an Israeli Jew, as he was put in a position to learn about the harsh realities Palestinians in 
Jerusalem face and to question his own part in those realities.  Malik, on the other hand, came 
from knowing more intimately the harsh realities his people face, but was encouraged to adopt a 
new centrist narrative through Kids4Peace – the one Malik was raised with.  In a way, the 
Kids4Peace program played the role of devil’s advocate for the two individuals, encouraging 
them each to take on information and narrative that were farther away from their original 
understanding of the conflict. Johann continues:  
I think that’s the idea later. Maybe it is the idea now but back then it was more just 
bringing Jews and Arabs together, which is a super important thing in itself.  That’s 
another thing.  But it wasn’t really about -- at least at the beginning -- maybe towards the 
end of like 9th and 10th grade.  But it wasn’t really, “let’s see how your lives interact in 
ways you didn’t think they did. And what does it mean to be a Jew when it comes to 
Palestinians, and what does it mean to be a Palestinian when it comes to Jews?” That 
kind of wasn’t intentionally explored.  But it was definitely something that sparked up. 
Noa discusses the internal change that happened the first time she discovered there was 
something she did not understand: 
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It was a really, really interesting camp.  And I just had the best time there, and so that's 
what I remember mostly.  I was also really small.  I was in the 7th grade and there were 
people there who were in 10th and 11th grade because I was in this school that was mix-
aged. And I think that was the first time actually that in the 7th grade that I understood-- 
not understood but I mean, I understood there's something that I don't understand.  It's not 
just like being friends with Arabs and speaking Arabic and everything is just so cool and 
normal and fun and nice.  I understood.  I mean, there's this friend of mine, Mariam... We 
were just really good friends and we had the best time with each other but she lived in 
[East Jerusalem,] and I live outside of Jerusalem and I'm Jewish, so it doesn't really 
matter or anything to me. And for her, it took her like an hour to go to the meetings 
throughout the year because she had to pass through a checkpoint. And for me, I mean, it 
took me like forty minutes and it wasn't that big of a deal.  But at this camp, it was the 
first time that she explained to me what a checkpoint is for Arabs, and then I understood 
it.  Every morning for the past seven years, I passed through two checkpoints.  But I'm 
Jewish, and it doesn't really matter or anything to me.  And I never noticed it the way she 
did.  So I think that was the first time in Kids4Peace and in my life really that I connected 
the dots between my Arab friends and the life they had and the life I have -- and this 
conflict how it affects us and how it affects our friendships…Actually, I think 
Kids4peace had a really big part of it.  I don't know why I can't-- I don't remember 
specifically that conversation that I wasn't feeling comfortable with my Jewish identity.  
But I know that the Palestinian side was really vocal and was heard a lot -- maybe more 
than the Israeli side.  And yeah, maybe that’s part of why I didn't feel so comfortable 
about my Jewish identity.  I can't remember why.  Maybe it was just me.  Maybe it was 
the first time that I heard about all those terrible, terrible things that are happening just 
next to me.  And I was so in shock that I got into defense and I saw them-- and thinking, 
"No. That can't be the whole story."  But now I know that it kind of is the whole story.  
And at least that's what matters to me that people are unsafe here.  And feeling threatened 
and going through checkpoints everyday -- that's the main thing for me.  Maybe this time 
was the first time I've heard about those things and I said to myself, "That can't be it."  
But it is.  So yeah, kids4peace had a big part of it. 
Aiden acknowledges that Kids4Peace helped open his eyes to racism that he had 
unwittingly been a part of growing up:  
Well, before I joined, I remember a very specific situation where -- there's a whole lot of 
racism going around in Israel, you’re probably aware of that.  And so I remember when I 
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was in fifth grade, and I was chanting a very racist song, which is related to a soccer 
team.  And I just didn't realize what I was singing.  I didn't even pay any attention or put 
any meaning to it, because it just didn’t matter to me. It was there.  That was the language 
I spoke.  And slowly I started to realize these horrible things these words mean.  And as I 
grew older, I realized that those words eventually translate into actions.  And then I was 
very, very grateful to be in Kids4Peace.  I was lucky enough to get that mindset of having 
a healthy view about other people that are different from me. 
Aiden expresses gratitude for this opportunity for growth and to incorporate the 
Kids4Peace mindset.  He continues:  
I'm taking the knowledge information and mostly the personal interaction from Kids for 
Peace as just evidence, I could say, that you can't make conclusions to people because 
I've been exposed to many times that people are just assuming or are being judgmental 
towards an entire crowd just because they're either Arab or if they come from certain 
countries than people immediately put a label on them and just say, "Okay, they're--That 
something in their nature is just different from us.”  And I just experienced on my flesh 
that it's not. So I'm trying to-- I've been seeing myself as sort of this ambassador trying to 
let people know or make them see that you can't look-- That you can't just look at 
someone and that is a little different than you and just decide that he is what you hear in 
the media because the media takes all the extreme situations and they just spread it 
around because that's the thing that catches our eye most.  It's the easiest thing to get 
ratings, I guess.  And that shape the public mind.  So what I am trying to do, not alone 
might I say, I'm joined by many, many people who also share my view.  But I have the 
privilege of taking real life-- check the word, examples, yeah, and just sharing parts of 
my personal experience with that demographic I could say and try to make people see 
that they can be prejudiced because prejudice is the most dangerous part of all this.  It's 
what's blocking us from communicating. 
 
4.5 Visions of Kids4Peace: Goals, Motivations, and Visions of the Future 
 
Personal and Group Goals 
 
During my Monitoring and Evaluation internship at Kids4Peace, it became clear that 
there were a variety of goals of and motivations for youth participants and staff of the 
organization.  As discussed in Chapter II, the relative power of the group may shape the goals of 
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the group members as they enter into contact with one another.  Palestinians living in Israel strive 
for equal rights, justice, an end to the occupation, and a social and political future that involves 
autonomy in some sense for their people.  This is evident in many of the Palestinian youths 
interviewed for the study.  In a discussion about his identity, Malik states:  
I want to strive for equal rights in Israel among all citizens, but at the same time, I feel that’s part 
and parcel of my Palestinian identity.  I think that’s something that can’t be taken away from [my 
identity]. 
It is evident through this comment that an important aspect of Malik’s personal goals 
inside and outside of Kids4Peace is to strive for equal rights for Palestinians and that this goal is 
intertwined with his collective Palestinian identity.  The struggle for rights for his people and his 
collective identity cannot be separated.  Later in the interview, I asked Malik what he believes to 
be the goal of Kids4Peace.  Malik provides his interpretation of the true goals and output of the 
organization: 
I think if you asked me a few years ago I would say “to get big enough to like stop the 
conflict or to solve the conflict,” but I don’t think that’s the case now.  I think 
Kids4peace, it’s really nice because it’s a community.  Yeah, it’s like a little community 
of Jerusalemite people.  I don’t see it creating immense change that ripples through 
Jerusalem, but I think the idea of it being family -- of it being a safe space for kids, 
parents, brothers, sisters -- the idea of having fun experiences -- I think that’s meant to be 
a drop in an ocean of peace work. 
Although Malik’s personal goals do not perfectly match up with the purpose and goals of 
Kids4Peace, they do overlap.  Malik reframes the purpose of Kids4Peace for himself, allowing 
him to find a different type of value in his experience in the program.  Relating back to Malik’s 
comments in section 4.3, Kids4peace provides community beyond national or religious collective 
identity in a way that some of these youths crave.  In Malik's case, this community is the safe 
space in which meaningful dialogue can be had, voices can be heard, and friendships challenge 
individuals to expand and solidify their selves.  This experience in itself is valuable for Malik, 
who later tells me that he continues his peace work through other venues.  He continues: 
I think that in itself those positive experiences definitely contribute to solving the 
conflict.  I don’t think Kids4Peace is the be all and end all… I don’t think the reason it 
exists is to solve the conflict.  I think it provides a lot of people with a sense of optimism.  
I think it provides them with community.  I think it gives a lot of Palestinians just a thing 
to do after school, because extracurriculars are not that common in East Jerusalem.  I 
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don’t think the purpose is to end the conflict, but I definitely think there is merit and 
virtue to having it there, even if that’s not the end goal. 
Although Malik has tapered his expectations of the organization’s impact in ending the 
conflict, he values the small part it may play in enriching the lives of Jerusalemite youth and 
inspiring optimism.   He also makes the point that Palestinian youth have less access to 
extracurriculars, so Kids4Peace provides them with an after-school activity.  
Most Jewish Israeli respondents in the study discuss finding a way to live together 
peacefully.  Palestinians and Leftist Jewish Israelis (social justice also embedded in this identity) 
focused on social justice and equality. 
A few of the study subjects reported that their goals are to act as seeds of peace, hoping 
that their sentiments will reverberate into the larger environment.  This sentiment is similar to the 
aims of similar organizations like Seeds of Peace (from where the imagery of “Seeds of Peace” 
arises) and presumably Kids4Peace itself.  The hope is that the seeds planted into society by 
individual participants in the organization will grow and lead to change in a larger sense.  
Christian expresses this idea: 
To share hope.  To expand our family.  The community is getting bigger and bigger each 
year.  I can see that.  I can recognize it.  I’ve been working with different groups.  Each 
group is getter bigger, which is good. My goal in kids4peace is to share hope for younger 
generations. Because that’s how it’s supposed to start. With the younger generations. In 
order to teach them when they’re young. When they’re growing up, they learn a lot. And 
they understand. Not in like an older age when they already know from their own 
community about the other side. 
Yael, an Israeli Jew says: 
I think at different points of the program it’s got different goals.  In the first few years, 
the emphasis that we felt was very much on friendship and trust.  And getting to know 
each other and getting to know each other’s cultures and faith and sort of having an 
opening point at which we can both talk about issues where we know where the other is 
coming from.  And really being able to later on bring up harder issues while having the 
foundation of trust and friendship to lean back on.  So, I’d say it’s sort of building up the 
knowledge and the trust so you came out of it having a good experience with each other 
that you could later build upon. 
When asked what peace means to her, Yael again brought up the goals of the 
organization in the context of political agenda.  She states: 
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That was also a question we had in Kids4peace.  At the global institute, we said, “Look, 
in our song/cheer -- I don’t know what to call it -- we say, ‘we can do it better, we can 
live together’.  But we’re not sure what that means.  Does that mean one state for two 
nations?  Because we’re getting funding by a country that says two states for two nations.  
So what are we supportive of?  When someone asks me, “what’s Kids4peace?  What’s 
their end goal?  What do they want to see happen?”  I say, “honestly, we don’t really 
have an end goal.  But when there’s an end goal happening, we want to make sure that it 
happens peacefully.”  And that there are people saying, “look, even if I kind of disagree 
with it, I think there should be one country, or I think there should be two.”  I think there 
should be people saying, “It’ll be okay.  We can live together.  We can live apart as 
peaceful countries next to each other.”  But it’s important that there are people supporting 
it and not creating more conflict as it happens. 
 Yael reflects the apolitical nature of the organization’s goals.  She describes the goal to 
others as a creating a foundation of people who sustain peace no matter what the political 
solution.   Aiden, also a Jewish Israeli, describes his perception of the purpose of Kids4Peace: 
I see the purpose of Kids4Peace as the meeting point, because in Israel you can say that 
we live kind of parallel lives because we're on the same, in my case, city and some people 
are like me and my friends or my circle going to certain places and the other people both 
in the other side colleague goes to different schools.  And it's not only that, but they also 
get different treatment.  When you go to the Eastern City of Jerusalem which was 
conquered in the Six-Day War in 1967, you can really see the difference on the buildings, 
in the infrastructure because you can see that the Arabic neighborhoods are getting-- I 
don't want to say bad or is, but they're getting a different treatment from the Jewish 
neighborhoods in the Western City.  So Kids4Peace is really a great opportunity to take 
people and make them see the other side from firsthand experience.  And that's not 
something that comes by quite easily – allowing an environment where you can really 
evaluate a person by his intentions or his emotions -- his personality -- not by his race or 
nation.  It is a very big issue in Israel.  People are being judged for their race all the time.  
And so what I'm getting at is that Kids4 Peace makes the connection, the proper 
connection between the different people in Israel. 
Some participants like Ismail and Saed, who interviewed together by request, expressed 
their desire for Kids4Peace to spread a wider net and to start discussions around politics earlier in 
the program.  One motif brought up by these two youths was an impatience for change and 
frustration with those in the program who do not seem to share the same goals.  Ismail says: 
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I don’t always agree with that goal [to plant seeds of peace].  I feel like we should be 
broader to reach more people.  I feel like in Kids4Peace they don’t want us to get into the 
politics at a young age… Look, I see that [planting seeds is] the purpose, from my 
perspective.  I don’t know from their perspective.  But I see that as the purpose from my 
perspective.  As to whether it is working or not, I think Saed took up an issue earlier that 
not a lot of people are taking it seriously.  So, I think that’s the issue.  If more people take 
it seriously, it will be far more reachable… They think that its goal is that it’s all fun and 
stuff.  They don’t know that there’s a political side to Kids4peace.  They would never 
imagine that there’s a political side. 
 Ismail and Saed are two current members of Kids4Peace.  They vent their frustrations 
that some of their fellow Kids4Peace members do not share their goals to make social change.  
They appear eager for change.  At a different point in the interview, Ismail reference leaders like 
Martin Luther King, Jr. and Nelson Mandela.  Ismail and Saed partially fault the organization for 
not allowing for political discussion earlier on in the program.51  At the same time, Ismail 
embodies the goal of the program as it is perceived by these two youth – to plant seeds and to 
spread hope and optimism:  
Look, as an individual, I believe. Yes, I believe. And you see here the word ‘believe’. I 
believe. It’s all about having hope. High hopes in God or anything. Having high hopes. 
And you know, yes, I believe. But as an individual, yes of course I believe that I could 
make a change hopefully one day. That’s my belief and hopefully, hopefully...Who 
knows what happens, but if you see something that influences people, like if they see 
someone speaking on their behalf. Like someone who is empowering them... like 
speaking, of course non-violently, speaking what they think, then people would follow 
him and he would become a leader, like as we saw in Martin Luther King. 
Laila’s perspective aligned with Ismail’s in the sense that she yearns for her work in 
Kids4Peace to have a wider influence: 
The general purpose is to create peace… maybe… I can’t really say, because I feel like 
with all the work that is being done here, for me personally, the only thing that I gained 
from Kids4peace is the social… Maybe also knowledge -- knowledge and social gains. 
But other than that, I feel there is something missing.  Maybe a wider influence, or... 
 
51 Kids4Peace programs are designed to build trust through lighter encounters in the first couple years of 
the program.  As the program progressing, political discussion is added, starting with education on conflicts 
abroad and eventually discussing the local conflict. 
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yeah, to not just stay in this bubble -- this closed kind of safe zone -- to actually do 
something out of these walls.  
Although all participants reported some kind of gain from the program, many like Laila 
and Ismail expressed their yearning for wider influence.  Many joined Kids4Peace optimistic and 
driven to enact change in Jerusalem and the wider conflict.  There are undertones of frustration, 
disappointment, and eagerness for change in these answers.  Laila’s emphasis on the “bubble” 
phenomenon – that Kids4Peace creates an idealistic, harmonious world not necessarily touching 
reality – is a common theme expressed by other participants as well.  These youths are driven to 
know how to expand their influence.52   
Participants Ismail and Saed take their participation in Kids4peace very seriously and 
express frustration that others may not share their same goals.  Ismail explains:  
And that’s hugely connected to the point I said earlier about fun.  People just come to 
fun.  Not people who are actually coming to be leaders and want peace.  Yeah, I think 
that.  For example, let’s say… I don’t know, as I said other programs -- some programs 
they focus on like other let’s say, intellectual programs, the educational programs -- they 
focus on taking very specific people.  I think that’s what Kids4peace should do.  They 
should take very specific people who just want peace.  That’s my point… Yeah, what’s 
the part of bringing new people and bringing new people just like taking donations and 
just you know having a lot of people. That’s pointless actually. Because as I said, some 
people are coming just for the fun and for the sake of it. And not everyone has this goal. 
Ismail continues:  
A lot of people are talking [during programs], a lot of people are just you know in their 
own world.  There’s a lot of people, the few people who actually want change, who 
actually want to be leaders and they actually want to influence others don’t have the 
chance to do that.  Why?  Because there is people, other people that who just want to you 
know have fun.  And I think that’s not the point to just get in people you know take 
donations.  What’s the point if you’re not achieving any goal? 
Noa speaks about her desire to learn and understand.  She looks to Kids4Peace, and her 
bilingual school, to unveil the truth around her.  She tells me:  
I think the tools I really got just from-- I don't know if it was from Kids4Peace or from 
my school and just being an aware-- a person with awareness to the situation here, and I 
am now. I mean, I don't want to stay blind to anything.  I want to see everything and 
 
52 Kids4Peace programs do attempt to address these goals through the Youth Action Program (YAP).  
However, it seems that some of the youth do not find this to be influential enough.  
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everything there is to know and see, I want to know and see it.  I think Kids4Peace would 
have been a big part of it.  Not making things disappear because it's not comfortable for 
me. 
What is “Peace”? 
In the interviews for this study, I asked the youth participants, “what does ‘peace’ mean 
to you?” and “what are the prerequisites necessary to obtain it?”  I received a variety of answers 
to this question, ranging from the political to the social to the personal.  Some discussed one-
state/two-state solutions.  Others referred to the interpersonal: people from different groups 
learning to coexist and become accepting of differences.  One respondent considered an internal 
peace as her first priority. 
Jewish Israeli, Yael explains her thought process around the meaning of “peace” in a 
political context and that of Kids4Peace: 
At school and stuff, I do get into a lot of discussions about what Israel’s policies should 
be and what that rests upon.  And I mean it’s difficult. You need to know what’s going on 
with Israel.  What it would mean, for instance, to give land back.  I know a lot of people 
who say, “Look, I would be happy to give all the land they want back if it could promise 
me peace - unconditional peace.”  But then again, what does that peace look like?  What 
does it look like to you?  Does it mean that … there are no Arabs?  Does it mean that… 
there are two states?  … I say, “honestly, we don’t really have an end goal.  But when 
there’s an end goal happening, we want to make sure that it happens peacefully.” … 
Which is a hard thing to say, because then people say, “Well then what do you want? Do 
you want one nation do you want two countries?”  And I say, “Look, honestly, I was 
raised to believe that we can live together. That we should be one country”.  But it’s hard 
to say that.  Especially in the Jewish state.  Like Israel has a hard time with reform Jews.  
How is it going to deal with non-Jews?  As a majority or as a bigger group rather than 
just a few like Israeli Arabs that happen to be there before ‘48… so you know, it’s okay.  
It’s not so many of them, so they’re not really hurt by the Jewish identity of the state.  
But it’s not so easy.  So wait, do I believe in two countries?  If so, like what does that 
mean?  That I don’t want people who are my Arab friends to live near me?  So that’s a 
really difficult point. Like what is the end goal? What do I want to see happen in ten, 
twenty years?  
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Yael raises important questions about the future and takes a practical approach to 
envisioning a peaceful solution.  She does attempt to envision futures both with Jews and 
Palestinian Arabs living together in one country and with them living separately each with their 
own country.  She grapples with the implications of both and with what it means about her own 
values to choose one solution over the other.   
Noa, a young left-wing Jewish alumna of K4P, also acknowledges that her thoughts on a 
political solution have changed.  She says:  
I think what's necessary is harmony and maybe equality as well.  I know I'm not-- maybe 
right now we won't get to equality anytime soon or even anytime in general, but I think 
we need to.  I think we need to want to go there.  I think I want just all to see each other 
as equals.  I mean, I know we're not equals in this space.  I know walking around 
Jerusalem, me and my Arab friends are not equal.  I want to see everyone to see my Arab 
friends as equals to them.  So I think that's a necessary for me.  And see life, just people 
in life as equal.  I mean, if one people was losing his life and the other one is losing his 
life and one's an Arab and one is Jew, it’s supposed to mean the same thing for us.  And 
practically, actually, I have no idea.  I'm kind of losing faith actually.  It's really hard to 
be here and see it and be faithful.  Once I believed in two states for two nationalities, but 
I don't know if I believe in that anymore, and I don't know if it's possible anymore.  I 
don't know.  I just really don't want my kids to grow up in this kind of environment.  
Practically, I have no idea.  I wish it wasn't that way.  I wish it's not going to stay the 
same as it is. 
 Noa’s definition of peace relies heavily on the idea of equality between herself and those 
who are Arab living in the county.  With a heartbreaking tone, she expresses a loss in faith in the 
situation and in a political solution she once saw as viable.  However, her dream for equality 
appears to be her priority.  Aiden, an Israeli Jew currently in the army, shares his real politik 
vision of peace: 
Unfortunately, it looks like a contract.  I had this vision -- I'm not sure if I imagined it or 
if I dreamt about it or what was it -- I remember that I was thinking about me going into 
my home, into my building, and seeing an Arab family go to their apartment in that 
building, and me going to mine.  And that was like normal to me.  So what I thought of 
peace, that's what I thought about.  But as I became more aware of the situation, I 
understood that we're not there yet, and we have to make some agreements in order to 
make peace. There is a very nice quote relating to that.  It was by our Menachem Begin, 
the prime minister who signed the peace agreement with Egypt.  He said, "The hardships 
  
 
 
 
89 
of peace are better than the sufferings of war."  So that's what I see peace as.  It's a 
business.  It's something you've got to maintain, but it's-- you'd be much better off.  You 
do make sacrifices.  But they're very worthwhile. 
 Aiden’s response was the least idealistic out of those I received.  He acknowledges the 
interconnectedness of the two peoples, which makes peace a necessity and matter of practicality.  
His mindset may be a derivative of a mix of the security mentality taught in the army and the 
Kids4Peace coexistence narrative.   
 
Palestinian Responses  
 
Palestinian young people in the study report a variety of visions of peace, much like the 
Jewish respondents.  Maroun, a Christian Palestinian citizen of Israel echoes the responses of 
many other Palestinian Arabs living in Jerusalem.  
First of all, in order to have peace you have to learn.  You have to listen you have to 
understand. You have to live and accept others, the other side. Peace — it’s like, okay we 
understand that there are different groups.  We still have to live with each other in order 
to live peacefully.  Life without conflict, without arguments, without wars. Peace is 
something that needs to be found in every single place in the world.  Because it’s God’s 
creation we have to respect this place.  In order to do so, we have to live in it.  Live 
peacefully, not to throw bombs at each other to ruin peoples’ homes or futures.  You have 
to respect the other side.  You have to love them also.  Work with them, live with them, 
everything.  So peace is a big demand.  But if we work together, it’s worth it, and we will 
achieve it easily.  But we need to change the mindset of the people.  Jerusalem is one of 
the most beautiful cities I’ve ever been in.  Like some people never notice that. 
Like Jersualem, walking into the city and seeing these ancient walls that I’m looking at 
right now. It’s like something magical.  Something magical.  The people inside it are 
making it a worse place.  That’s what I think.  I’m serious, it’s like the most beautiful 
place I’ve ever been in.  I can’t wait ‘til I see everyone walking around together, making 
friends talking the same language.  I don’t know what language it would be.  Just staying 
there together.   
Maroun seems to present a people-centered view of the conflict.  In many ways, Maroun 
reflects the coexistence narrative and cosmopolitan worldview.  He stresses that the mindsets of 
the people inside the city make it a difficult place to live.  Maroun looks towards a cosmopolitan 
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future in which the people of Jerusalem live side by side, melding together through one language 
and sense of belonging.   
Mariam, a Christian Palestinian who currently lives in the West Bank and attends medical 
school, gives an answer that focuses on an internal sense of peace: 
Peace is — right now?  At this point in my life or just in general?  It’s like calmness.  It’s 
comfort.  Like coexistence would be the obvious answer.  Like peace would just be 
settled down.  Having inner peace, like being calm, accepting yourself, others, where you 
are, what you’re doing, your approaches.  I guess that’s my answer for this stage in my 
life. 
This response stands out given its disconnection from the political and social conflict.  
Previously Mariam speaks of her difficultly in being a Christian in a religious Muslim town.  At 
this point in her life, she faces this divide more strongly than the Israeli-Palestinian divide.  She 
feels more alienated from the Muslim community and traditional culture which surrounds her in 
her current location.  When asked what brought her to this understanding of peace, she says: 
It was very hard moving to Nablus.  It was like a cultural shock.  You wouldn’t think so, but it’s 
very different.  I had to learn to accept where I was, like this is the place i’m going to be.  I’m still 
struggling with that.  I’m still trying to find peace with that, but working on it.  It’s challenging.  
It’s very… it’s very different.  And it’s taking me a lot of effort and time to be at peace with 
myself being there.  
Hamza, a Muslim Palestinian, presents a vision of peace which involves equal life for 
Palestinians and Israelis and increased infrastructure.  He presents this thought on how the needs 
of the Palestinian people can be met.  Much of his pragmatic prescription for peace points to 
increased involvement of Palestinians in government and running infrastructure.  He also hopes 
for a normalization of Israeli and Palestinian interactions.  Hamza asserts: 
So, to me, peace would look a lot like – definitely a lot more organized, Palestinian 
presence, a stronger ability for defense… I’d love to see less borders. I’d love to see a 
Palestinian health care and education being invested in a lot more.  I’m not really 
opposed to like a border, but [I’d like] just more like right of return, freedom of 
movement. Yeah. Just, kind of, less fighting, less, kind of less armed conflict.  I’d like to 
see a lot more equal life… and both sides having [their] basic needs met.  So, definitely 
the whole Gaza thing has to stop for Israel, but that’s something I think should be dealt 
with by both Israelis and Palestinians. Israel’s reasons and Palestinian’s reasons for doing 
whatever that should be dealt with. I ‘d also like to see a little bit less of [fighting], so, for 
example, it annoys me when I hear people say—“oh the Palestinian stand”, or like, “oh, a 
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Palestinian committed an attack”, or like, “oh, Palestinians use women and children as 
human shields.”  As long as there’s no unified Palestinian state, whatever a Palestinian 
does, those are the actions of that person or of that party.  So, kind of having less like, 
“oh, the Palestinian attacked us.”  The Israeli attacked us.  People are also used to seeing 
“Palestinians” and “Israelis.”  Haifa has a large population of Arabs and Israelis, so it’s 
not a big deal.  Versus where I live, French Hill now is a very, kind of—there’s a lot of 
Palestinians and Israelis.   But when I lived it was where—when I lived there, it was 
very different. And so once, when I was at a park, a group of Orthodox Jewish girls 
kicked out an Arab family and were yelling at my mom.  And I don’t see that happening 
if Palestinians and Israelis being in the same place is normalized… So I’m aware that it 
would be very difficult to force millions of people to speak together and live side-by-side, 
but definitely having a more organized Palestinian presence, more equal development.  
… Whatever it is, I’d like to see issues like that kind of being discussed–a lot more 
confrontation, but healthy confrontation.  Like, “Why did you do that?” Making sure aid 
can come in.  Construction supplies can’t come into Gaza anymore despite that, you 
know–so, I’d love to see like Palestinians being in administrative positions, checkpoints, 
settlements.  Like even in the West Bank, I think Palestinians only control like 22 percent 
or something crazy.  [I’d like] kind of a lot more equitable investment, representation, 
right of return.  
After Kids4Peace 
Joining the army is a right-of-passage in Israeli society.53  A majority of young Israeli 
adults join the army immediately after high school, feeling bound by a sense of duty to their 
country and to their people.  Israelis may also choose the alternative – national service work – 
however, this choice does not hold the same kind of prestige offered by military service.  With 
the Jewish Israeli students planning to join the Israeli army, I inquired into what that meant for 
them in the context of their participation in Kids4Peace.  Yael says:  
We talked about it once very briefly.  And in my mind, the question is sort of, “who 
would you rather be in the army?”  Because the Israeli army does exist, and it will exist 
for the next foreseeable future.  Even if it’s a common saying to say to your kids, “When 
you’ll be older, there will be no army because there will be peace.  You won’t have to be 
53 See Chapter II. 
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in the army.”  And yet still, in the foreseeable future we will have an army.  So my 
question is, who would you rather have be the soldier in front of you?  Someone who 
knows nothing about you, sees you as the enemy and as a suspect of a crime or someone 
who understands your culture – is there because he believes in keeping both sides safe?... 
They have a problem with things he does on a daily basis because of ethical issues, but he 
raises those ethical issues and says, “I’m not going to take this lying down”.  Would you 
rather be would you rather have the good soldier or not see your friend whose been in 
Kids4peace ever contribute to something you find unethical?  And it’s a hard question.  
Would you rather see your friend on the battlefield?  Would you rather see them or not?  
Because not seeing them means someone who is not your friend is in front of you.  
Seeing them means that they’ve joined the cause that you’re against.  
Yael justifies participation in the army thinking that it is better to have Israeli Jews who 
have participated in Kids4Peace in the army than ones who have not formed connections with 
Palestinians.  She explains that those who have participated in Kids4Peace can resist ethically 
questionable actions in the military.  When asked if she sees herself being one of those who raise 
ethical issues in the army, Yael responds:  
Umm… it’s not very easy.  I mean in the army there’s not really room to say, “I think we 
should change this policy”.  That’s really something that would be done through the 
Kinnesset, but it could be the little things.  An officer at a checkpoint smiling and saying, 
“I’m sorry for the inconvenience” or saying, “I’m sorry this is taking a little longer 
because we need to do some other checks” can make the experience a little less 
traumatizing.  I mean, it’s still traumatizing in the sense that people need to be searched 
every day in order to get to work.  But on the other hand, it’s making it a little less worse.  
And I think even if it’s something small, I mean that already makes room for it to be 
questioned.  I personally am not going to be at a checkpoint, since I hope to go into the 
intelligence unit.  I’ll probably be in an office behind a computer.  And that’s a good 
question.  Some of my friends said they don’t want to be in something top secret 
technological that would probably mean doing things that have an ethical question mark 
on them.  And I think that I’d rather – I’d be the one questioning the ethical things rather 
than saying I’m not going to – I’m going to turn a blind eye to it and pretend it doesn’t 
exist.  And I’d rather be aware of what exists and deal with the ethical questions myself 
than say, “I’m just going to trust that if I can’t see it it’s not happening.” 
Yael discussed the potential to face ethical issues in the army.  She seems unclear on 
whether she will have the power to influence policy or behavioral changes within the army but 
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claims that as a participant of Kids4Peace with knowledge of ‘the other’, she would rather be the 
one in the position to raise questions.   
Aiden, an Israeli Jewish alumni, also plans to join the army after he completes the pre-
army program in which he is currently enrolled.  When asked if he will bring the lessons he 
learned from Kids4Peace into the army, he tells me:  
It raises a lot of questions.  It made me realize that me of all people have to go to serve in 
combat.  I have to be in a combat position because I need to spread the word at the line of 
fire I could say.  You can’t expect to talk all ideology and talk how your words and to 
expect everyone to listen when you’re doing nothing practical.  So what made me realize 
that is that I have to go to the front lines and be there for that cause.  Not to just do my 
part, but also spread the word and let people know out there what the consequences are to 
this whole situation. 
Palestinian participants of Kids4Peace also grapple with this dilemma as their Jewish 
friends graduate high school and make decisions whether to join the army or not – a choice that 
either supports or negates the wellbeing of their people.  Chris explains his perception of his 
Israeli Jewish friends joining the army: 
I have a close friend – one of my closest friends – finished in the Army recently.  He was 
in a very violent unit.  They call this one Mista’arvim.54  I don’t know if you know it.  It’s 
basically a unit of special forces where they also – a lot of times – they act like Arabs, 
they dress like Arabs, and they do like field work and they do a lot of messed up stuff. 
There’s a show also about them, [Fauda], about the unit. It’s very famous now.  So Fauda 
is about that unit. My friend served there.  And yeah, I mean we talk about it sometimes.  
He told me.  Serving in that unit was very important for him, but he told me that he got to 
see that he felt like what they were doing was wrong a lot of times.  I’d also heard that a 
few of my old classmates from Hand in Hand, for example, now they work with 
intelligence. 
… One of my old classmates told me that there. And she said that she was very 
disappointed that they went into Hand in Hand school to learn about peace in Arabic, just 
so they can be recruited to use that against us at some point.  I don't think I know 
someone that right now is in the army actively serving.  Maybe my best friend when we 
were kids -- he might be serving now.  Last time I saw him, he was doing community 
service instead of army.  But I think he joined the army in the end.  We're not very close 
54 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/musta-israel-agents-pose-palestinians-171218061118857.html 
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anymore, so I wouldn't know, to be honest…It's not easy.  It's not easy.  I mean I don't 
take anything personally, because I know a lot... they're forced to go into the army.  I 
know if I was in their case, I would go into the army.  And maybe even -- I would try to 
go for the best unit in the army too.  Because I'm just an ambitious person.  And that's 
what they put in front of me, that's what I'm going to do.  So I understand that point.  But 
it's not easy, because in the end of the day, the reality of the situation is after what I've 
seen in my life, I feel like in the end of the day the army is -- you can call it defense army 
-- but it's defending against someone. And that person is us -- Arab people.  We’re even 
Arab citizens, which is very unfortunate.  I mean, if you want to say that a lot of people 
make the case that, “okay, Arabs from outside are coming in, Gaza and West Bank these 
outside are coming in behind.”  But even as an Arab citizen that technically has every 
right like any other citizen, we get treated like shit by the army [and] by the police.  
Things like that. 
Chris, like a few of the other Palestinian respondents, expresses frustration that he and 
one of his peers experience due to Jewish friends joining the army, when his collective group is 
treated inhumanely by Israeli soldiers and police.  He mentions that his status as a citizen does not 
protect him from violence and discrimination. 
There are often major repercussions for young adults refusing to join the army – social, 
political, occupational, and economic.  Young Israeli Jews who refuse to join as a political 
statement against the occupation may be jailed.55  Those who simply claim pacifism as a reason 
not to join may be excused, but they face social stigma and alienation from a major part of Israeli 
society. 
Noa serves as an example of an Israeli Jew who did decide not to join the army and finds 
pride in this decision.  Noa explains that she brings the responsibility her privilege dictates – a 
responsibility she internalized from her upbringing and solidified through Kids4Peace -- forward 
into her decision not to join the army.  She states: 
If I am Jewish here in Jerusalem, in Israel, it comes with lots of responsibility. One of the 
responsibilities I have is not going to the Army in my opinion.  And saying no to the—to 
resist the violence that is all around us.  And not feeling comfortable holding a gun at the 
age of eighteen.  And I have to say -- I mean that's one of my responsibilities.  And I'm 
really proud to be Jewish.  And I think that -- I mean because I'm Jewish I have to invest 
my life for this cause, for solving the conflict, and living in harmony and peace with my 
 
55 Ultra-orthodox Jews are currently exempt from military service, a fact that outrages many secular 
members of Israeli society.  
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neighbors.  I think I have more power than my Palestinian friend.  I think I have more 
time and strength to invest in it.  Because I mean I can afford energy and time to solve 
this conflict.  I know some of my friends, some of my Palestinian friends, have to afford 
their time and energy to survive and to stay where they are and to -- I don't know, they 
have so many different things to invest their money and power in energy about.  And I 
mean, I don't have.  So now I feel comfortable with my Jewish identity, and I know it 
comes with tons of responsibility. 
In this statement, Noa takes on her collective identity in a new light than before she 
entered Kids4Peace.  Noa views her Jewish identity with pride knowing her responsibility to 
resist violence and militarism.  She expresses her commitment to dedicating her time and energy 
to work towards peace, in whatever form that takes.  This recognition of privilege and 
responsibility is a powerful trope for Israeli Jews who participate in the Kids4Peace program.  
Although none of the other participants expressed it in this way.  Noa says: 
Right now, I mean power is limited.  Because I know I didn't go to university, and I don't 
have a job in the field. And I'm not in college or something, which is something I really 
want to do.  But I mean, I know I have some power.  Talking to people.  Just talking to 
the girls that I'm doing national service with.  And the girls in my hostel maybe.  But I 
think I mostly wait till the time where I'll be-- maybe after university and find a job in the 
field. Because then I know I will have the power I want to.  But I'm really looking 
forward for this.  Something to help me with the-- I mean, something that will help me in 
the politics field.  I don't know if it's going to be law maybe or I don't know. I have a 
dream to study abroad, study in the States, study at NYU maybe. 
In addition to refusing to join the army, Noa demonstrates a desire to get involved in 
politics in the future.  She considers which steps she may need to take to get there.  Noa serves as 
an example of one way in which Kids4Peace can build strong allies in the Israeli Jewish 
community. 
In reflecting upon the interviews with Kids4Peace participants, it remains unclear 
whether participants dramatically change their trajectories based on participation in Kids4Peace.  
It appears that sub-cultural background (political leanings and associations), socioeconomic 
status, and family influence likely play a major role in the youths’ choices for their futures.  
Maroun describes the friendships that have followed him outside of Kids4Peace: 
We built a lot of relationships.  Although there may have been kids who left the camp 
because of what happened, but still some of us who like felt this idea of dialoguing a lot 
was good… that helped us connect more.  I made a lot of friendships with that here with 
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friends they’re now serving in the army right now.  I don’t see them a lot for two years, 
but still we’re friends on social media, which is cool.  If I see them in a checkpoint or 
working, I say hello, of course.  I would love to see them.  And for the kids, I met a lot of 
kids from all over.  They’re awesome.  They all love each other.  They’re like a family -- 
a big family… like the tenth-grade group.  Just awesome.  And from working with 
advisors… we still hang out sometimes.  Jews, Muslims, Christians, we hang out all. 
Maroun’s comments reflect Yael’s point that she believes her Palestinian friends would 
rather see a friendly face at the checkpoints than an unfriendly one.  Others like Chris and his 
friends feel differently.  
I asked Noa if she had difficulty reintegrating from the ‘bubble’ of inter-group harmony 
created by the Kids4Peace programming.  In response, she discusses the difficulty of maintaining 
her friendships from Kids4Peace:  
Somehow me and Mariam kept in touch for a few years after the camps and after the 
leadership camp.  Yeah, it was hard.  It was hard, and it's also the fact that I don't have 
lots of friends from Kids4Peace.  I mean, me and Mariam speak sometimes, but we're not 
friends just like we used to be.  Just like it is hard to keep in touch with my Arab friends 
from class.  They're in a really different part of their life right now, and they chose to go 
to the university, and they're studying.  Some of them study their second year of 
university now, and I didn't even start thinking about what I want to study and where I 
want to study and how to do it.  I mean, it's we have really different cultures, and I think 
that's the main part of it.  And I don't know if-- I mean, Kids4Peace or my school goal 
was to make is friends, probably not.  I don't know if that was the goal.  I want to believe 
that [it’s] not because I gained so much from both of these programs that staying friends 
is not a big part of it.  I have such an amazing and special experiences in Kids4Peace in 
the States and in the camps that the fact that I don't have friends is not a disappointment 
in those terms… I know that everything I gained in Kids4Peace in the program, I still 
carry it with me today.  So maybe the philosophical part of it is still with me, so maybe 
that wasn't so hard to integrate, but the friendships were.  Yeah, I didn't realize how 
different-- I mean, I just realized.  I was talking to Mariam, and she's in med-school—and 
other people are in the army.   
… Or even if I don't have any friends from Kids4Peace, I do have friends from my 
school, but even if I didn't have any, I don't think that my school or Kids4Peace were 
there to make this one culture that is fine for everyone and everyone can take part of it in 
equal amount and everyone can do the same things.  And at the end of the day, if I want 
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to meet outside of school, we do different things.  We are come from different cultures 
and not everything is fine with me and fine with my classmates and my Arabs classmates.  
And I wanted to go to hang out in the city center, and they don't want to do it because of 
all kind of different kinds of cultural things.  And I'm happy that we didn't make one 
culture that fits everyone, because it's wrong and there isn't such a thing.  So, of course 
we have shared experiences, and we've been through amazing stuff together.  But we 
didn't stay friends, because we all come from different cultures.  It's fine.  I'm fine with it. 
Noa suggests that she has brought the philosophies of Kids4Peace into her post-
Kids4Peace experience, but not the friendships.  However, she believes that the purpose of 
Kids4Peace was not to make lasting friendships or for the collective identities of the participants 
to blend into one common culture.  She emphasizes group differences, potentially referring to 
differences in belief systems, customs, and culturally defined interests.  Noa also mentions the 
problem of geographical segregation in Jerusalem.  The language here is vague, but her reference 
to her Arab friends refusing to visit the city center (which resides in West Jerusalem, the Israeli 
Jewish side of the city) “because of all kind of different kinds of cultural things” could mean that 
her Arab colleagues either have different preferences due to their culture,56 do not want to 
participate in Israeli culture and would prefer to support businesses on the Palestinian side, or a 
combination of these factors.  This comment may also refer to the stigma around 
Palestinians/Arabs associating with Israeli Jews.  Sarah echoes Noa’s conclusion about 
relationships from the K4P program: 
Yes [I had some strong, impactful relationships], but now that I’ve left those have faded 
away sadly. Which is a shame. But while I was there, yes I had some good friends. 
Mariam, a Christian Palestinian reflects Noa’s comments about the friendships made 
during their time in Kids4Peace together: 
During the time that I was involved with Kids4Peace, I did have very many meaningful 
relationships, so I am very thankful for them.  But I guess this happens if you went to a 
school and you switched schools and you drift away from your friends from the first 
school.  We did stay in touch for a couple -- I think for two years or a year in a half after 
we left Kids4peace, me and my friend Noa -- but then we kind of just drifted away.  
Because Kids4Peace was a common place for us to be, but then after that unfortunately 
we both got -- she went to -- she did not go to the army but she went to training 
something.  We both went to very different paths.  I went to university. There was just 
 
56 For instance, religious Muslims may prefer not to meet at bars in West Jerusalem.   
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not any more common things between us, so we kind of drifted away. But during 
Kids4peace, I did have many meaningful friendships throughout, and I still cherish them. 
Mariam cites that Noa did not go into the army, “but she went into training something.”  
This suggest the extent of separation between Israeli Jewish and Palestinian societies in the same 
city, despite the efforts of Kids4Peace to bring these two sides together.  The trajectories of youth 
with different group identities take them in separate directions, which makes maintaining 
friendships difficult.  These youth are afforded different opportunities based on their identity.  
Israeli-Arab youth do not have the option to join the army or to do national service.  This is likely 
why Mariam does not seem to know exactly what program in which Noa is enrolled.  Instead of 
these national programs and institutions, Israeli-Arabs more often go straight to university.  These 
separate trajectories reform a gap between the youth, although many do seem to continue 
incorporating the values and lessons of Kids4Peace into their worldview.  
As mentioned in the previous section, Mariam is now focused on maintaining her own 
sense of peace in a different context that alienates her from the Palestinian community.  She 
therefore is not currently focused on her mission through Kids4Peace, but hopes to return to the 
cause someday.  Mariam explains:  
Okay so in [this city], in my situation, I find it very hard to [be accepted] as a Christian to 
begin with.  I’m Arab just like them, but [me] being Christian is a shock to them.  It’s a 
minority in [this city].  At this point after being there for a year in a half now, they don’t 
have to accept me.  It’s fine.  Well my name gives it away.  You can see how they start 
treating you differently.  They have these questions.  Some are very nice and genuinely 
want to know more about you, but some of them they attack you with them and some are 
rude. At this point, I just want to be at peace.  I already have a lot of school work, and 
I’m not really focused on the aspect of trying to change their mentality about me as a 
Christian.  And if I were to be any other than like them, you can feel like you can just feel 
how they perceive you as different than them, and it makes life even more challenging 
there than it should be.  So at this point I’m like, “just let me be.  I’ll let you be and move 
on with our lives.”  So if that’s a challenge for me, let alone on a bigger scale.  It’s quite a 
headache.  Like for me right now, I’m really focused on school, it’s a lot of work. So 
unfortunately, I’m not really looking to that aspect [of the work of Kids4Peace].  But 
whenever I can, through how I act, what I say, the things I post on social media, I try to 
convey that through that.  But I don’t go out of my way specifically to try to make a 
change right now, but I do look -- I see myself going back to Kids4peace, because I feel 
like it’s home for me there.  I’d be coming back home.  And helping them make a 
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change, and they can help me achieve that as well.  I see myself coming back in the 
future, but right now it’s not really my focus.  
As a Christina Palestinian, Mariam faces challenges to her identity on multiple fronts.  
There is a sense of frustration and exhaustion in her response, as well as a resignation to the 
social reality in which she lives.  It appears that which of her identities feel the most salient and 
challenged is context dependent.  In the city in the West Bank in which she lives now, her 
Christian identity makes her ‘the other’.  Additionally, she faces an academically rigorous 
program, which takes up her focus at this time. She takes the approach of facing one battle at a 
time and  
For some like Malik, the Kids4Peace experience served as a gateway to other peace 
organizations and coexistence communities, which heightened his sense of agency and gave him 
the tools to make social and political change.  
4.6 Power and Privilege: Youth Perceptions 
The data presented various youth interpretations of the meaning and impact of power and 
privilege within the context of Kids4Peace.  When asked whether privilege and power were 
discussed in the Kids4Peace programming, a few Jewish Israeli students presented an 
interpretation of this question divergent from the one I had in mind.  These responses also 
differed from those of the Palestinian youth.  Several Israeli Jews brought up their perception of 
bias towards the Palestinian youth in the organization, rather than address the larger issues of 
power and privilege that exist within the context and the country at large.  Several Israeli Jews 
also divulged awareness of their privilege and responsibility as Jews living in Israel/Palestine.  
Egalitarian Environment 
According to Contact Theory, one of the requirements for a successful contact 
environment is a sense of equality between groups in contact.  In response to questions about 
whether Kids4Peace provides an egalitarian atmosphere, a couple Jewish Israeli subjects 
expressed feeling out-numbered.  These youth suggested they perceived unequally distributed 
empathy from Kids4Peace staff members, due to their identity group’s relative privilege.  Sarah 
serves as an example of a Jewish youth who lived almost completely separately from the ‘other 
side’ before Kids4Peace as opposed to the participants who attended Hand in Hand School or had 
experience with Palestinians prior.  Sarah reports: 
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That was also an issue in Kids4peace where sometimes we would feel that they were 
siding too much with the Palestinians and less -- because we already had a better life -- 
they were putting more focus on them.  So we also thought that –We also thought that -- 
we’re all57 --- it’s the same amount of Muslims, Christians, and Jews, but they’re all 
Arabs after all.  They all spoke Arabic.  So sometimes they were talking, and we 
wouldn’t be able to understand.  On the other hand, we talk and they understand us 
perfectly.  They understand us.  And so sometimes we would feel like they were a little 
too on their side and less on the Jewish side.  Because again, they have it harder.  
Here Sarah brings up the way in which she perceives the organization to deal with the 
power disparity between Jewish and Arab/Palestinian youth in Jerusalem.  She appears 
discouraged that the Arab youth seemed to receive more attention than the Jewish participants; 
Additionally, she is frustrated that the Arab participants could understand when the Jewish 
students spoke Hebrew, but that the Jewish students could not understand when the Arab students 
spoke Arabic.  This difference in knowledge of ‘the other’ comes from the power disparity 
itself58.  Arab youth are often required to learn Hebrew in schools and in order to gain 
employment in many places in Jerusalem.  Israeli Jews, on the other hand, have not historically 
been taught Arabic for fluency as it is not seen as necessary for their livelihood or survival.  
In the previous excerpt, Sarah’s usage and accentuation of “we” and “them” categories 
heavily emphasizes collective identity belonging.  She does not answer the original question 
directly (“How did being in K4p make you feel about your identity?”), but it is interesting that 
she brought this up in response to this question about her feelings around her identity.  It could be 
an indirect answer (that this perceived attitude made her feel worse about being an Israeli Jew) or 
it could be a frustration that she wished to vent.  Directly in response to “Do you feel this 
program creates an egalitarian atmosphere?” Sarah says: 
Most of the time, yes. But I know sometimes the Jewish kids would feel they would give 
a little more attention to the Arab kids and the Jewish kids would be left on the side. 
 
57 In this moment, Sarah’s speech breaks.  It appears that she is uncomfortable using the word 
“Palestinians” in the public café where the interview takes place.  She pauses mid-word.  I realized that this 
reluctance to speak about Palestinians in the context of Kids4Peace may have been due to the public nature 
of our meeting.  In retrospect, I wish that we were able to have a more private conversation.  However, this 
location was more convenient for Sarah than the Kids4Peace office in East Jerusalem.  
 
58 Cite an article that describes: In most cases of power asymmetry, the group with less power has more 
information and knowledge of the group with more power out of necessity to survive in a world built to 
benefit the high-powered group.  
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Noa weighs in on whether she felt there was equal opportunity for participants from all 
collective identities within the organization: 
I want to say yes, but then, I want to think about it a little bit more.  Maybe say no.  I was 
really young.  I was young in the fact that I didn't-- I mean, I didn't really understand 
what is going around me.  I was the youngest every time I've been there.  So I didn't feel 
comfortable speaking because I was just really young.  Not because I was Jewish, for 
sure.  But I think that the part that most of the people who manage this program are Arabs 
and Muslims, also Christians.  I mean, the time I was there, [two Jewish women] were the 
heads of Kids4Peace.  And it changed.  Yeah. Most of the staff were-- I don't know if it's 
right -- That's what it seems to me -- that most of the staff is Arab Muslim and Arab 
Christian. 
When asked the question, Noa and one other Jewish participant cites the proportion of 
Israeli to Palestinian/Arab staff as a factor in whether the organization provides an egalitarian 
atmosphere.  It is clear that the collective identities of staff members plays a role in participants’ 
perceptions of fairness and proportionality.  
I found contrast between the nature of Jewish Israeli responses versus Palestinian (Israeli-
Arab) responses.  When asked this question, Israeli Jews responded with, “mostly yes,” 
explaining that they believed Palestinian participants received more attention from the staff.  
Palestinian participants responded “yes” unilaterally, affirming that the organization provided an 
egalitarian atmosphere that offered the same attention to Israeli and Palestinian participants.  Noa 
answers:  
That's a good question.  I want to say yes, but then, I want to think about it a little bit 
more.  Maybe say no.  I was really young.  I was young in the fact that I didn't-- I mean, I 
didn't really understand what is going around me.  And the dialogues wasn't-- I mean, I 
was the youngest every time I've been there.  So, I didn't feel comfortable speaking 
because I was just really young.  Not because I was Jewish, for sure.  But I think that the 
part that most of the people who manage this program are Arabs and Muslims, also 
Christians.  Most of the staff were-- I don't know if it's right.  That's what it seems to me, 
that most of the staff is Arab Muslim and Arab Christian.  I don't know.  I don't know 
because it's changed so often.   
When asked whether the Kids4Peace staff discussed these issues of power and privilege 
directly in the programming, Sarah recounts, “I think they were just trying to balance them. They 
didn’t really talk about [these issues].”  As a participant she perceived a type of bias towards the 
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Palestinian youth, potentially brought on by the guilt of leaders of the organization or by the 
biases of the Palestinian staff, but no explanation of why these powers needed to be balanced. 
 On the contrary, Aiden does recall Kids4Peace programs involving explicit discussions 
about power disparities and inequalities between the two groups:  
Later when we were a little older, I remember in ninth grade, we were getting into it.  We 
were asked to read certain chapters [in a book], and then we were discussing the 
implications and causes for each thing.  And I can't recall if we ever talked about what 
can we do about it. Maybe in a meeting that I wasn't attending, we did, but we were 
talking about the-- we got over-- and we did tackle real-world problems… I remember 
when I was in eighth grade, there was-- it's not-- like an operation between Israel and 
Hamas in the Gaza.  I just remember hearing from my Palestinian friends about what they 
see happening in Gaza.  And I just remember I was in shock by what's happening there, 
because I've been seeing only one side.  I've been receiving rockets and hearing all those 
alarms and stuff, and I didn't realize that the other side is also is suffering a great deal.  I 
think the best example of it is that I remember was that someone said that whenever the 
Israelis hear an airplane, they feel safe.  And whenever the Palestinians hear an airplane, 
they're getting alert. So it's two different lives. So that was a real deal-breaker for me. 
 
Language and Power 
 
Malik touches on the way language is used differently between identity groups through 
the politics of the language59.  Political implications of the conflict seep into the way the struggle 
is defined.  Most academics and laypeople alike use the term ‘conflict’ as in “Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict”, or sometimes expanding the term to reference a wider “Arab-Israeli conflict”.  Others 
repudiate the use of the word conflict, as they define what is happening not as a conflict between 
two equal powers, but as an occupation of land and people through a powerful neocolonial project 
known as Zionism. 
 
59 The terms used to describe the land itself often differ depending on one’s political position.  Some still 
refer to all of the land in that region as Palestine.  Even some left-wing Jewish Israelis continue use this 
terminology to indicate their political view that the state of Israel is an occupying colonial force and their 
belief in decolonizing the land, returning it to its indigenous people.  During my stay, I largely avoided this 
predicament by telling those I communicated with that I stayed in “Jerusalem”.  I will use this in this paper 
as well when possible.  I will also focus on Jerusalem as a locale in order to localize and not generalize my 
study, as the experience of Palestinians and Israelis in other parts of the country and externally varies 
immensely. 
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Yeah, using the word "conflict" is a term that's a lot more neutral to everybody.  And so 
it's a term used in-- I've used the word "conflict" in this conversation.  And yeah, for 
some Palestinians, it might be something that's more interchangeable.  Others, they might 
insist that this is an occupation and never use the word conflict.  But I think some of the 
left-wing Israelis definitely called it an occupation.  Or they may have called it a conflict, 
but when you ask them, "Do you think it's an occupation?" they definitely would have 
agreed.  I think the face of Kids4Peace is changing slightly.  It's changing slightly.  I 
think the Israelis in Kids4Peace are slowly becoming more right-wing.  I think that's 
something that's great actually.  But I also think it's-- I think less and less Israelis would 
agree that this is an occupation and not a conflict.  Or that at least there is an occupation 
and a conflict.  Yeah, definitely.  Those power dynamics, they're really, really important. 
In this context Malik exposes yet another contradiction in the work being done at 
Kids4Peace and other coexistence organizations.  On one hand, Malik expresses approval that the 
organization is incorporating more right-wing members.  This means that the message and impact 
of the organization will reach those who have the potential to undergo the greatest transformation 
from the experience.  On the other hand, the incorporation of Zionist leadership and right-wing 
participants may change the content and style of the organization.  As Malik mentions, language 
may be used more carefully and neutrally in order to avoid making right-wing participants 
uncomfortable.  This trend may turn deeper into the focus of the organization, impacting content 
of workshops, activities, and dialogues.60  
Contrary to Malik, Johann seems to disapprove of the involvement of individuals who do 
not hold principles that Johann sees as being essential to the work of Kids4Peace: 
Definitely there were challenges along the way, but they were mainly come internal and 
with the organization itself and the program and everything. Not particularly anything 
from my [community].  I mean… let’s see what… it was a long time ago.  I think I mean 
for the first time I met people who had – I mean that were in an integrated framework 
program -- that might have let’s say reservations or uhh…  were hesitant to be fully in it. 
I generally think it came more from the Jewish side.  I mean there were a few Jews who 
were not in full agreement with everything I thought you needed to be in agreement with 
in a program like that.  
60 For example, activities may retain a lighter focus on personal and religious identity versus conversations 
that touch upon issues of the power dynamics that exist between youth in Jerusalem.  According to one 
advisor I spoke to, programs have decreased focus on issues of power and privilege over the years she has 
been involved.  
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Johann observed that some of the Jewish participants were not completely sold on the 
premise of the organization.  This brings up an interesting issue.  Should an organization like 
Kids4Peace reach out to those who do not believe in peace in an effort to bring them into the fold, 
or should recruiters avoid this to avoid the risk of harming the other participants and the 
authenticity of the program.  
Socioeconomic and Geographical Privilege 
Mariam interprets my question about power and privilege on multiple levels.  When 
asked whether these topics were addressed in the Kids4Peace program, she says:   
I think it would have been good if they brought up privilege more often, because mostly 
people who were more vocal about their opinion never addressed their privilege.  And I 
remember, in like something I did for Kids4peace maybe last winter, the people from the 
U.S. came and they asked us about our life in Jerusalem.  But they wanted to hear about 
our struggles in Jerusalem, and I couldn’t help but think, “why are you asking me about 
my struggles?  You should be asking the people in the West Bank, the people in Gaza, 
not me.”  I’m very privileged.  And I don’t remember that coming up in Kids4Peace.  I 
feel like in Kids4peace, we were all privileged.  We don’t have much to complain about. 
And obviously, things on a very social level, okay maybe, but on the big scale like real 
struggles I don’t think we -- like if we were to talk, we would be talking to the people 
who are actually going through that and not for ourselves personally.  So I think that 
aspect should have been brought up more during our dialogues.  Just to put things into 
perspective for each other. 
Mariam is self-reflective in pointing out the relative privilege she holds in relation to 
Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank.  She seems to believe that the privileges youth in 
Kids4Peace generally hold should be an important piece of the conversations they have around 
the conflict.  
Jewish Privilege 
Two left-wing Jewish citizens of Israel – Noa and Johann -- bring up their ambivalent 
feelings about their position of privilege. Noa outlines her thoughts on the privileges she holds as 
a Jewish Israeli as well as the privileges that non-Israeli Jews hold in Israel:   
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I think it's a privilege we as Jews have.  And it doesn't say that we have to use it.  I mean, 
we also can walk around in Hebron, and feel free, and we have those streets that are made 
only for us then-- I mean, it's not cool.  It's just not cool to use this privilege because we 
can.  The same about getting your citizenship because you're Jewish.  It's important, and 
it's important that people will do this kind of work.  So it's important that people will do 
this kind of work, and I know it's also really important for, I mean, how the world sees 
us.  The world would see that there's a different narrative as well.  That Jews actually care 
about Palestinians’ lives and the conflict in this kind of sense.  But getting their 
citizenship is a difficult-- I mean, it's a process that is only for Jews.  It sounds bad -- not 
just sounds bad.  It's bad.  It's a bad privilege we have.  It's a bad privilege that is only for 
us.  I would feel more comfortable with it the moment where also Arabs and Muslims 
and Palestinians could get their citizenship here to work about those things… Also, I get 
money from the government now, which is the money me and my parents pay, and only 
certain people get it.  Only I’m like, "Oh, my gosh. They want a certain type of Jew from 
a certain type of place," and, yeah, it's -- And no-one asked me if I want to give my 
money to people who are [making Aliyah]. 
Noa refers to the fact that Jews around the world can legally become citizens through a 
process called making Aliyah (meaning “to ascend” in Hebrew).61  She articulates her opposition 
to this law and to Jews taking advantage of their privilege while Arabs/Palestinians do not share 
that privilege.  Noa also references racism here when she says that the Israeli government “wants 
a certain type of Jew from a certain type of place.”  Here she refers to the targeting of American 
and European Jews to make Aliyah.  She expresses her rejection of these privileges and connects 
her participation in Kids4Peace as part of her way of showing the world that there is a different 
narrative and a Jewish Israeli mindset that involves awareness of privilege and compassion for 
Palestinians living on the land.  
   
American Influence 
 
In the description of one of the camps she attended in the United States, Noa brings up 
the American perspective that was passed down to the campers.  She says:  
I think I also remember a session about how-- Stuart, the one who hosted us on his farm, 
he explained the American perspective on conflict resolution in Israel and Palestine.  
 
61 This procedure is open to Jews only became official based on the Law of Return, passed in 1950, which 
granted every Jew in the world the right to settle in Israel (Nefesh B’Nefesh, 2017). 
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Now when I think about it, it was really, really-- he had a really specific agenda.  He was 
really pro-American intervention, and that's what he explained.  But at least I got the 
knowledge.  And now I know how to criticize this point of view that I don't agree with.  
But at least I got to hear it and understand it.  So I think that's a camp that I really gained 
a lot from. 
Noa felt that the hosts of the camp she attended held a specific view of the conflict and 
how it should be dealt with.  She seems to have appreciated hearing the host’s point of view 
despite disagreeing with his opinions.  Rather than experiencing the American bias negatively, 
Noa reports gaining knowledge from the experience and the ability to criticize the perspective of 
those who propose American intervention.  In this way, she gained a deeper understanding of 
alternative points of view, but also of her own thoughts on intervention.   
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter outlines the ways in which collective identity of young people intersects 
with the meaning they make of their experience in Kids4Peace.  The literature presented in 
Chapter II lays a foundation for this mean-making process.  The conversation around Kids4Peace 
and the intersections this paper investigates take place within larger conversations about identity, 
narrative, coexistence, and normalization.  Throughout my time interning for and researching 
Kids4Peace, and during my time spent in decolonizing activist circles interested in promoting 
Palestinian human rights, I encountered critiques of coexistence work done in Palestine/Israel.  
This chapter delves into these criticisms and how they relate to the real experience and thoughts 
of the youth interviewed.  Additionally, this discussion touches on an alternative perspective on 
the narratives developed by ‘ethos of conflict’ and on the real output Jerusalemite youth receive 
from being involved in Kids4Peace aside. 
 
5.1 Kids4Peace in Conversations about Contact and Coexistence 
 
This section discusses some criticisms of the coexistence model presented by scholars, 
activists, and other parties involved in this conflict.  A critical underlying theme of this research is 
power asymmetry between collective identity groups in conflict and the ways in which 
asymmetry is or is not reflected in the youths’ experiences and motivations. 
Allport’s contact theory asserts that intergroup contact reaps the desired positive effects 
only if four conditions of contact are met: equal group status within the contact environment, 
shared goals between the groups, intergroup cooperation, and support of authorities, law, or 
custom (Pettigrew, 1998).  Contact theory intersects with the topics in this section to aid in the 
discussion about the effectiveness of Kids4Peace as a conflict intervention.  Even if Kids4Peace 
Jerusalem, to the best of its ability, ensures equal treatment of all youth involved in the program, 
power asymmetry outside of the organization’s walls impacts the youth in the program and will 
inevitably seep into the contact environment.  This inequality shows up in the differing 
motivations and goals of those in contact, in the way youth participate in and experience 
dialogue, and in what youth get out of the experience as a whole.62   
 
 
 
62 Power differentiation may be reflected in the way group members express themselves in dialogue. 
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Identity, Power, and Goals for Contact 
 
This sub-section investigates the goals of Kid4Peace (K4P), the goals of K4P youth 
participants, and the youths’ perceptions of the organization’s goals.  It is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to arrive at conclusions about the correlation between collective identity, power and 
participant goals.  However, this chapter contributes to the discussion about how the relative 
position of power of the collective identity group in this conflict may influence the goals of young 
people belonging to those identities groups and participating in Kids4Peace.  I use the research of 
Saguy, Dovidio, and Pratto, also mentioned in Chapter II, as a backdrop for this discussion. 
The mission statement on the Kids4Peace website reads, “We empower youth to create 
more peaceful communities.  In the face of violence, hatred and injustice, we connect youth from 
across religious and social divides and give them tools to be agents of change.  Our vision is to 
create a global movement of peace leaders and activists who transform divided societies into 
communities of lasting peace” (About Us, 2019).  I deduced additional goals of the organization 
by investigating the metrics used to evaluate its programs.  These goals include personal 
transformation, involving changes in attitudes towards ‘the other’,63 an increased sense of agency, 
and shifted perceptions of the conflict.64  
Reported goals of current youth participants and alumni of Kids4Peace, outlined in 
Chapter IV, range from the internal (an increased understanding of the other, general knowledge, 
and personal transformation) to the interpersonal (friendships and community-building) to the 
external (to influence social and political change).  I examine youth perceptions of their own 
goals and the purpose of the organization through a lens of collective identity and power 
dynamics with the research of Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto as a framework for understanding the 
role of group power in goals for contact.65  The findings show that individual goals do, at times, 
align with the goals of their collective identity group as projected by Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto.  
In other instances, individual goals stray from the predicted findings due to an ideological 
divergence from the collective’s master narrative.   
 
63 Many of the youth interviewed do not report excessive negative attitudes about ‘the other’ before 
entering the program, particularly those who attended the bilingual Hand in Hand School.  However, some 
with less contact prior to Kids4Peace do cite fear and a lack of understanding. 
 
64 It is notable that metrics used to evaluate the K4P programs are designed for a report sent to USAID 
(United States Agency for International Development), the project’s primary funder.  This project was 
funded by USAID until 2018 when U.S. President Trump withdrew money from organizations supporting 
Palestinians (Zanotti, 2018).  
 
65 This research is introduced in Chapter II. 
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The data shows that after graduation, alumni seem to have a different perspective on 
Kids4Peace than while they were participants.  Alumni seem to synthesize the benefits of the 
organization as well as problems and challenges in their summation of the program’s goals and 
their own.  Generally speaking, current participants express more dissatisfaction due to 
dissonance between their own goals and the organization’s goals, and between their own goals 
and those of the other youth in the program.   
Social Identity theory (SIT) as outlined in Chapter II, relies on the idea that humans are 
motivated to maintain a positive self-concept.  This motivation may play a role in the formation 
of group goals for contact.  The underlying motivation for positive self-image of the group and 
self is also contained within the ethos of conflict.  The subconscious selection of goals for contact 
may also be supported by this ethos and the beliefs it describes. 
By accepting goals that are oriented towards social change, the more powerful group, 
Israeli youth, may feel that their place in the system is delegitimate.  A few Israeli youth 
acknowledged this belief and were more motivated to work for social change than their Jewish 
counterparts who seemed to more strongly hold views that holstered the idea of a Jewish state.  
On the other side, working for social change also supports the Palestinian system of beliefs and a 
positive self-image as they strive for rights and dignity.  
One of the strongest ways in which collective identity interacts with experience in an 
asymmetrical conflict such as that in Israel/Palestine is through power dynamics of the collective 
identity groups as they are experienced by individuals in the Kids4Peace program.  The relative 
power of a collective group may have an immense impact on the goals of the members of the 
groups as they enter into contact with one another (Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2008).  Saguy, 
Dovidio & Pratto’s analysis of power and goals states that those in the disadvantaged group in 
conflict will be more motivated than the advantaged group to work for social change when it 
comes to goals for contact with ‘the other’.  In alignment with this finding, Palestinians living in 
Israel strive for equal rights, justice, and an end to the occupation, in addition to a social and 
political future that involves some form of autonomy for their people (2008).  Malik represents 
this notion in his assertion, “I want to strive for equal rights in Israel among all citizens, but at the 
same time, I feel that’s part and parcel of my Palestinian identity.  I think that’s something that 
can’t be taken away from that [Palestinian identity].”   
Many Palestinian subjects in this study perceived the purpose as direct social change, 
reflecting their personal goals going into the organization.  A few of the youth, specifically 
Palestinian participants like Ismail and Saed, expressed frustration at the lack of a larger 
immediate impact.  Their goals in joining Kids4Peace were to inspire and create social and 
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political change.  Those most impatient with the lack of direct action are Palestinian current 
participants.   
On its website, Kids4Peace describes itself as “apolitical.”  Reflecting on the goals of the 
organization, it is pertinent to question whether it is possible to be apolitical in a conflict that 
impacts the core of daily life in Jerusalem and is rooted in the collective identities of members of 
the organization.  Apoliticism signals a position of privilege, as it is a privilege to remove oneself 
from politics.  It is often said that to not take a political stance supports the status quo be default.   
Saguy, Dovidio & Pratto suggest that Jewish Israelis, as the more powerful group, may 
have goals that fit within the existing power structures and status quo (2008).  The data from the 
interviews does reflect points made by these scholars to an extent.  Many Jewish participants of 
Kids4Peace state a desire to understand the inequalities in their country.  These subjects reported 
their perception of the purpose of Kids4Peace to be mutual understanding on an interpersonal 
level.   
Jewish Israelis who plan to enter the army spoke of bringing social awareness and 
empathy to soldiers on the frontlines (Aiden) and potentially to military policy (Yael).  Aiden 
declares the purpose of Kids4Peace as a meeting place where the two sides can make a “proper 
connection” and an opportunity to get firsthand knowledge of ‘the other’.  Aiden specifically 
mentions Israeli Jews having the opportunity to see the inequalities between the Palestinian and 
Jewish sides of the city (East and West Jerusalem, respectively).  Yael’s representation of her 
own goals presents a contradiction.  She claims that she aims to bring the mindset of Kids4Peace 
into and raise ethical questions in the highest levels of the military.  However, she admits that it is 
difficult to make change in this way.  She suggests that change in these policies and procedures 
can only be made through the Knesset.  This demonstrates how perceived goals and the reality 
may not match up.  
It is not only Palestinian young people who cite the struggle for social justice as a key 
part of their collective identity.  Through a self-reflective process, Noa, a left-wing Jewish 
alumna, finds the responsibility to fight for social change intrinsic to her Jewish identity.  Noa 
does not represent the findings mentioned above.  Her response suggests that far left-wing Jews 
may report having goals to disrupt the status quo just like their Palestinian counterparts.  Far left-
wing Jews in particular may have goals more similar to Palestinian participants in terms of 
commitment to social justice.66  
 
66 Given the small sample size in this study, further research should investigate specific personal goals 
more extensively.   
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Several participants – Palestinians and Israeli Jews alike -- were of the mindset that the 
new awareness brought upon by Kids4Peace would be a catalyst for change through individual 
participants bringing this awareness to their communities.  These participants took on the Seeds 
of Peace approach, in which they saw themselves as “seeds” that will spread and grow into 
peaceful social change.  According to a few of the subjects in this study, Kids4Peace served as a 
steppingstone as youth gained knowledge, a greater understanding of ‘the other’, and important 
life skills, but did not perceive the organization to have action-oriented goals.67  Although 
Palestinian participants reported an eagerness for social change and a more active role, most 
jointly acknowledge that Kids4Peace can primarily provide the “seed” approach to change.  
However, participant faith in the effectiveness of this approach and their own agency to spread 
awareness varied.  In many cases (for both Jews and Palestinians), a sense of “realism” appears to 
mediate personal goals and perceptions of the organization’s goals.   
Youth in this study also presented different perspectives on who should be the targeted 
members of Kids4Peace.  Some youth, such as Malik and Adina, believe that it is beneficial to 
have participants from all ends of the political spectrum.  It seems that Palestinian youth with this 
mindset believe that incorporating right wing Jewish Israelis might allow for the greatest societal 
change.  Others, both Palestinian and left-wing Israeli Jews, agree with Johann who asserts his 
belief that there are certain values and facts that should be agreed upon in order to join 
Kids4Peace.  Those of this opinion aim to achieve a safer environment for the most vulnerable 
youth and a greater capacity to make an impact.  This difference in opinion reflects differing 
goals of the youth.  
 It is important to note that the goals of the organization have and may continue to evolve 
further with shifting times and leadership.  As a team, Kids4Peace leadership decides what kind 
of community the organization strives for, who they reach out to, and what the screening process 
looks like for admission into the program.  It is unclear whether the true goals of leadership are to 
challenge the overarching power structures in a meaningful way.  Whether this is the case or not, 
stating so on the Kids4Peace website may deter youth from joining the organization and may 
even put those involved in danger.  The stated goals of Kids4Peace may in fact be authentic in 
their commitment to “apoliticism.”  Alternatively, this more neutral stance may be a reflection of 
the predicament many peacebuilding organizations in Palestine/Israel face.  They may often 
 
67 The exception to this statement is the optional action-based “Advocacy Track” accessible to the high-
school YAP (Youth Action Program) participants.  One project cited by Malik and other Kids4Peace 
representatives lobbied local movie theaters to incorporate Arabic subtitles in their movie screenings.  
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balance the desire to involve those who would benefit most from the contact with the need for 
members to have enough shared values to create a safe, productive space.  The issue is even more 
delicate given young people are involved and could be at risk.  
 
Identity Transcendence and Identity Accentuation 
 
Identity transcendence and identity accentuation relate to an individual’s adherence to 
their collective identity group’s master narrative (a concept described in Chapter II).  These terms 
describe the extent to which one’s individual identity is intertwined with their collective identity 
and their personal narrative with their group’s master narrative.  Identity transcendence involves 
a reduction of the salience of an in-group identity to take on a new common identity that is 
inclusive of the out-group.  In contrast, identity accentuation refers to a process of increased 
salience of social identity and emphasis on “us” and “them” categories.  The process of identity 
accentuation is characterized by polarization and sometimes accompanies a continued 
delegitimization of the out-group identity and narrative (Hammack, 2011).  These concepts 
appear in Hammack’s research of Seeds of Peace and Hands of Peace, which serves as an 
example through which I ground ideas that arise in my own research. 
Hammack’s findings show that identity transcendence is a goal of the two peacebuilding 
organizations he studied (2011).  An orientation towards identity transcendence in peacebuilding 
assumes that Israelis and Palestinians can peacefully coexist only if individuals in each group 
transcend the ideologically rigid master narratives that divide them.  The aim is for participants to 
“develop a consciousness for coexistence” (Hammack, 2011).  Hammack describes the way in 
which Seeds of Peace promotes the adoption of a super-ordinate identity that incorporates 
individuals of both ‘sides’ of the conflict into one community and culture of peace (2011).  
Kids4Peace does not promote the super-ordinate identity as systematically as Seeds of Peace.  
However, the interviews I conducted do suggest that being a “kid for peace” may come with the 
responsibility of adopting and transmitting a consciousness for coexistence to the larger 
Jerusalemite (Israeli and Palestinian) communities.  
 Seeds of Peace, more so than Kids4Peace, espouses identity transcendence as an ideal.  
However, to a certain extent, the participants of Kids4Peace interviewed in this study suggest 
feeling an expectation to accept a Kids4Peace narrative over their collective identity group’s 
master narrative or their own personal adaptation of that collective narrative.  This sentiment was 
expressed more directly in Malik’s interview, but many of the other interviews supported the 
point.  Hammack’s study of Seeds of Peace discovers a pressure on youth to adopt a third, centrist 
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narrative.  A similar centrist narrative is described by Malik in the findings (Chapter IV).  The 
third narrative Seeds of Peace promotes relies on a story of liberal pluralism, cosmopolitanism 
and individual-driven social change (Hammack, 2011).68 
The interviews for this study generally did not get into details about individuals’ beliefs 
about the region’s history and the conflict.  However, I was able to deduce general outlooks on 
‘the other,’ perspectives on the conflict, and points on which individuals diverged from their 
group’s master narratives.  I witnessed a degree of identity transcendence in those who attended 
Jerusalem’s Hand in Hand school – primarily in Israeli-Arab youth, like Malik and Chris 
who both attended this school and participated in other Jewish Israeli extracurriculars.  I also 
classify Johann's (who was raised reform Jewish and a citizen of Israel) attitude as a form of 
identity transcendence, as he does not identify as Israeli but rather as a person from 
Jerusalem.  He does not directly attribute this transcendence to his participation in Kids4Peace, 
although it may have played a role.   
On the other hand, Kids4Peace may have played a role in Malik’s identity accentuation.  
Malik warns against the coerced adoption of the centrist narrative.  He asserts, “to adopt a 
Kids4Peace narrative that's a centrist narrative just for the sake of being centrist, I think it's 
terrible.  It's really, really bad.  And I think it hurts the impact that it has.  I think in the minds of 
participants, it means that you should change your opinion.”  The experience of feeling pressure 
to present this narrative seems to solidify Malik’s beliefs in some of the elements of his own 
collective master narrative. 
Rather than experiencing identity transcendence, some participants of Kids4Peace felt a 
strengthening of their relationship to their collective identity, or identity accentuation (Hammack, 
2011).  Fatima and Adina relayed an increased salience of, understanding of, and confidence in 
their collective identity.  This result at times appeared to be in conjunction with participation in 
other programs alongside Kids4Peace.  Noa, for example, describes a process of learning about 
her Jewish identity.  She transitions from feelings of shame – feeling uncomfortable identifying 
herself as Jewish to non-Jews – to a sense of pride in her Jewish identity as well as a sense of 
obligation to use her privilege to fight for equality.  She credits the Raufman program for gaining 
pride and confidence and her experience in Kids4Peace for her process of self-reflection and her 
gained sociopolitical awareness.  In this way, Noa begins a faux process of identity 
transcendence, one that brings about shame and discomfort.  However, it seems that she 
eventually arrives at an accentuated and nuanced understanding of her Jewish identity rather than 
 
68 This model is familiar in Western culture, but individual-driven social change may be more difficult to 
enact in cultures so strongly based on the approval of the larger community.   
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identity transcendence.  Noa’s reflections, along with Malik’s commentary on pressure to adopt a 
Kids4Peace narrative, could suggest that the idea of identity transcendence may not be innocuous, 
ideal, or realistic as a goal for contact. 
 
“The Bubble” 
 
One criticism of the coexistence model, and a motif brought up by Noa, involves the idea 
that organizations like Kids4Peace create a “bubble” that political issues, power asymmetry, and 
cultural limitations from the real world supposedly do not touch.  Peace organizations may 
present a kind of bubble in which the youth appear equal and everyone may be friends regardless 
of their collective identity.  However, when faced with the real world, this bubble may pop, 
leaving participants stunned and disillusioned.  In this bubble, youth should be able to discuss 
politics and social issues in an egalitarian and safe space.  However, the criticism of this bubble is 
that the youth who participate in coexistence camps form hope about a non-existent reality and 
are then forced to go back to a world in which the dynamic built at camp does not exist. The 
interviews show that this is, in part, the case.   
Noa mentions the fact that the Kids4Peace camps do create a bubble and that returning 
home was difficult.  She, as well as other participants like Mariam, also addressed the fact that 
her friendships did not last after graduation.  In the “generating affective ties” phase of Allport’s 
Contact Theory, positive emotions, brought upon by intergroup friendships should inspire 
empathy between members of the different groups, ideally forming last bonds between in-group 
and out-group members.  These lasting bonds, solidified by the experience of working together 
for shared group goals, should lead to out-group reappraisal by in-group members.  For this 
reason, the establishment and growth of friendships is key to the contact intervention.  However, 
many alumni reported losing touch with the friends they made during Kids4Peace who were from 
the ‘other side,’ and some current participants reported not having made friends with members of 
the out-group.  Noa and Mariam, once close friends in the program, both reported having lost 
touch over the years due to differing life directions.  Noa claims that she does not believe 
sustaining these friendships is the goal of the program.  Instead, she reports keeping the lessons 
from these friendships with her into her future life choices.  In this way, the friendships made 
through Kids4Peace may be temporal yet meaningful. 
On the other hand, Kids4Peace Jerusalem does not act as a bubble.  Youth report facing 
discrimination and attacks during the programming.  The inevitable imperfections of the program 
  
 
 
 
115 
and the fact that meetings take place locally year-round makes the bubble phenomenon less 
prominent.   
The ‘bubble’ does not perfectly isolate the Kids4Peace culture, because youth continue to 
experience reality on the outside throughout their years in the program.  This is the result of a 
long-term, year-round program that includes parents and community members.  As the youth live 
through multiple Israeli-Gazan wars, continued occupation and oppression of the Palestinian 
people, and violent attacks from both sides, they may internalize increased feelings of 
helplessness and disillusionment.  Participation in Kids4Peace mediates this sense of helplessness 
for some by providing a source of optimism and community for those who believe in peace.  In 
this sense ‘the bubble’ may act as a vision of what society could be like post-conflict, fueling 
hope and optimism in the youth.  However, this bubble is not fully insulated from the outside 
world.  
The overlap of Kids4Peace and the world outside Kids4Peace is evident through some of 
the youths’ stories, which mention negative interactions with outsiders while together as a group.  
Through Kids4Peace, youth grapple with complex realities made even more stark by directly 
facing ‘the other’.  Jewish Israeli youth must reconcile their bonds with and understanding of 
Palestinians when deciding whether or not to join the army.  If they do decide to join the army, 
they must think about how their experience in Kids4Peace will influence the unit they choose to 
join and the way they carry themselves during their service.  To Palestinians and left-wing Israeli 
Jews in the program, this service symbolizes the unjust distribution of power and inhumane 
treatment of Palestinians.  Palestinian youth must come to terms with the fact that many of their 
Israeli Jewish friends from Kids4Peace will be on the other side of a checkpoint, in a unit that 
gathers intelligence, or potentially even committing direct acts of violence against their people.  
These realities are difficult for the youth to ignore while forming and maintaining friendships. 
Kids4Peace designs their program to avoid creating a bubble separate from the realities 
of Jerusalem.  The program is held year-round in order to incorporate the ideas of Kids4Peace 
into the everyday lives of the youth and their families.  Kids4Peace attempts to target this issue 
through parent groups and community events.  The organization hosts a parent program which 
aims to help parents support their children through an integration process – that through which 
participants bring the Kids4Peace experience into their daily realities – and through any difficult 
emotions that may arise during the process.  Many students did cite their parents as a source of 
support and encouragement throughout their time with Kids4Peace. 
Rather than describing Kids4Peace as a ‘bubble,’ some youth name it as the tool that 
popped ‘the bubble’ they knew while living in a segregated community surrounded by only 
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members of their national identity group or while attending the bilingual school Hand in Hand 
(which some described as a ‘bubble’ itself).  Chris explains, "When you're in Hand in Hand 
school they construct a wall around [the conflict and suffering].  They say, ‘there's a conflict, but 
it's all good. We're all friends, and it's all good.’  But you don't realize actual people are suffering.  
But when I went to East Jerusalem and started studying at Beit Hanina (it's next to Shu’afat), I 
started learning the mentality of how people think and how people see the other side. You know, I 
came from Hand in Hand.  My best friend was Jewish.  And there they don't like Jews as much.  I 
wouldn't call them extreme, but I was always different for being more open to Jews and being 
friends with Jews.  It was weird.  And that I spoke Hebrew and stuff."  In this way, Chris received 
a better understanding of the Palestinian narrative through Kids4Peace and by moving to a 
Palestinian neighborhood than an understanding of ‘the other.’  
Not only do youth report opposition they have faced as a group, but youth participants 
from all identity groups described negative reactions to their participation in the Kids4Peace from 
members of their own communities.  In carrying the external response to their peace work with 
them, the line between the world of Kids4Peace and communities outside of Kids4Peace may 
become blurred for these youth.  Additionally, many youth mention ways in which Kids4Peace 
values and skills are taken into their communities outside of the program.   
 
Confronting the Issue of Normalization (Tatbi'a) 
 
Within the discussion of opposition to Kids4Peace participation, a handful of Palestinian 
participants mentioned tatbi’a, or the English word, “normalization.”69  Tatbi'a (normalization) is 
a term used to describe the “process of building open and reciprocal relations with Israel in all 
fields, including the political economic, social, cultural, educational, legal, and security fields” 
(Salem, 2005).  Palestinian youth alumni and current participants assert that members of their 
community oppose their participation due to anti-normalization beliefs – these community 
members believe that normalized relations with Israelis is harmful to their community and to the 
Palestinian cause. 
 
69 This concept is referenced in Chapter IV in the context of sources of the opposition youth face to their 
participation in Kids4Peace. 
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However, anti-normalization positions lie on a spectrum, and not all Palestinians and 
allied activists share the same stance on this issue.70  Some stand vehemently against any form of 
normalization, asserting that all peacebuilding activities involving both Israelis and Palestinians 
are problematic in that they dismiss the colonial power structure as the main source of the 
conflict, presuming that it should be up to the people on the ground to learn to live with one 
another within an unjust status quo.  Other perspectives are more nuanced; they classify certain 
activities as normalization but others as ambiguous and passable.  Others claim that normal 
relations with Israel is not possible, and therefore the word normalization should not be used to 
describe any current activities (Salem, 2005).   
Different standards are set for internationals than for Palestinians living in the West 
Bank.  Palestinian citizens of Israel carry a different set of anti-normalization rules as well 
according to PACBI (Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of 
Israel)(2011).71  Some activities considered normalization under its broadest definition include 
 
70 “Anti-normalization positions in the Arab world fall into four main categories: Islam, Arab Marxism, 
Arab nationalism, and a mix of different ideological groups who all agree on the importance of resisting 
‘cultural normalization.’  The root of the Islamic anti-normalization position comes from the belief that 
Palestine is an Islamic waqf (endowment), and that Jews have no rights at all in it.  Consequently, Israel's 
existence is not legitimate, and therefore it is not possible to recognize it.  The stance of Palestinian 
Islamists is more moderate than this.  Since the beginning of 1994, the position of Hamas has been to 
accept coexistence with Israel without recognition, and without normalizing relations.  The Marxist 
position on normalization is inherited from their anti-imperialist stance; therefore, they speak against 
normalizing with Israel as a part of their anti-normalization towards imperialism. This Marxist anti-
normalization propaganda was strong in the Arab world during the 1970s and 1980s, and they put it into 
practice through anti-normalization committees such as the Committee for the Defense of the Arab 
National Culture in Egypt.  With the collapse of most of the Arab Marxist groups, the Marxist anti-
normalization trend has continued among groups of intellectuals who refuse normalization within the 
broader framework of the rejection of both social and cultural consumerism.  The third anti-normalization 
position is that of the Arab nationalists, whose position towards Israel has passed through two stages.  In 
the first stage, which lasted until the 1970s, the Arab nationalists considered Israel (which they called "the 
Zionist entity") to be a threat to Arab national unity, because geographically it has separated the Arab east 
from the Arab west, and has also taken part of Arab land.  In the 1970s the Arab nationalists split into two 
different groups with respect to their stance regarding normalization.  The official Arab position was 
expressed in a readiness to participate in negotiations with Israel through an international peace conference 
in Geneva as early as 1973. A second position, held by Arab nationalist intellectuals, rejected negotiations 
with Israel - even if they did not lead to the recognition of and the establishment of a normal relationship 
with Israel. It should be noted here that even those Arab nationalists who have taken part in official 
negotiations with Israel, such as the Syrian regime, make a distinction between negotiating with Israel and 
normalizing with Israel.  The last category consists of a mixture of groups all of which call for the 
rejection of cultural normalization. Those working against cultural normalization include various religious, 
national, and Marxist orientations, some of whom believe that fighting against political and economic 
normalization is not likely to succeed. Therefore, they consider it is better to concentrate on preserving the 
last and most important ‘garrison’: Arabic culture” (Salem, 2005). 
 
71 Palestinians who remain citizens of Israel and live within the Green Line may be confronted with two 
forms of normalization (PACBI, 2011). 
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joint Israeli-Palestinian academic journals, the buying of Israeli products (primarily those made 
on illegal settlements, which normalizes the existence and legitimacy of these settlements), events 
hosting mainstream Israeli artists, and peace-building organizations such as Kids4Peace.  
PACBI’s (Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel) website 
explicitly lays out the organization’s thoughts on dialogue, which is often offered as an 
alternative to boycott.  PACBI argues that any dialogue or reconciliation process that does not 
endeavor to end oppression “serves to privilege oppressive co-existence at the cost of co-
resistance, for they presume the possibility of coexistence before the realization of justice” 
(PACBI, 2011).72  
The issue of normalization may be a more structural way of looking at the situation on 
the ground, but the embodiment of this concept and questions around it are personal for young 
people participating in Kids4Peace.  Palestinian participants build friendships with young Israeli 
Jews knowing that these friends will likely join the army after graduating high school.  Chris 
mentions the disappointment felt by his peers who attended Hand in Hand school (a bilingual, 
Israeli-Palestinian school in Jerusalem) with Jewish classmates who gained knowledge of Arabic 
language and Palestinian culture to then use the information against Palestinians once they join 
the army after graduation.  The same sentiment is reflected in those who oppose the work of 
coexistence organizations such as Kids4Peace.  Through a systemic lens, it may appear harmful 
to provide the Israeli state and those who serve in the military a deeper understanding of the 
Palestinians whom they oppress and occupy.  For this reason, many oppose normalization of 
relations until drastic changes in institutions and state structure are made.  Whether or not the 
information learned at Kids4Peace ends up being used in a harmful way, there is widespread fear 
and opposition among Palestinians in response to this kind of coexistence work that brings 
together Israelis and Palestinians.  Those I spoke outside of the organization to who opposed this 
kind of work suggested a superficial quality to peace work while larger systemic oppression 
 
72 The PACBI website reads, “While many, if not most, normalization projects are sponsored and funded 
by international organizations and governments, many of these projects are operated by Palestinian and 
Israeli partners, often with generous international funding.  The political, often Israel-centered, framing of 
the ‘partnership’ is one of the most problematic aspects of these joint projects and institutions.  PACBI’s 
analysis of OneVoice, a joint Palestinian-Israeli youth-oriented organization with chapters in North 
America and extensions in Europe, exposed OneVoice as one more project that brings Palestinians and 
Israelis together, not to jointly struggle against Israel’s colonial and apartheid policies, but rather to provide 
a limited program of action under the slogan of an end to the occupation and the establishment of a 
Palestinian state, while cementing Israeli apartheid and ignoring the rights of Palestinian refugees, who 
compose the majority of the Palestinian people.  PACBI concluded that, in essence, OneVoice and similar 
programs serve to normalize oppression and injustice.  The fact that OneVoice treats the ‘nationalisms’ and 
‘patriotisms’ of the two ‘sides’ as if on par with one another and equally valid is a telling indicator” (2011). 
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remains outside of the Kids4Peace walls and continue to influence social dynamics within the 
program itself.  
Additionally, research shows that individual members of disadvantaged groups may lose 
motivation to act for structural change to benefit their collective identity group when that identity 
is less salient to them.  The chance that members of the advantaged group, who are more likely to 
advocate for social change if they perceive their privileged position as illegitimate, decreases as 
the group distinction become less delineated with a focus on commonality (Saguy, Dovidio & 
Pratto, 2008).  Although I did not specifically measure this phenomenon in the data I collected, a 
few interviews point to this potentially occurring in Kids4Peace participants.  The Palestinian 
participants, most of whom attended Hand in Hand School, focused primarily on hope and some 
on commonalities between the groups and less so on political action.  
Israeli Jewish youth in the study do seem to recognize a stark difference between their 
own position and that of their Palestinian counterparts.  They report differences in culture and 
highlighted the disparity in suffering between the two, a reality they saw more explicitly during 
their time in Kids4peace.  Almost all Israeli Jewish alumni and currently participants, aside from 
one right-wing identified youth, report some willingness to work for social change.  Commitment 
for social change does fall into the coexistence narrative discussed earlier in this chapter.  
However, the level of commitment of Jewish Israeli alumni to this cause varies.  Those who 
refused to join the army, for example, may represent a commitment to supporting the Palestinian 
rights, equality, and an end to the occupation.  Others choose to follow the common Israeli Jewish 
practice of joining the army, maybe even the intelligence, but state that they will use their 
knowledge from Kids4Peace to impact those inside the military. 
Some of the Palestinian participants who mentioned normalization understand and 
respect the anti-normalization perspective but also find value in the benefits they reap from 
Kids4Peace.  Mariam mentions that her professor declares his opposition to normalizing activities 
due to his difficult reality crossing check points each day and facing difficult Israeli soldiers.  She 
explains that she understands that people are angry and sees where they are coming from.  She 
admits that going through a program like Kids4Peace is “not an easy process,” but that it could 
results in good things.  She acknowledges that she believes both sides of the argument are valid.  
Professionals in peacebuilding, like activist and academic Sami Adwan, reframe the issue 
of normalization.  Adwan describes his peace work with Israeli academics as an act of resistance.  
He states, “Peacebuilding is part of resistance in our situation. What we do in PRIME [Peace 
Research Institute in the Middle East] is also resistance because we are resisting the dominant 
narrative of the occupation and its ideology.  It is also resisting the traditional perspective of 
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seeing the conflict.  So, by creating a generation of children who look at the situation from a 
critical perspective—that is resistance, because you resist the taken-for-granted, the legitimatized, 
monolithic approach to history or narrative. I would say resistance takes the military and non-
military, the peaceful and the not peaceful” (Adwan 2007; Richter-Devroe, 2008).  Activists like 
Adwan project the possibilities for youth in Kids4Peace.  His statement encapsulates the attitudes 
of many Palestinian youth participants and their reasons for continuing coexistence work despite 
arguments against normalization.   
As both a practitioner in the field and an activist, I find myself grappling with the issue of 
normalization and to what extent the work of Kids4Peace may be flawed through the lens of anti-
normalization rationale.  I understand the perspectives of those who criticize the type of work 
done by Kids4Peace and similar organizations.73  I have had conversations in which I broke down 
in tears speaking to anti-normalization activists who consider any coexistence work as supportive 
of the occupation.  One activist in particular reasoned that if she saw real numbers of a reduction 
in Israeli Jews joining the army, she may see this work as legitimate.  This complicated and 
charged topic is and will continue to be an important part of the dialogue Palestinians have 
around participation in coexistence organizations like Kids4Peace. 
 
5.2 Social Power: The Positive Power of Narrative and Group Identification in Conflict 
 
            Several of the grassroots approaches to conflict resolution in cases of intractable, ethnic 
conflict are grounded in a reconciliation or negotiation of conflicting group narratives.  These 
often involve intergroup contact and dialogue.  Without taking structural sources of the conflict 
into consideration, many believe that ‘identity transcendence’ through this contact may act as a 
source of conflict transformation.  Identity transcendence may be an easy answer for Western-
minded folks sitting in relative comfort and existential security far removed from the conflict.  
However, it is an act of privilege to transcend one’s collective identity.  This approach overlooks 
the power a strong collective narrative provides those whose livelihoods and identities are at risk. 
A compelling story is a powerful force in itself.  To have a moral backbone to one’s story 
assigns meaning to one’s life, one’s identity, and one’s very existence.  The force of this story in 
the context of collective narratives is compounded by the numbers and power of the group.  In a 
collectivist culture, this group narrative and corresponding shared group meaning is particularly 
powerful.  
 
73 Other organizations like Kids4Peace includes Seeds of Peace, Hands of Peace, and even the school 
attended by many of the youth interviewed in this study, Hand in Hand.  
  
 
 
 
121 
Not only does narrative protect the psyche in the ways mentioned in the section on ethos 
of conflict, but collective narrative contains elements of important truths that give the group and 
individuals within the group moral, social, and often political power within the conflict setting 
and on the international stage.  These forms of power compensate for a lack of military, 
economic, and immediate political power.  This power comes with having moral authority and 
being ‘in the right.’  In the same vein, the position of ‘the victim’ also holds a certain kind of 
power.  The victimized group can use their narrative in strategic ways to strengthen their position 
(Agbaria & Cohen, n.d.).  Strategies may involve awareness campaigns that highlight human 
rights abuses perpetrated by the more powerful group onto the less powerful group.  This is the 
case with the Boycott Divest Sanction (BDS) movement and other Palestinian rights groups that 
have brought awareness of expanding illegal settlements and human rights violations to the 
international community.  
Saguy, Dovidio, and Pratto assert that one of the ways in which a disempowered group 
can support social change and improve their position in society is by rewriting the public 
discourse (2008).  That is to bring into public consciousness the injustice their group experiences 
and the illegitimacy of the existing power disparity.  These authors use the examples of 
nonviolent resistance during the civil rights movement in the United States, South African 
apartheid, and the struggle for Indian independence.  Activists of these movements brought 
awareness to the oppressive nature of the status quo and questioned the legitimacy of these 
hierarchical systems (Saguy, Dovidio & Pratto, 2008).   
The political history and narratives deeply and irreversibly interlink these two peoples in 
a negative interdependence (Hammack, 2008; Kelman, 1999).  This investigation of the 
experience of young people in Kids4Peace extracts the question whether it is possible to reframe 
narrative around this   interconnectedness in a way through which these groups may maintain the 
power of their collective narratives as well as form bonds with ‘the other’, work together for 
social change, and heal from the trauma each group has experienced.  
 
5.3 What do Young People Get Out of Kids4Peace? 
 
Participants reported a myriad of impacts from the Kids4Peace programs.  Among these 
outputs are an increased confidence, a stronger sense of self and personal voice, a greater 
understanding of the self and other, exposure to different perspectives, communication and 
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leadership skills,74 a therapeutic release through dialogue, and greater socio-political awareness.  
Most participants described a sense of self-growth through the program.  Additionally, youth 
report gaining a sense of belonging, support, and a safe space for expression in the Kids4Peace 
community. 
Youth in this study cite finding their voice and sense of self through the Kids4Peace 
program.  This process may have been facilitated directly by the tools that Kids4Peace provided 
(i.e. nonviolent communication workshops and exercises around identity), through the process of 
self-expression and self-reflection that comes with contact with ‘the other’, or through the 
community which gave youth a space to explore their thoughts around coexistence and peace.  I 
found that the youth who were given opportunities to speak to international groups, either 
domestically or through outreach tours to the United States, were most likely to report a 
strengthening of voice and personal identity as well as an increased sense of confidence.  
The work young people do in Kids4Peace inspires some to be leaders for their 
generation.  Ismail, for example, tells me, “Look, as an individual, I believe.  Yes, I believe.  You 
see here the word ‘believe.’ It’s all about having hope.  High hopes in God or anything.  Having 
high hopes.  But as an individual, yes of course I believe that I could make a change hopefully 
one day.  That’s my belief, and hopefully, hopefully... Who knows what happens, but if you see 
something that influences people -- like if they see someone speaking on their behalf, someone 
who is empowering them, [someone who is] speaking (of course non-violently) -- speaking what 
they think, then people would follow him.  And he would become a leader, like as we saw in 
Martin Luther King.”  The fervor behind Ismail’s words not only demonstrated the inspirational 
speaking skills he has gained over the years,75 but also the strong sense of optimism Kids4Peace 
allows him to nurture.  
When asked if he feels he has the power to create social change, Ahmed says, “I’m a 
counselor with Kids4peace ...When you’re teaching the younger kids everything that Kids4Peace 
taught you before, you feel like you’re doing more than just staying.”  This statement reflects a 
deep need to do something “more than just sitting” in the conflict.  It appears that passing on the 
knowledge Ahmed has gained through Kids4Peace serves as a coping mechanism.  The 
Counselor in Training (CIT) program also seems to provide youth a sense of agency when 
 
74 For the sake of narrowing the scope of this thesis, the findings section does not address youth responses 
around leadership skills.  However, a majority of respondents who participated in the CIT (Counselor in 
Training) program or moved into higher positions in the organization reported leadership skills as a major 
benefit of the program.  
 
75 Ismail reported that he developed his speaking skills both in Kids4Peace and from watching YouTube 
videos.  
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otherwise many of them feel momentarily helpless to do anything about the conflict.  Gaining 
these leadership skills through the Counselor in Training (CIT) program seems to provide youth 
with a sense of responsibility and agency through their role in shaping the younger youth. 
Palestinian youth in K4P express a sense of relief in being heard and expressing 
themselves through dialogue.  In a study that examines the interaction between group status and 
contact condition (coexistence model versus confrontational model), Hammack, Pilecki, 
and Merrilees found that confrontational contact seems to be more effective in empowering the 
low-status group (i.e. Palestinians) than contact intended to foster coexistence/recategorization 
and interpersonal friendship (2013).  This may account for why Palestinians expressed greater 
feelings of empowerment through direct political dialogue than in gaining understanding of the 
other (and presenting a centrist narrative for reporters and visitors).   
Several Palestinian young people also reported being empowered by speaking in front of 
groups -- locally or through speaking tours -- due to the opportunity this provides them to share 
their personal narratives.  As mentioned above, in addition to advocating for the Kids4Peace 
narrative, these public speaking opportunities allow facilitate participants presenting their 
personal and group stories.  Therefore, the Kids4Peace experience presents a contradiction.  On 
one hand, Palestinian youth in particular may have felt pressured to cater their story to an 
audience, as Malik suggest.  On the other hand, youth gained confidence and the feelings of self-
knowledge through these opportunities to express themselves through dialogue and public 
speaking. 
5.4 Limitations of the Study 
As primary researcher, I experienced many obstacles throughout this study.  These 
limitations included language, gender, culture, timing, selection bias, interview process, and my 
own positionality in the conflict.    
Language 
With minimal Hebrew and Arabic language skills, I felt most comfortable conducting 
interviews in English.  Although almost all young people in Kids4Peace do speak English -- as 
much of the programming is conducted in English -- some youth have more developed English 
skills than others.  Holding the interviews in English may have created a disparity in the 
information I received from participants.  Those who are less proficient in English were able to 
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express less of their experience than those with high proficiency in the English language.  With 
more resources and time, I may have hired a translator to conduct interviews with youth in their 
native language.  
Gender and Culture 
Like language, gender and culture stood as a partial barrier to my research.  It is 
important to recognize the cultural norms around communication and gender when conducting 
fieldwork in a culture that is not one’s own.  Despite my preparations and intentions to be 
culturally aware and sensitive, there may have been subtle cues that I did not pick up on.  There is 
a flow and comfort that comes along with speaking to those from one’s own culture.  My 
interviews may have lacked this flow at times.  As an American, I sometimes felt awkward asking 
questions, not knowing the culturally appropriate way to approach certain topics.  Additionally, 
after studying the norms around gender and mixed gender interactions in Arab culture, I felt that 
young Palestinian males from more traditional Muslim communities would have been more 
comfortable opening up to a male interviewer.  With more resources, I would have included male 
interviewers in the interview process. 
Selection Bias 
As mentioned in Chapter III, the young people who participated in this study were 
selected by the Kids4Peace director and staff members.  The staff provided me with a list of 
youth they remained in contact with or who they felt would be most willing to participate in the 
interview process.  These participants were those most involved in Kids4Peace.  Some of these 
youth graduated to be counselors and even paid advisors for the program.  Therefore, these 
participants are likely some of the most engaged and supportive of the program.  Although these 
individuals had criticisms, the data does not include the full spectrum of experiences youth had in 
Kids4Peace.  It would be interesting and informative to interview youth who dropped out of the 
program for various reason or those who were less involved, possibly due to dissonance with 
program goals and design. 
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PI’s Positionality, Shortcomings, and Bias 
There is an awkwardness and naivete which I assume accompanies any researcher’s first 
time in the field.  I felt the growing pains of this process intensely and viscerally.  I felt them 
while transcribing of interviews.  I cringed at the way I approached certain questions and 
stumbled on my words.  I came up with so many ways in which I could have conducted the 
interviews better.  I know that in some cases, these youth could have provided me with fuller, 
more in-depth answers if I had the know-how and confidence to coax them out.  Additionally, my 
position as an American with a Jewish background may have influenced the way the youth 
presented information. 
It is critical to acknowledge the bias I hold as an individual with a past connection to 
Judaism and a leftist activist culture.  Have participated in anti-occupation activism, I hold a 
bias.  Although I have found myself in a more neutral space than before, my background 
inevitably impacts the way I examine the topics in this study. 
5.4 Conclusions 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Further research should follow a larger number of alumni of the Kids4Peace program in 
their future endeavors.  Ideally, this study should include a wider range of modes of 
participation.  Whereas my study involved some of the most active members of Kids4Peace, 
many of whom moved on to become counselors and a few even staff members.   
I suggest a study which enumerates activist, peacebuilding, and social justice-oriented 
activities performed by alumni of Kids4Peace, as well as the number of Jewish participants who 
refused the army versus those who joined the army.  This research should collect qualitative data 
on motivations for the aforementioned activities and for refusing to join the army.  This data will 
serve to answer the question: did participation in Kids4Peace impact the life choices of 
participants after graduation?  Does Kids4peace motivate Israeli Jews to refuse participation in 
the Israeli military?  
Research around power dynamics in dialogue could be expanded and applied specifically 
to Kids4Peace.  How can K4P dialogue address power and privilege more directly and 
effectively, leading to greater awareness of structural realities and how they impact the 
relationship between youth in the program?  Additionally, I would expand my investigation of 
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narrative with a critical look at the American narrative about coexistence work and whether 
Americans working in Kids4Peace culturally influences the programs.   
 
Final Words  
 
The trajectory of Kids4Peace tells a story of an organization in flux, evolving with the 
preferences and needs of the time and with shifting leadership.  Like other types of grassroots 
non-profits, Kids4Peace attempts to fill the needs of people on the ground.  In order to fill these 
needs, it is imperative to understand what they are through the voices of the youth involved.   
The discussion in this study aims not to criticize the organization or its staff, but to 
offer insights into the program’s impact and to raise the voices of those participants asking for 
true change, representation, clear intentions, and in the case of the conflict’s most vulnerable 
youth, a commitment to social justice.  As with all social movements, the pro-peace movement in 
Jerusalem and Palestine/Israel at large comes with immense complications and contradictions.  In 
order to form alliances, people on the ground must meet, humanize, and bond with one 
another.  However, by meeting and communicating with no vision for structural change, it seems 
that this work may act as part of the problem rather than the solution.   
Youth participate in Kids4Peace out of interest, curiosity, a willingness to grow, and for 
the material opportunities the organization provides.  Given the right facilitators, this work could 
be transformational in that it could bring greater awareness to what must be done and motivate 
youth to work stridently for real social and political change.  The organization could be a 
platform for youth social organization.  Although the organization currently moves in 
the direction of a youth-led model, steps can be taken to create more intentional programming 
around youth goals with a deeper focus on social change and awareness. 
The criticism of Kids4Peace and other coexistence organizations is rooted in the lack of 
attention to problematic structures and power asymmetry.  This dynamic can create a cycle of 
continuing power disparities and maintenance of the status quo.  Despite the merit of these 
arguments, it is apparent in this research that, when coming face-to-face with ‘the other’ in a deep 
and continuous way, issues of power asymmetry and collective blind spots become more difficult 
to ignore for some.  Kids4Peace provides spaces in which facades may begin to be questioned 
and crumbled.  Although the power dynamic and issues of privilege are often not explicitly 
discussed, and some participants interpret these issues differently, some participants do reflect, 
grow, and find themselves in the reflection of ‘the other.’   
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Introductory Questions: 
1. Can you tell me a little bit about yourself?
• What grade are you in? Which neighborhood do you live in?
2. What is your nationality on paper and how do you represent yourself?
3. What got you involved and has kept you involved in Kids4Peace?
• How long have you been in Kids4Peace?
• How do your friends and family react to you being in Kids4peace?
4. What do you see as the purpose of Kids4Peace?
5. What does “Peace” mean to you? What does that look like in your mind? What is
necessary for true peace?
Programming Questions: 
6. What are you looking to get out of Kids4Peace?
7. What could Kids4peace do to help you get this?
8. Do you have any feedback about last week’s seminar in Jaffa?
• What did you think of the tour?
• What did you think of the dialogue?
• How did you feel during and after the dialogue?
Personal Transformation: 
9. How do you navigate your life differently with the skills and knowledge you have
gained from Kids4Peace?
10. What did you understand about the ‘other’ growing up? What were your initial
feelings towards ‘the other’? Where did this initial feeling come from?
11. In what way, if any, do you feel Kids4Peace has impacted your feelings about
[Palestinians/Israelis]?
12. In what way has Kids4Peace impacted your level of trust with “the other”? What
kind of relationships, if any, have evolved from this program? How do these
relationships translate into your interactions with members of ‘the other’ in general?
• Can you give a specific example? Can you tell me about one or more
relationships you have formed due to Kids4Peace?
Negative Externalities: 
13. Do you find challenges to your participation in Kids4Peace in your community (with
family, friends, neighbors, acquaintances, etc)?
14. How do you integrate the knowledge and skills you have learned at Kids4peace into
your daily life, if at all?
Positive Supports: 
15. What factors have helped support you in your journey with Kids4Peace and in any
positive personal transformation you may have experienced?
• Do you have any role models or peers who have supported you?
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Hope and perceptions: 
16. In what ways do you feel you can have an impact on your social and political 
circumstances? 
• In what way is this feeling different from before you started kids4peace, if at 
all? 
• Do you feel that Kids4Peace helps you to this end? 
 
Actions, Social Change, & Ripple Effect: 
17. What kind of impact do you feel you have on your environment now?  
• Do you have an example of when you took an action and saw an impact on the 
people or places around you? 
18. In what way do you see yourself influencing your environment and social/political 
situation in the future? 
 
Knowledge and Perceptions: 
19. To what extent do you feel Kids4Peace has provided you with knowledge that has 
improved your understanding of the sociopolitical situation?  
20. How does this knowledge impact your life? 
 
Agency: 
21. Do you feel that you have the power to influence others around you? How or how 
not? 
 
Other Programmatic Questions:  
22. To what degree do you feel that Kids4peace creates an egalitarian atmosphere? Do 
you feel that all youth have the opportunity to express themselves and their identity 
equally?  
• Do you feel that the programming is equally geared towards all religions and 
nationalities?  
23. What part of the program have you found most impactful? 
24. Is there anything you would like to see done differently in the future? 
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